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Abstract
European Union membership affects budgetary practices in Britain and France much 
more than the conventional literature acknowledges. Budgetary Europeanisation, 
defined as the process of adaptation of budgetary processes to EU pressures, involves 
not merely the compliance of budgetary aggregates to EU guidelines but mainly 
changes in bureaucratic practices, methods and strategies. Budgetary institutions have 
become hybrid because of the growing entanglement of national and EU budgetary 
procedures; therefore the conventional national approach to budgeting is outdated. The 
impact on budgeting is greater on spending than on taxing because unanimous voting 
safeguards national governments’ sovereignty on taxation.
The thesis isolates various pressures which contribute to budgetary Europeanisation 
(competition, substitution, regulation, lobbying and demand by Member States). It 
explains strategic differences between Britain and France. The Euro-PES mechanism 
and the Fontainebleau agreement in the UK explain the non-maximisation strategy of 
British administration, which contrasts to the French, based on the ‘principe de 
Constance'’ and sectoral rates-of-retum.
The thesis compares the processes of adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms to the 
consequences of EU membership in different policy domains (Agriculture, Transport 
and Health). It concludes that the degree of adaptation of EU pressures is higher when 
national bureaucrats often interact with international actors because they are better 
able to influence decisions at EU level (a major difference between Transport and 
Health). It confirms the link between budgetary Europeanisation and the amount of 
EU finance in departments’ budgets, but it shows that this link is a secondary 
explanation of differences in degrees of Europeanisation.
Finally, the thesis shows how EU programmes promoted shifts in national decision­
making, with greater effect on the processes of decision-making than on the substance 
of policy. This analysis suggests that national administrations retain a large margin of 
manoeuvre both in policy-making and in finance, and through their participation in the 
EU budgetary process.
2
Contents
List of tables.................................................................................................................. 7
Abbreviations................................................................................................................ 8
Acknowledgements.................................................................  10
Introduction..................................................................................................................11
1. Introducing European variables in the study of public budgeting in the 
United Kingdom and France............................................................................... 15
1.1. The understatement of EU variables in the study of national budgeting 15
1.2. Hypothesis and methods................................................................................. 22
1.2.1. Hypothesis
1.2.2. The concept o f Europeanisation
1.2.3. Data and methods
1.3. Theoretical tools.............................................................................................. 32
1.4. Conclusion...................................................................................................... 47
2. The scope for independent fiscal policy in the European Union: taxation
in the United Kingdom and France.................................................................... 51
2.1. The forces promoting fiscal convergence ......................................................53
2.1.1. Fiscal competition: the victory o f economic over budgetary 
constraints?
2.1.2. Tax harmonisation in the EU
2.2. Fiscal sovereignty secured?........................................ 71
2.2.1. Existing institutions: the legal protection o f national sovereignty
2.2.2. The margin o f manoeuvre o f national governments within 
taxation
2.2.3. The margin o f manoeuvre o f national governments within policy­
making
2.3. Conclusion...................................................................................................... 78
3. The influence of EU membership on national budgetary institutions: 
compliance or hybridisation?.............................................................................. 82
3.1. Compliance, the basis of institutional change in the E U ................................84
3.1.1. EU rules and the adaptation o f budgetary institutions
3.1.2. EU procedures to sanction national budgeting
3.1.3. Other EU rules
3.2. Institutional hybridisation: are budgetary processes still ‘national’?..............99
3.2.1. Hybridisation
3.2.2. A two-track budgetary process
3.3. Conclusion.....................................................................................................118
3
4. National budgetary institutions administering the financial relations
with the EU: impact on national strategies...................................................... 123
4.1. In the United Kingdom, an efficient locking mechanism............................. 124
4.1.1. The Euro-PES mechanism
4.1.2. The Fontainebleau agreement
4.1.3. The effect o f budgetary institutions on the strategy o f the British 
administration
4.1.4. Additionality
4.2. In France, a less constraining framework...................................................... 138
4.2.1. The 'principe de Constance’
4.2.2. The rate-of-return approach
4.2.3. The net contribution approach
4.3. Conclusion.................................................................................................... 147
5. The end of national budgeting? The case of Agriculture.............................. 151
5.1. The EU budget and agriculture..................................................................... 154
5.1.1. The evolution o f CAP
5.1.2. EU spending programmes on agriculture
5.2. The effect of EU expenditure on the budget for Agriculture in Britain
and France..................................................................................................... 159
5.2.1. EU expenditure and the MAFF budget
5.2.2. EU expenditure and the budget o f the French Ministry o f  
Agriculture
5.2.3. The future o f CAP and national budgets
5.3. The effect of EU budgeting on players’ strategies and decision-making 165
5.3.1. Level 1 negotiations
5.3.2. Level 2 negotiations
5.4. The margin of manoeuvre of national administrations on agricultural 
programmes................................................................................................... 175
5.4.1. The Common Agricultural Policy
5.4.2. Structural programmes
5.5. Conclusion.....................................................................................................182
6. Europeanisation under national control? The case of budgetary 
decision-making in the Department of Transport.......................................... 186
6.1. Historical background................................................................................... 190
6.2. Shifts in players’ strategies........................................................................... 194
6.2.1. States ’ subjective interests at the genesis o f the European 
transport initiative
6.2.2. HM Treasury and the Direction du Budget: the guardians o f their 
governments ’ interests or Machiavelian actors ?
6.2.3. The Department o f Transport: the defence o f sectoral interests at 
all costs ?
6.2.4. Corporate interest groups and professional experts: the secret 
makers o f public policy ?
4
6.3. EU constraints on national transport policy and the nationalisation of 
European transport policy............................................................................. 212
6.4. The effect of the European Union on policy-making and inter-groups’ 
relationships.................................................................................................. 219
6.5. Conclusion.................................................................................................... 225
7. Health: the embryonic Europeanisation of budgetary processes?............... 229
7.1. Historical background................................................................................... 231
7.2. The effect of EU membership on national health programmes....................237
7.3. Changes in budgetary decision-making processes........................................243
7.4. The effect of EU membership on power-dependence relationships 
between groups............................................................................................. 253
7.4.1. EU decision-makers and experts: a symbiosis o f interests?
7.4.2. New power-dependence relationships between national 
administrations and experts
7.4.3. Health department ‘re-positioned ’ within central government?
7.5. Conclusion.................................................................................................... 262
8. Conclusion: Europeanisation limited ? ............................................................ 266
8.1. The Europeanisation of national budgeting: the quantitative approach....... 268
8.1.1. A wide-ranging adaptation process
8.1.2. Country differences in the degree o f adaptation to EU pressures
8.2. The Europeanisation of national budgeting: characteristics and limits...... 274
8.2.1. Spending and taxing
8.2.2. Policy and policy-making
8.2.3. Practices and rules
8.3. The Europeanisation of national budgeting: the qualitative approach......... 281
8.3.1. Hybridisation: the greater complexity o f decision-making 
processes at level 1
8.3.2. The nature o f the representation o f national budgetary priorities 
at level 2
8.4. The sources of pressure on national budgeting.............................................285
8.4.1. Competition
8.4.2. Substitution
8.4.3. Regulation
8.4.4. Lobbying
8.4.5. Demand by Member States
8.5. The future of budgetary Europeanisation within EMU.................................295
8.5.1. The instruments o f economic regulation
8.5.2. The impact o f national budgetary policies
8.6. Conclusion.................................................................................................... 303
5
Appendices............................................................................................................... 307
1.1. Methodological annexe.................................................................................308
A. The problems o f data analysis
B. Assessment o f the literature
C. Elite interviewing: definition o f the sample and problems 
encountered
1.2. List of interviews.......................................................................................... 317
2.1. A comparison of British and French tax structures - The evidence from
data................................................................................................................ 322
2.2. VAT rates applicable in EC members as at 1st April 1987..........................330
2.3. VAT rates applicable in EC members as at 1st October 1992......................331
2.4. Excise duty rates applicable in EC Member States as of 2nd January
1991............................................................................................................... 332
2.5. Minimum excise duty rates in the 1992 Council Directives.........................333
3.1. Relative share of individual Member States in the financing of the EU 
budget (1994)................................................................................................ 334
3.2. Relative share of individual Member States in the financing of the EU 
budget (1997)................................................................................................ 335
3.3. The growth of the EU budget (1994-1996)...................................................336
3.4. The Edinburgh Financial Perspectives (1993-1999).....................................337
4.1. Evolution of Structural Funds payments in France (1989-1992)..................338
5.1. The Common Agricultural Policy.................................................................339
5.2. The Structural Funds: allocation per country and purpose (1994-1999)......340
6.1. European Union funding for transports projects........................................... 341
6.2. Priority transport projects: final list submitted by the Christophersen
Group to the Essen European Council for approval (December 1994).........343
Bibliography............................................................................................................ 346
6
List of tables
3.1. The French contribution to the EU budget (1989-1997).................................101
3.2. Institutional change because of hybridisation.................................................108
4.1. An assessment of equity in the financing of the EU budget (1992)................130
4.2. Reduction in the British contribution to the EC budget (1980-1983).............131
4.3. French budgetary balance with the EU budget (1988-1994)...........................145
4.4. Net contributors and net recipients to the EU budget (1994)......................... 146
5.1. Spending in Britain under Objectives 5a and 5b and the British rate-of-
retum on these Objectives (1994-1999).......................................................... 160
5.2. Government expenditure in the agricultural sector in France (1993)..............161
5.3. Expenditure under the Guarantee and the Guidance sections in France and
the French rate-of-retum (1989-1995)............................................................. 168
5.4. Spending in France under the Objectives 5a and 5b and the French rate-
of-retum on these Objectives (1989-1999)...................................................... 169
6.1. The budget for Internal Policies and TENs (1994-1999)................................192
6.2. Department of Transport’s baseline reduction under Euro-PES (1992-
1996)................................................................................................................ 202
6.3. Leadership and ‘rolling domination’ ...............................................................222
7.1. EU health budget (1995-1999)........................................................................236
8.1. Conditions for a role of national representatives at level 2 ........................... 283
8.2. The pressures on national budgeting...............................................................285
8.3. Conditions favourable to the role of experts in EU decision-making............ 291
7
Abbreviations
AEIF Association Europeenne pour 1’Interoperability Ferroviaire
Bercy Direction du Budget before 1994
BR British Rail
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CEC Commission of the European Communities
CFS Centrally Financed Services
CESP Common External and Security Policy
CNAM Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie
CNRS Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique
CO Cabinet Office
CTP Common Transport Policy
CTRL Channel Tunnel Rail Link
DB Direction du Budget
DGS Direction Generate de la Sante
DOH Department of Health
DOM Departement d’Outre-Mer
DTp Department of Transport
EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
EC European Community
ECIS European Centre for Infrastructure Studies
ECJ European Court of Justice
Eco-Fin European Council of Ministers of Economy and Finance
ECU European Currency Unit
EIB European Investment Bank
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
ERDF European Regional Development Fund
ESC Economic and Social Council
EU European Union
Euro-PES European Public Expenditure Survey
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FIF Federation des Industries Ferroviaires
FNPEIS Fonds National de Prevention, d’Education et dTnformation sur la 
Sante
GDP Gross Domestic Product
INSERM Institut National de la Sante et de la Recherche Medicate
IRF International Road Association
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Matignon The French Prime Minister’s Office
MT Ministere des Transports
NHS National Health Service
NPM New Public Management
OFCE Office Fran9ais du Commerce Exterieur
P & T Poste et Telecommunications
8
PBKAL Paris-Brussels-Kohln-Amsterdam-Luxembourg
PES Public Expenditure Survey
PFI Private Finance Initiative
PFO Principal Finance Officer
PPB Planning, Programming and Budgeting
PSBR Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
RCB Rationalisation des Choix Budgetaires
Rivoli Direction du Budget since 1994
SEA Single European Act
SGCI Secretariat General pour la Coordination Interministerielle
SNCB Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Beiges
SNCF Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Fran?ais
TENs Trans-European Networks
TGV Train a Grande Vitesse
UIC Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer
UNIFE Union des Industries Ferroviaires Europeennes
VAT Value Added Tax
WHO World Health Organisation
9
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to my supervisors, Dr. Howard Machin who made this thesis and 
my stay at the European Institute at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science possible, and Professor George Jones for his meticulous guidance, great 
availability and continuous support.
For their helpful comments in the preparation of this work, I would like to thank Dr. 
Moshe Maor, Professor Christopher Hood, Dr. Oliver Flanagan, Anna Maresso, 
Estelle Hartwig and Sarah Saffaz.
I am especially grateful to the various politicians and administrators in London and 
Paris who took time off from their duties and allowed me to interview them.
Most importantly in a thesis on budgeting, I would like to acknowledge the financial 
support received from the Commission of the European Communities which granted 
me a fellowship under the Human Capital and Mobility programme from 1994 to 
1996.
I would like to thank my parents, Dr. and Mrs. Jacques Hartwig for always providing 
me with the best family and academic environments. They have helped me to spare 
more time on my studies, and I am extremely grateful to them.
Finally, the person who deserves the greatest thanks is my husband, Cyril, who has 
encouraged me to pursue an academic career and has continuously supported my 
project with great enthusiasm and love.
I dedicate my thesis to my daughters, Astrid and Maylis.
10
Introduction
The genesis of the thesis contains a paradox. A large, number of scholars and 
politicians have argued that national budgetary policies, in particular fiscal policies, 
should be strongly coordinated throughout the EUbecause of the strong links between 
monetary and budgetary policies, and because the EU budget is too small to act as an 
automatic stabiliser in the case of asymmetric shocks. Therefore, one could expect the 
existing literature to describe how the growing coordination of national budgetary 
decision processes between EU national governments has changed existing budgetary 
institutions. However, the literature does not emphasise EU-related changes in 
national decision-making processes, and budgeting1 has not been described as a part of 
the European integration process in academic research to date or in government 
discourse for three reasons. First, economic arguments support the view that national 
autonomy in the use of budgetary policy is especially needed given the postulated loss 
of other classical instruments of macroeconomic policy regulation (monetary and 
exchange rate policies) in the third stage of EMU. Second, political arguments 
underline that governments are sovereign in their decisions to tax and set expenditure 
plans because Member States are not willing to ‘pool’ such decision-making power at 
the EU level. Third, at the institutional level, the European Union has no overall 
responsibility for the management of national budgets and, in the limited cases where
1 The term ‘budget’ is not used as in Britain (i.e. referring to taxation exclusively), but in the 
American and the French ways where ‘budget’ refers to both tax and expenditure plans. Except in 
specific cases where a comparative approach required that taxes and expenditure should be analysed at 
general government level, the ‘budget’ refers to the central government budget document. 
‘Budgeting’ is defined as the process of making budgetary decisions.
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Member States have entrusted the EU with some regulatory power (e.g. VAT, excise 
duties), national sovereignty remains protected by unanimous voting. The silence of 
theoretical and empirical research tends to support the official discourse according to 
which national budgeting is not affected by membership of the European Union.
The thesis questions the validity of the proposition that EU membership has no or little 
consequence for recent changes in national budgeting. The objective is to challenge 
the prevailing view that national budgeting is a process only internal to national 
governments, which may be fully explained by national variables such as interministerial 
bargaining or national budgetary mechanisms. In most conventional work on 
budgeting, budgetary decision-making is described as a bargaining process between 
national actors (spending ministries, Finance Ministry, Parliament) according to 
national procedures (legal rules and conventions) at the national level. This 
conventional work maintains that national governments exercise control over the 
budgetary process and are sovereign in their decisions to tax and set expenditure plans. 
This ‘national’ view on national budgeting is contrasted with the proposition that 
national budgeting cannot be fully understood if European factors are excluded. The 
latter suggests that integration in the European Union has promoted changes in 
national budgetary institutions, decision-making and outcomes which cannot be 
adequately explained if European variables are excluded. It assesses the extent to 
which national budgeting has been affected by the introduction of EU institutions and 
the process of European integration.
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The thesis uses empirical support to identify changes in national budgeting and to 
evaluate whether these changes have occurred because of EU membership. Empirical 
generalisation is then used to demonstrate that European factors must be introduced 
into the study of national budgeting. The empirical method raises two types of 
difficulty. First, the variables of budgetary change are numerous and non-exclusive 
because budgeting may be studied from a variety of perspectives, including accounting, 
public administration, economics and political science. The thesis selects several 
approaches to budgeting as complementary cases for the study of shifts in budgeting, 
whose conclusions are then contrasted. The second problem consists in isolating 
changes related to integration in the European Union from those occurring throughout 
the world and unrelated to EU membership, such as New Public Management.
Chapter 1 emphasises that the existing literature underestimates the importance of 
European variables in explaining the functioning of and changes in national budgeting. 
It explains the hypothesis, issues and methods used in the thesis and discusses the main 
theoretical tools used in the forthcoming chapters.
Chapter 2 focuses on EU-related changes in taxation to determine the scope for 
independent fiscal policy possessed by EU Member States. Chapter 2 compares two 
competing propositions and argues that, while economic competition and regulation set 
constraints on Member States’ taxes, national sovereignty remains protected by EU 
institutions (e.g. voting procedures).
The objective of chapter 3 is to identify how EU membership influences national 
budgetary institutions. It discusses two competing propositions explaining how and
13
why budgetary institutions change because of the European Union, and emphasises an 
“hybridisation” process.
Chapter 4 discusses the impact on the strategies of national civil servants of national 
budgetary institutions that administer the financial relations between national and 
European institutions.
The three subsequent chapters focus on groups of actors, their strategies and their 
participation in European decision-making processes. Each chapter concentrates on 
decision-making for the allocation of EU credits in one spending ministry. The three 
departments (Agriculture in chapter 5, Transport in chapter 6 and Health in chapter 7) 
were selected because the sectors in which they operate stand at different degrees in 
the European integration process. The thesis emphasises similar patterns of adaptation 
to the consequences of EU membership in different policy domains. Agriculture is 
conventionally considered the sector most exposed to European Union influences, 
Health the least, while Transport lies in-between the two.
The concluding chapter pulls together the various conclusions of the different 
approaches. It measures the extent to which, and how, European Union membership 
has modified national budgetary sovereignty, and looks forward to the impact of EMU.
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Chapter 1
Introducing European variables in the study 
of public budgeting in the United Kingdom and France
1.1. The understatement of EU variables in the study of national budgeting
The impact of EU membership on national budgeting has been largely understated in 
the existing political science literature. Most of the conventional work on national 
budgetary processes does not introduce European Union variables in the description of 
national budgeting. Many authors do not mention any impact of EU membership on 
national budgeting, which is approached as an “internal process”1 fairly isolated from 
the EU. Heclo and Wildavsky consider budgeting as the essence of British central 
government and relationships within Whitehall, not involving relationships between 
central government and the European Union. Their study of budgeting aimed at 
disclosing internal factors in policy-making, as reflected in the presentation of the 
targets of the book:
“Our first aim is to describe the expenditure process as it actually operates in 
British central government... Our second aim it to use the expenditure process 
as a spotlight for illuminating the characteristic practices of British central 
government... It tells us how politicians and civil servants co-operate, bargain 
and fight - both among themselves and between each other. It tells much about 
cabinet government, professional administration, parliamentary democracy and 
a host of other traditionally, and usually formally, understood doctrines. In 
short, the expenditure process is an immense window into the reality of British 
political administration.”2
1 Lord, Guy (1973) French budgetary process (Berkeley: University of California Press) : x.
2 Heclo, Hugh and Wildavsky, Aaron (1981) The private government o f public money: community and 
policy inside British politics (London: Macmillan): lxi-lxii.
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Although the budgetary literature adopts different theoretical approaches and uses 
various variables (e.g. bureaucrats, institutions, aids to calculation), the national focus 
on budgeting has rarely been challenged and non-national variables have been largely 
excluded. For instance, authors focusing on the impact of budgetary procedures (e.g. 
supply procedure3, formal stages for drawing up the budget document4, planning5) do 
not describe how national institutions are affected by EU membership and how EU 
institutions create new constraints at the national level. Authors focusing on the role of 
certain actors in the budgetary process, such as the Directeur du Budget or the 
Principal Finance Officer, do not consider the possibility that these actors may be 
influenced by their interactions with their EU counterparts. Similarly, the potential 
influence of the EU or the OECD in the use or introduction of aids to calculation such 
as cash planning in the UK6, Rationalisation des Choix Budgetaires in France7, zero- 
base budgeting or Planning, Programming and Budgeting8, is neglected by these 
authors. In most conventional work on budgeting decision-making is described as 
bargaining between national actors (spending ministries, Finance Ministry, Parliament) 
according to national procedures (legal rules and conventions) at the national level. 
The EU is not considered an actor in the budgetary processes9 nor an arena for 
decision-making.
3 Premchand, A. and Burkhead, Jesse (eds) (1984), Comparative International Budgeting and Finance 
(London: Transaction books): 119-120.
4 Rivoli, Jean (1969), Le budget de I'Etat (Paris: Le Seuil): 20-59.
5 Hall, Peter (1986), Governing the economy - The politics o f state intervention in Britain and France 
(Cambridge: Polity press): 171-215.
6 Pliatzky, Leo (1989), The Treasury under Mrs. Thatcher (Oxford: Blackwell).
7 Institut Frangais des Sciences Administratives (1988), Le budget de I'Etat (Paris: Economica) : 13, 
25-26.
8 Rubin, Irene (1993) The politics o f public budgeting - Getting and spending, borrowing and 
balancing (Chatham: Chatham House).
9 The actors involved in British budgeting are central and local governments and nationalised 
industries according to Peter Mountfield, “Recent developments in the control of public expenditure in 
the United Kingdom” in Premchand, A. and Burkhead, Jesse (eds) (1984), Comparative International 
Budgeting and Finance (London: Transaction books): 109-111.
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Most conventional works on integration in the European Union also disregard 
budgetary matters.10 Budgeting is not traditionally described as a case for illustrating 
integration in the EU because there is no overall responsibility of the EU for national 
budgeting and because there is no recognition by central governments that budgeting 
should adapt to EU pressures. First, conventional textbooks on integration in the 
European Union do not emphasise the links between the EU budget and national 
budgets, or restrict it to the revenue side of the EU budget in their discussions about 
national contributions. They overlook the relationships between EU expenditure and 
national budgets in matching or complementary spending programmes. The 
understatement of the role of EU expenditure is apparent in the assertion by Sbragia 
that “with regards to budgets and money the governance of the Community differs 
from that of parliamentary systems in that spending is less important than regulating.”11 
Second, the received account in European literature restricts the EU influence to 
limited issues such as VAT where the EU has gained formal regulatory powers. Third, 
there is no discussion of the relationships between EU and national levels in the making 
of national and EU budgetary decisions, namely the participation of national actors 
from finance and spending ministries in the determination of EU spending priorities.
A few works in budgetary and European-studies literatures establish a link between 
national budgeting and EU membership but their focus remains narrow. Until 1992 
authors mainly emphasised the budgetary cost of financing the European budget12 and
10 Guerrieri, Paolo and Padoan, Pier Carlo (1989) The political economy o f European integration 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
11 Sbragia, Aberta (ed.) (1991), Euro-politics - Institutions and policymaking in the "New” European 
Community (Washington: The Brookings Institution): 7.
12 Price, “Budgetary policy” in Blackaby, F (1978) British economic policy, chapter 4 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press): 536.
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discussed the return on the national contribution. Decisions in the Treaty of Maastricht 
reoriented the focus to three main issues: the restrictions to central governments’ use 
of budgetary management (e.g. prohibition of debt financing and bail-out) and the 
sanctions from the European Union to promote budgetary discipline;13 the need for 
greater co-ordination between national budgetary policies for EU macroeconomic 
policy; and the scope for independent fiscal policy in the EU.14
While starting to integrate EU variables into the study of national budgeting and 
discussing the budgetary implications of European integration, these works offer a 
restrictive view of the breadth and width of changes related to EU membership. EU 
influence is associated with the need for budgetary discipline within EMU, and the 
impact of new EU responsibility to issue budgetary rules applicable in the member 
countries and to impose formal sanctions for the non-attainment of targets. This 
approach is negative, since it emphasises prohibited practices and restricted margins of 
manoeuvre for central governments. There is no explanation of how EU decisions are 
made and of the involvement of national governments in the formation of EU laws and 
in the drawing up of the Maastricht criteria. EU is seen as a regulatory body external 
to Member States. Furthermore, these accounts have no empirical basis since they do 
not describe changes in budgetary institutions or practices in the application of the 
Maastricht obligations.
13 Fair, Donald and Boissieu, Christian de (eds) (1992), Fiscal policy, taxation and the financial 
system in an increasingly integrated Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic): 19-27, 361-382 and 411- 
425.
14 This issue is particularly emphasised in the French literature, notably CEPH-OFCE (1990), "Vers 
une fiscalite europeenne?", Observations et Diagnostics Economiques, Revue de VOFCE, 31 (Apr.), 
121-189; Cahiers Frangais (1993), “Le budget de I’Etat”, Cahiers Frangais, 261 (May-June) (Paris: 
La Documentation Frangaise); Berlin, Dominique (1989), "L'elimination des frontieres fiscales dans la 
CEE", Droit et Pratique du Commerce International, 15: 35-74.
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Hagen15 uses the new institutionalist framework to link the discipline requirements
from EMU with supply procedures in the Member States. He argues national
budgetary processes are the key to achieving the discipline required by EMU, and he
assesses national budgetary procedures in EU countries. Hagen introduces European
criteria for assessing national budgeting, and his detailed framework of budgetary
institutions may be used as a basis for empirical testing. He demonstrates that
"a budgeting process lending the prime or finance minister a position of 
strategic dominance over the spending ministers, limiting the amendment power 
of parliament, and limiting changes in the budget during the execution process 
is strongly conducive to fiscal discipline”.16
He argues “institutional reform of the budgeting process may be a promising alternative 
for the EC to foster fiscal stability”.17 He recommends specific institutional reforms 
such as the creation of a National Debt Board and the adoption of a Debt Change Limit 
at the beginning of the budgetary process. However, Hagen’s focus is normative since 
he specifies what the ‘best practices’ for budgetary procedures should be. His 
approach is static since he does not describe changes in national budgetary institutions 
because of EU membership. Also, he assimilates budgetary convergence to a greater 
need for better institutions and overlooks changes in decision-making and strategies.
15 Hagen, Jurgen von “The role of institutional and procedural framework on fiscal discipline”, in 
Wildavsky, Aaron and Zapico-Goni (eds) (1993), National budgeting for Economic and Monetary 
Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff) and Hagen, Jurgen von and Harden, Ian (1994), National budget 
process and fiscal performance, working paper.
16 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.): 4.
17 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.) : 5.
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Zapico-Goni18 offers a most complete account of the influence of EU membership on
national budgeting. In contrast to earlier works, he does not restrict the influence of
the EU to its regulatory activity. He argues
“the role of the centre has to be understood beyond the imposition of fiscal 
norms and budget scenarios. Strategic guidance and interorganizational 
development are also very important components of budgetary co-ordination 
for fiscal discipline ... The objective of this work is to analyze, discuss and 
suggest positive initiatives for central budget units at the EC and national levels 
to encourage convergent spending behaviour.”19
According to the author, the influence of the EU on budgeting is not restricted to 
‘negatively oriented’ fiscal norms and procedures which establish limits that Member 
States cannot surpass. To the legislative and ‘police-like’ activity of the EU he adds its 
role of leadership and of articulating various institutions within budgetary decision­
making. He argues that fiscal norms may be attained only if the EU provides overall 
leadership and secures the support of its strategy by individual departments. He argues
“Neither the European Commission nor the Member States’ finance ministries 
can guarantee that norms and rules for convergence will be implemented by 
spending departments as formulated by the centre unless they are previously 
negotiated and accepted. Proper negotiations guarantee that relevant interests 
will be taken into account (incorporated or compensated) when defining 
convergent budgetary policy. This means that the finance ministries cannot 
negotiate any budgetary position in Brussels without prior integration of 
domestic interests.”20
18 Zapico-Goni, Eduardo, Chapter 6, “Adapting national spending behaviour for European 
convergence” in Wildavsky, Aaron and Zapico-Goni, Eduardo (eds) (1993), National budgeting for 
Economic and Monetary Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff): 119-144.
19 p.121-122
20 p. 136
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Zapico-Goni introduces three factors which had been neglected in the conventional 
literature and seem important in understanding the influence of EU membership on 
national budgeting. First, to the negative approach of the influence of the EU he adds 
a positive one , based on strategic guidance and leadership. Second, he introduces the 
idea of an impact of EU membership on decision-making and interministerial 
negotiations. EU membership constrains Member States’ budgeting not only by 
establishing limits for budgetary macroeconomic aggregates but also because it affects 
earlier stages of the budgetary process. Therefore, Zapico-Goni introduces European 
Union pressures during the drafting of budgets.
Third, by linking the success of negotiations at the EU level to policy determination at 
the national level, Zapico-Goni establishes a relationship between the two decision­
making levels which had been neglected before. However, the development which 
follows is normative, since the author recommends initiatives which should be taken. 
There is no empirical account of whether and how EU membership alters national 
budgetary institutions and decision-making because of the various interactions between 
EU and national budgeting. The lack of evidence to support this new approach to EU 
pressures on national budgeting reveals an empirical gap in the conventional work on 
budgeting.
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1.2. Hypothesis and methods
1.2.1. Hypothesis
The starting point of the thesis lies in this gap in the literature that needs to be 
investigated. The impact of EU membership on the determination of state income and 
expenditure has been inadequately discussed both in the literature on budgeting and on 
European integration. Little attention has been paid to this topic, and most writers 
stated the impact was small. Existing researches focus on technical issues (e.g. legal 
constraints on excise duties rates), which underlies the need for a broad approach to 
EU-related changes in national budgetary processes.
The main hypotheses tested throughout the thesis are the following. First, the thesis 
puts forward that the national approach is inappropriate to study budgeting because 
national budgeting is influenced by EU variables to a greater extent than is usually 
maintained. The thesis seeks to determine the impact of membership of the European 
Union on patterns of national budgeting. Are national budgetary processes affected by 
integration in the EU? Are there pressures on Member States to adapt their budgetary 
mechanisms emanating from the EU? The key argument of the thesis is that the impact 
of EU membership on national budgetary processes is greater than is widely assumed. 
This proposition is tested throughout the thesis, first in an overall way, e.g. with 
taxation and the Public Expenditure Survey in Britain, and then in three policy areas 
representing different degrees of exposure to EU influences.
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Second, we take the hypothesis that actors are more constrained by the EU and also 
better able to influence international actors, when they interact frequently with actors at 
the international level. This hypothesis implies that the adaptation of budgetary 
processes to EU pressures should be proportional to the frequency and intensity of 
interactions between national and European actors during policy-making processes. 
Therefore, the thesis focuses on the involvement of national actors in the European 
budgetary process and the participation of EU actors in national budgeting because of 
the entanglement of national and EU budgetary processes.
A third hypothesis is tested in chapters 5 to 7, focusing on intermediate level decisions, 
on departmental programmes and on power-dependence relationships between actors. 
The thesis studies three departments (Agriculture, Transport and Health) illustrating 
different degrees of exposure to EU pressures. The EU has influenced policy in their 
jurisdictions to varying extents and with varying time lags. The thesis tests the 
argument that the adaptation of budgetary processes to EU pressures is proportional to 
the amount of EU finance in the budget of the department. The greater the size of EU 
transfers, the more constrained national budget actors and the more budgetary 
decisions are influenced by the EU. This assumption implies that Agriculture should be 
the department in which the influence of the EU is the greatest and Health the 
department where EU influence is the most marginal, with Transport lying in-between 
the two.
To determine the impact of EU membership on national budgeting and test these 
hypotheses, the thesis is structured around four main issues. First, the thesis quantifies 
this impact (big or small?) and determines the degree to which processes are affected.
23
Here the comparative approach is useful to evaluate the size of changes in different 
policy settings and across the European Union. The thesis argues that the impact of 
European Union membership has been far wider than might have been presumed from 
an examination of the literature, but that there is still a considerable margin for national 
discretion.
Second, the thesis assesses the “quality” of this impact: did it improve national 
budgetary procedures or did it create more problems than it solved? The thesis does 
not draw conclusions on the pros and cons of integration in the European Union for 
budgeting. Rather, it gives an appreciation of changes in the processes of budgeting in 
a qualitative perspective. For example, the thesis argues that the process of decision 
making on budgeting has become more complex and fragmented, but at the same time 
EU membership has obliged departments to define a more consistent policy than 
before.
Third, the thesis evaluates the impact of EU membership depending on aspects of 
budgeting under scrutiny. The pressures on budgeting are not uniform and there are 
many different ways to draw lines between aspects of budgeting. Using the dichotomy 
between spending and taxing, the thesis argues that national governments retain a large 
margin of manoeuvre for decisions on taxation. The impact of EU membership on 
taxation is far more restricted than is asserted in the literature, while the impact on 
public spending is largely underestimated. The thesis also draws contrasts between the 
impact of EU membership on policy and on policy-making. The sectoral chapters 
demonstrate that the impact is greater on policy-making than on the outcomes of
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policies. The influence of EU membership is greater on practices and strategies than 
on formal budgetary rules.
Fourth, the thesis identifies how EU integration impacts on budgeting. Here the thesis 
determines various pressures on budgeting (e.g. competition, regulation) to expose the 
main sources of influence. However, the illustration of how the impact operates should 
not be interpreted as a causal statement on the reasons for EU influences.
To describe the process of adaptation of national budgeting to EU integration, the 
thesis uses the concept of Europeanisation. It is necessary at the outset to be precise 
about the definition of Europeanisation which has been used throughout the thesis.
1.2.2. The concept o f Europeanisation
There is no consensus on usage of the concept of Europeanisation in the literature, 
reflecting that Europeanisation means different things to different authors. 
Europeanisation is a loose concept which was adopted by various schools of thought 
and adapted to their particular need for theoretical tools. First, with traditional 
“government” models of policy-making Europeanisation (or “Europeification” in some 
rare cases) refers to the tendency for an increasing number of decisions to be made at 
the EU level.21 Europeanisation is the process through which the EU progressively 
becomes a supranational body thanks to the “pooling of sovereignty”. It contributes to 
the “hollowing out” of EU nation states, “referring to a haemorrhaging of authority
21 Andersen, Svein and Eliassen, Kjell (eds) (1993), Making policy in Europe - The Europeification of 
national policy-making (London: Sage).
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from the nation state to other public and private sector actors at the supranational, 
national and subnational levels”.22 Here the international system is the site of the 
dependent variables which should be observed. However, this first meaning of 
Europeanisation suffers from “conceptual overloading” since it includes the process of 
transfer of sovereignty from the national to the EU level as well as the building of a 
supranational policy-making institution. Therefore, most authors prefer more specific 
terms to describe different facets of Europeanisation (integration, pooling of 
sovereignty, spill-over).
Second, “governance” models have used Europeanisation to describe the increasing 
entanglement between national and EU policy making, and multilevel bargaining in 
general. Europeanisation describes the interlocking of national and EU decision 
making procedures on a number of policy issues. This second meaning of 
Europeanisation is useful, but Europeanisation is not the best term to use. Other 
terms, which are not specifically EU-oriented but which may be applied to describe 
European Union processes, are commonly preferred by many authors because they are 
more explicit (e.g. interdependence, linkage, entanglement, etc.).
Third, Europeanisation describes the processes through which national-level 
organisations adapt to European Union level pressures. Here Europeanisation is a 
consequence of integration in the EU. Analysed variables belong to the national 
system only since the focus is on changes at the national level. This usage of 
Europeanisation rests on the assumption that EU integration promotes specific changes
22 Page, Edward (1997), “The impact of European legislation on British public policy making: a 
research note”, working paper (Oct.).
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which may be distinguished from broader integration processes such as 
internationalisation and globalisation. Also, this third meaning of Europeanisation, by 
playing down the influence of national-level organisations in the formation of EU 
pressures, may convey an “authoritarian” view of the causes of change in national 
systems. However, the third meaning of Europeanisation remains extremely useful to 
account for changes in a national system caused by membership of the EU. It 
emphasises the dynamics of change rather than static descriptions and may be applied 
to various types of changes (in policies, processes and behaviour).
In the thesis Europeanisation is used to describe the process of adaptation of 
bureaucratic mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership. The 
Europeanisation of national budgeting designates all types of changes in budgetary 
procedures at the national level in response to EU membership. Europeanisation is 
restricted to this “third” usage, that is the changes in a national system in response to 
membership of the EU, because it is a useful concept to demonstrate the impact of EU 
membership on national budgeting. Also, the term Europeanisation is particularly 
appropriate here since other words may be used for the other usages (e.g. integration). 
“The Europeanisation of national budgeting in the United Kingdom and France: a study 
of governmental processes” must therefore be understood as a quest for the impact of 
European Union pressures on national budgetary processes and the adaptation of these 
national bureaucratic processes to EU pressures.
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This definition of Europeanisation, as the process of adaptation of bureaucratic 
mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership, is the same as used by Lequesne 
in his studies of the impact of Europeanisation on the French bureaucracy. For 
Lequesne,
“Europeanisation of national administrations can be defined as an incremental 
process reorienting the direction and the shape of the national administrative 
institutions and of the public policies to the degree that the EU dynamics 
become part of their organizational logic.”23
Since in the thesis Europeanisation describes the consequence of EU membership, 
Europeanisation differs from harmonisation, defined as “the setting of rules with the 
aim of reducing the scope of discretionary decisions and of achieving greater 
uniformity in economic structure.” 24 Here harmonisation designates the cause of 
change and the setting up of voluntary top-down measures. Europeanisation may 
therefore, result from harmonisation, as is showed in chapter 2. Europeanisation also 
differs from convergence25 and uniformisation because it does not imply that policies 
and policy processes become more similar over time (i.e. converge). EU constraints 
may stimulate divergent policy changes in each Member State. For example VAT 
harmonisation caused opposite changes in balancing between direct and indirect 
taxation depending on the existing tax structure in each Member State.
23 Lequesne, Christian (1995), “The Europeanisation of public administrations: some considerations 
about the French case”, paper presented at the LSE Symposium on Europeanisation: institutional 
change in Britain, France and Germany (London, 24 March).
24 Commission of the European Communities (1984), “Convergence and coordination of 
macroeconomic policies: some basic issues”, European Economy, 20: 73.
25 “Convergence is a longitudinal process through which formal as well as informal behaviour and 
values become increasingly similar because of a variety of domestic and international factors” 
according to Leonardi, Robert (1993), Convergence, cohesion and integration in the European Union 
(London: MacMillan): 185.
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These definitions determine the variables used in the thesis. Because Europeanisation 
revolves around the notion of adaptation to the EU, the thesis focuses on the nation­
state as the site of the dependent variables (national institutions, national decision 
making procedures, national actors). EU factors are treated as independent variables 
since they are the source of demands made upon national systems.26 The thesis shows 
some of the various factors at work in the EU that shape budgeting (e.g. competition, 
regulation, substitution). These factors, which are different in their nature, are studied 
only because they are the causes of change within national administrative systems.
The thesis develops a new concept, hybridisation, to account for the increasing 
entanglement between national and European policy-making. This new term is useful 
to distinguish between linear changes in national mechanisms caused by EU 
membership (Europeanisation) and the interlocking of national and EU decision making 
procedures (“hybridisation”). Hybridisation revises the conventional approach to 
budgeting because it implies that the national context is inappropriate and that EU 
variables should be introduced to explain budgetary decisions in a nation-state. 
Therefore, hybridisation represents an important contribution to validate the hypothesis 
that focusing on the national context is inappropriate for studying budgeting since 
national budgeting is influenced by EU variables to a greater extent than is usually 
maintained.
Because Europeanisation is defined as a process, the thesis measures the degree to 
which policy sectors and countries are engaged in this process. The analysis is at all
26Rosenau, James (1980), The study o f global interdependence - Essays on the transnationalisation o f 
world affairs (London: Frances Pinter): 168-179.
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times comparative between Britain and France. The thesis shows the extent to which 
different policy areas, agriculture, transport and health, are exposed to the process of 
adaptation to the EU.
Finally, the thesis focuses on bureaucratic mechanisms. It looks at the institutions and 
at the roles of the actors in the budgetary process. The thesis looks at changes in the 
public expenditure review, at the budgetary negotiations between the Finance Ministry 
and spending departments and at the role and strategy of the actors involved in national 
budgeting. However, the intention is not to describe the national budgetary process as 
a whole but only to delineate changes in these mechanisms which were caused by 
membership of the European Union.
1.2.3. Data and methods
The thesis uses empirical evidence to identify changes in national budgeting and to 
evaluate whether these changes have occurred because of EU membership. It adopts a 
comparative approach as a way of isolating similar pressures from EU membership on 
budgeting and contrasting the adaptation of different Member States to these 
pressures. The thesis focuses on the United Kingdom and France, which may be 
considered to be ‘matching cases’ for several reasons. First, the UK and France 
present a resemblance at the macroeconomic level (size of the country, level of 
development, standard of living). Because they are among the wealthiest EU members, 
the UK and France are both excluded from Cohesion Funds and have fewer regions 
eligible for Structural Fund support. It is more widely assumed that cohesion
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countries’ policies and budgetary choices are influenced by EU funding; therefore the 
thesis deliberately selected EU members where the EU influence is considered to be 
small. Second, national budgetary institutions and the breakdown of responsibility 
between sub-levels in the two countries are similar. It would have been difficult to 
draw parallels between a centralised and a federal state because of the great differences 
in decision-making processes and the split between local and central government 
expenditure. Third, because of their size, the UK and France have similar weights in 
the negotiations at the EU level. Fourth, comparison of British and French budgeting 
reveals several differences: the size of the public sector and the level of taxation are 
much higher in France than in the UK, which indicates different uses of the budget for 
allocation and redistribution. That the UK joined the EC 15 years after France may 
explain differences in the timing of changes between the two countries.
The time-scale for the comparison of budgeting in the United Kingdom varies 
depending on the particular subject matter discussed. Analysis of budgetary aggregate 
data and taxation allows for the observation of trends since the early 1970s. Only after 
Charles de Gaulle withdrew from the French presidency in 1969 did the United 
Kingdom receive indications that France would not set more obstacles to UK 
membership of the EEC. Similarly the influence of EU membership on budgeting in the 
ministry of Agriculture may be measured as early as the 1970s. However, in other 
chapters discussing institutions, and budgeting for transport and health, the impact of 
EU membership on budgeting is much more recent. In these cases the comparison is 
focused on the 1990s since Europeanisation trends were reinforced by decisions 
contained in the Treaty of Maastricht.
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Empirical evidence was gathered through an extensive analysis of budgetary aggregate 
data since the early 1970s and through interviews with 59 officials from British and 
French national administrations which took place between November 1994 and April 
1995. Interviews were conducted in four government departments (Finance Ministry, 
Agriculture, Transport and Health departments) in Britain and France 27 The thesis 
then uses empirical generalisation to assess whether the process of national budgeting 
did adapt to the consequences of EU membership, and to demonstrate that European 
factors must be introduced into the study of national budgeting because of 
Europeanisation.
1.3. Theoretical tools
The choice of an empirical method to study budgeting raises the question of which 
viewpoint to adopt. Budgeting has been studied from a variety of perspectives, 
including accounting28, public administration29, economics30 and political science. The 
political science approach to national budgeting itself is subdivided in a number of 
theories, including cultural theory31, new institutionalism32 and public choice theory33.
27 For more details on the allocation of interviews per sector, country and bureau, see the 
methodological annexe, Appendix 1.1.
28 For instance, Her Majesty’s Treasury (1994), Better accounting for the taxpayer’s money - 
Resource accounting and budgeting in government, Cm 2626 (London: HMSO, July).
29 For instance, Institut Fran?ais des Sciences Administratives (1988), Le budget de I'Etat (Paris: 
Economica).
30 For instance, Haan, J. de, Sterks, C. and Kam, C. de (1992), "Towards budget discipline: an 
economic assessment of the possibilities for reducing national deficits in the run-up to EMU", in 
Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 99 (Dec.).
31 Wildavsky, Aaron (1986), Budgeting', a comparative theory o f budgetary process, 2nd edition 
(Oxford: Transaction books).
32 Hall, Peter (1986), Governing the economy - The politics o f state intervention in Britain and France 
(Cambridge: Polity press).
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Each of these schools offers a different definition of budgeting and uses distinct 
variables of change. For instance, new institutionalists focus on budgetary institutions, 
and cultural theory focuses on kinship and shared values within central government. 
Not all these theoretical frameworks are used in this research. However, since the 
variables of change are numerous and non-exclusive, the thesis selects several 
approaches to budgeting as several complementary cases to test the hypothesis.
Strictly speaking, budgeting is defined as “the exercise through which the annual 
receipts and expenditure of the government are forecast and authorised by 
Parliament.”34 The budget document reflects national government’s decisions over 
expenditure and taxation. While the remainder of the thesis emphasises the margin of 
manoeuvre of national governments in spending decision-making, chapter 2 focuses on 
the influence of the EU on taxation policy in Britain and France. It compares the 
impact on budgeting of competition and regulation with that of EU institutional 
arrangements.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 adopt the new institutional approach to budgeting and use the 
definitions and the variables developed by Hagen. “We interpret the budget as a locus 
of conflict resolution and the budgetary process as a constitutional mechanism to 
structure and solve disputes and reach agreements.”35 New institutionalism posits that 
budgeting is best analysed at the institutional level because it assumes institutions
33 Dunleavy Patrick (1991), Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf).
34 Budgeting is defined as the “acte par lequel sont prevues et autorisees par le Parlement les recettes 
et les depenses annuelles de l’Etat” in Basle, Maurice (1985), Le budget de I'Etat (Paris: La 
Decouverte): 5.
35 Hagen, Jurgen von and Harden, Ian (1994), National budget process and fiscal performance, 
working paper, : i.
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perform several roles. Institutions frame constraints and powers, define the means 
through which states pursue their interests and reflect power distribution at a given 
point in time. Institutions shape actors' and states' expectations, perceptions of self- 
interest and preferences by establishing a network of responsibilities and relationships 
to other actors. New institutionalism seeks to determine how procedures and norms 
affect budgetary choices. Chapters 3 and 4 adopt the new institutional framework, 
focusing on changes in budgetary institutions as the major factor and indicator of 
budgetary change. They introduce European variables in the new institutional 
framework in that they test the proposition that EU membership has incited national 
budgetary institutions to change. Therefore, Europeanisation is revealed in the changes 
in national budgetary institutions because of EU membership.
We need to review which institutional variables should be integrated in the study. New 
institutionalism combines numerous variables, creating the effect that ''the study of 
institutions that emerges as the hallmark of modem political theory potentially forms 
the basis for a synthesis of several intellectual traditions within political science''.36 To 
the ‘old’ institutional focus on 'fundamental' institutions37, new institutionalism adds 
"formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure 
the relationships between individuals in various units of the polity and economy."38 
New institutionalism retains the emphasis of public choice theory on individual action 
and integrates the impacts of individual rational motivations on budgeting. However, 
the extent to which bureaucrats perceive their self-interest is determined by institutional
36 Alt, James and Shepsle, Kenneth (eds) (1990), Perspectives on positive political economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 24-25.
37 e.g. balance of power, international law, diplomacy, legislative structures and electoral rules.
38 Hall, Peter (1986), Governing the economy - The politics o f state intervention in Britain and France 
(Cambridge: Polity press): 19.
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settings. Institutions are viewed as important determinants of preferences over
different actions, but in turn they are endogenously determined by individual 
preferences, traditions and transaction costs.
While Wildavsky concentrates on the procedures used by bureaucrats to allocate 
resources to competing expenditure programmes, new institutionalism adopts a more 
comprehensive definition of budgetary institutions. Budgetary processes incorporate 
“the collection of institutions, rules, and procedures through which decisions about 
government spending and taxation are made.”39 According to Hagen, budgetary 
procedures are synchronised in three stages: bargaining inside government on drafting 
the budget, the parliamentary stage with the amendment and the vote of the Finance 
Bill, and implementation by the government.
Interministerial bargaining over the drafting of the budget is framed by: first, how 
division-of-labour arrangements assign roles to individual actors. A typical European 
arrangement is that governments draft budget proposals and present them to the 
legislature. The division of labour determines who the agenda-setter is; second, how 
specialisation-of-labour arrangements assign jurisdictions to individual groups of 
actors. These arrangements are crucial because they determine what kind of choices 
the agenda-setter can make (spending ministries have jurisdiction in their sector only) 
and the possibility of trade-offs. Labour specialisation depends on the existence of 
general constraints such as a golden rule;40 third, the quality of information the budget
39 Hagen, Jurgen von and Harden, Ian (1994), National budget process and fiscal performance, 
working paper: 3.
40 A golden rule is a binding budgetary clause. For instance, the Commission has recommended that 
government deficit should not exceed government investment expenditure.
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conveys about public finances and the government's intentions. Poor information 
allows the government to send mixed signals about its fiscal intentions. The degree of 
information also depends on the amount of off-budgeting;41 last, the existence of 
multi-year planning, the degree of commitment it conveys and the extent to which it is 
detailed (definition of targets, length of planning horizon, and nature of forecasts).
Institutional arrangements for the passing of the budget law through Parliament 
include: first, the voting procedure within Parliament (agenda-setting, timing, single 
vote for all expenditure, and an initial vote on budget size), which determine the degree 
of potential reciprocity and universalism;42 second, the amendment procedure 
specifying how MPs may alter budget proposals and what amendments are receivable 
(e.g. whether it is required that they are off-setting);43 third, party system and 
discipline, and more generally the relations between government and Parliament; four, 
the political implications of rejecting a budget proposal, which depend on the 
government's power and how easy it is to use a replacement procedure. If budget 
rejection is likely to lead to the demise of the government, then the government should 
propose a budget which is expected to find wide support in Parliament. This constraint 
tends to weaken the government's position in the budgetary process. But the political 
party supporting the government will refrain from proposing changes if the government
41 Off-budgeting consists in taking expenditure out of the budget document while it is centrally 
financed to enhance budgetaiy aggregates. Off-budgeting contradicts the principle of 
comprehensiveness.
42 “Universalism refers to the property of budget proposals to contain ‘something for everyone’, i.e. to 
distribute favors more generously than an individual decision maker would want. Reciprocity refers to 
the principle of not attacking another person’s appropriation proposal in return for her not attacking 
ones own. Both tend to increase expenditure.” in Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures 
and fiscal performance in the European Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, 
Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.): 28, referring to Alt and Chiystal (1981).
43 Off-setting amendments means that changes to tax and expenditure plans must have a neutral effect 
on budgetaiy aggregates (e.g. deficit, PSBR and size of the public sector). Proposals to increase public 
spending must be accompanied by equivalent expenditure cuts on other budget items.
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is in danger, which strengthens the position of the government. The combined effect is 
ambiguous.44
The execution of the budget by the government includes: first, the power of the 
Finance Minister to block expenditure and to impose spending limits on ministers who 
exceed their budget norms; second, the degree to which budget law binds the 
government's actions legally and politically during the fiscal year. Flexibility in the 
execution of the budget depends on the possibility of transferring expenditure between 
budget titles, of carrying unused funds forward, on the existence of a budget reserve 
and on the use of open-ended appropriations; and third, the degree of flexibility to 
respond to unforeseen events, which depends on the procedure to meet new demands 
for spending and reduced taxation and on the possibility of proposing supplementary 
budgets during the execution of the budget law.
New institutionalism offers a framework to assess the effectiveness of budgetary 
institutions in influencing individual or collective behaviour.45 Effectiveness is first 
measured by success in implementation, through asking whether the operation of the 
institution has alleviated the problem that led to its formation. Second, success in 
compliance depends on enforcement and transparency (the ease of detection of 
violations by subjects; and the probability that violators will be subject to sanctions; the 
magnitude of the sanctions imposed). Third, success in persistence is defined as the 
ability of institutions to adapt to changing circumstances without losing their capacity
44 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.).
45 Rosenau, James and Czempiel, Emst-Otto (eds) (1992), Governance without government: order and 
change in world politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
37
to handle the problems they were created to solve. Persistence depends on 
transformation rules (amending procedures and the requirements imposed for altering 
institutions) and on robustness (whether the institutions rely on ‘heavy’ procedures 
such as majority voting, or on ‘light’ procedures such as consensus).
The new institutional framework allocates a specific ordering role to EU institutions in 
an environment considered conflictual. The interpenetration of bureaucracies and 
interest groups operating in tandem in Brussels creates a system where their actions 
can be detected, rewarded and punished. EU institutions bring together leaders of 
Member States, parties and interest groups in a permanent dialogue, continuous 
contact and collaboration. Actors learn about the preferences of their counterparts. 
EU institutions do not harmonise all interests and even create conflicts, but Member 
States find an incentive for co-operation because EU membership raises the cost of 
defection or of non-participation and enhances the value of reputation. This incentive 
is intensified because permanent institutional structures lengthen the time-horizons of 
participants and multiplies interactions.
The focus in chapters 5 to 7 differs from that of the preceding chapters because the 
level of analysis of budgeting is lower. Preceding chapters focus on high-level 
decisions on expenditure and revenue, and on system-properties (i.e. how the 
environment influences the budget outcomes through actor’s strategies and processes), 
which Rubin46 describes as ‘macro-budgeting’. In contrast, chapters 5 to 7 are directed
46 Rubin, Irene (1993) The politics o f public budgeting - Getting and spending, borrowing and 
balancing (Chatham: Chatham House) - Rubin, Irene (ed.) (1988), New directions in budget theory 
(New York: State University of New York Press): 24-28.
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to ‘micro-budgeting’. They focus on intermediate-level decisions on departmental 
programmes and line-items and usually emphasise bottom-up decision-making 
processes. Policy-making is seen as bargaining process between groups of actors with 
various degrees of authority, who are linked by power-dependence relationships. To 
some extent this approach to budgeting may be close to Wildavsky’s description of 
budgeting47 as a network of communications where information is generated and 
reacted to. He argues, “if politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose 
preferences shall prevail in the determination of national policy, then the budget 
records the outcome of this struggle”.48
While conventional budgetary literature has traditionally focused on stable groups of 
participants at the national level, actor-based network theories explore the development 
of international and European networks in which officials and interest groups form 
linkages and alliances, which are no longer concentrated at the national level. Actor- 
based theories share with public choice theory a focus on individuals, and acknowledge 
that institutional arrangements shape actors' preferences and strategies. Their 
originality lies in their argument that nation-states and governments are not the best 
units for analysis of policy-making. They stand in contrast to 'within-systems theories' 
(according to Rosenau) which emphasise variables at one level only and neglect the 
levels or systems in which antecedents are located and into which the behaviour of 
actors is projected. These theories argue that the international variables of domestic 
policies can no longer be held constant.
47 Wildavsky, Aaron (1986), Budgeting: a comparative theory o f budgetary process, 2nd edition 
(Oxford: Transaction books): 7-9.
48 Wildavsky, Aaron (1992), The new politics o f the budgeting process, 2nd edition (New York: 
Harper Collins): preface.
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Rosenau offers a formulation of the relations between national and international 
systems in his linkage theory. To test interactions between actors and structural 
changes in the polity, he introduces international variables in comparative politics, and 
vice versa. Rosenau uses the concept of linkage to illustrate a "recurrent sequence of 
behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another."49 "Two or more 
autonomous actors are linked in the sense that the outcomes associated with the 
choices of each individual participant are determined, in part, by the choices of each of 
the others."50 Interactions between national and international systems may explain how 
and under which conditions budgetary choices at one level affect budgetary choices at 
another level. Rosenau argues that linkage occurs when authority structures span 
national boundaries, i.e. when the dynamics whereby the authority is created, continued 
and dissolved at the national level emanate from the international level. National actors 
and budgeters tend to determine their behaviour in compliance with EU 
recommendations which they consider more legitimate than national ones. Rosenau 
sees two reasons why legitimacy is delegated to international levels: actors tend to rely 
on appeals to common values because of the decline of the nation-state; second, actors 
increasingly rely on scientific knowledge because of the technical nature of issues. 
Authority structures (compliance because the directive is legitimate) differ from 
influence structures (compliance because the directive is preferable), from loyalty 
structures (loyalty is not expressed through compliance only), or from citizenship 
(rights and obligations emanate from law). Budgeting would therefore become linked
49 Rosenau, James (1980), The study o f global interdependence - Essays on the transnationalisation o f 
world affairs (London: Frances Pinter): 180.
50 Rosenau, James and Czempiel, Emst-Otto (eds) (1992), Governance without government: order and 
change in world politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 188.
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because interactions between non-unified actors expand the EU authority structure as 
legitimacy grows for European actors.
Putnam’s formulation of actor-based network theories51 goes further in integrating 
national and international policy-making. While Rosenau emphasises the international 
causes and consequences of national policy-making and vice versa, Putnam emphasises 
the totality of national and international political systems and accounts simultaneously 
for domestic and international factors and behaviours. His 'general equilibrium' model 
argues that the distinction between domestic and international decision-making levels is 
irrelevant because variables at the two levels are 'entangled'. Some sub-levels of 
government may express national or international opinions, but intermediate actors 
operating across boundaries reconcile opinions in such a way that a specific policy­
making process, based on multi-level interactions emerges, different from both national 
and international policy-making. Actor-based network theories describe a new policy 
context where policy-making depends on many variables and varied actors 
(governments, EU institutions, networks of transnational actors). On an increasing 
number of matters national politics is contingent on EU decision-making, which is itself 
made up of the aggregation of national choices in every Member State. Actor-based 
theories point out not only complexities and conflicts in multi-level decision-making, 
but also the constraints on government in reconciling these competing interests 
simultaneously. These theories interpret the Europeanisation of decision-making as a
51 Putnam, Robert (1988), "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games", 
International Organization, 42: 427-460.
41
consequence of the entanglement of national and EU institutions and actors; and they 
substitute actors' networking for the nation-state framework.52
Putnam suggests a methodology, the 'two-level game' metaphor, to study interactions
between domestic and international levels. This model conceptualises the entanglement
of domestic and international variables and the interactions between actors.
"At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments."53
Central government decision-makers appear at both domestic (level 1) and 
international (level 2) negotiations and try to reach a point where both parties are 
satisfied. The constraint underlined by this model is that any tentative level 2 
agreement must be ratified by each level 1 organisation.
Nation-state and national government are subject to theoretical reconstruction in actor- 
based network theories because they assume variables are entangled and the executive 
is never unified in its views. In contrast with the state-centric paradigm of international 
relations or with theories where actors are only supplementing the nation-state, actor- 
based theories argue political life is sustained through a variety of dissimilar and 
competitive authority structures. Rosenau, in his theory of transnational relations, had 
already underlined "processes whereby international relations conducted by
52 Andersen, Svein and Eliassen, Kjell (eds) (1993), Making policy in Europe - The Europeification o f 
national policy-making (London: Sage).
53 Putnam, Robert (1988), "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games", 
International Organization, 42:434.
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governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups, 
and societies."54 Actor-based network theories focus therefore on actors' strategies, 
dependencies and coalitions. They adopt a wider definition of actors than public choice 
theory, since they include non-governmental actors and supranational organisations. 
Also, while public choice theory describes bureaucrats as following the same budget- 
maximisation paradigm, actor-based theories stress that actors adopt different 
strategies and pursue different, even competing, goals depending on whom they are 
bargaining with. The splitting of government into several sub-levels is useful to take 
account of the distribution of power, and conflicts of interests, within the executive. 
Actors in the level 1 game include members from the administrative and political 
systems, such as party and parliamentary figures, cabinet-level ministers and 
committees; and actors from the public and from interest groups such as 
spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key private groups, sponsors 
and the leader's own political advisors. Actors in the level 2 game sit with their foreign 
counterparts across the table, and with diplomats and international advisors at their 
elbows.
Actor-based network theories define a number of variables for understanding multi­
level bargaining between actors, which chapters 5 to 7 focus on. The two-level game 
metaphor may be used, first, to divide the budgetary process into several sub-levels of 
bargaining with distinct actors and constraints. Actors involved at several sub-levels 
may not defend the same argument, nor pursue the same goal, depending on the actors 
they bargain with. The success of their bargaining may be analysed by win-sets, i.e. the
54 Rosenau, James (1980), The study o f global interdependence - Essays on the transnationalisation o f  
•world affairs (London: Frances Pinter) : 1.
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sets of choices that would match actors' constraints. The definition of win-sets raises 
questions on whether actors' preferences can be reconciled, whether opponents' 
interests overlap, whether actors' preferences are homogenous or heterogeneous, and 
what is the cost of'no-agreement' or the 'reversion-point' for each actor.55 
Second, Putnam emphasises the context in which the bargaining takes place, for 
instance, the degree of uncertainty about the positions of the other negotiators, about 
their expectations and the participation rates of the constituents.
Third, the approach focuses on the distribution of power among participants since it 
assesses asymmetries in power distribution and in the spread of information. The more 
symmetrical the distribution of power, the harder it is to establish institutional 
arrangements but the more effective they are once formed.
Fourth, Putnam measures the degree of external interdependency, i.e. where national 
actors cannot pursue their own goals without adjusting for, and endeavouring to 
regulate, the actions of others. Rising levels of interdependence increase the need for 
reconciling national and European interests and strengthen social pressures against the 
violation of the institutions' rights and rules. High external interdependency means that 
members of international society will be most concerned with interactions with others. 
It reduces the risk of voluntary and involuntary defection.
Last, Putnam emphasises the capacity and willingness of national governments to 
implement provisions favoured internationally. Members of international society have 
restricted means with which to enforce institutional arrangements within national 
jurisdictions and depend on national governments for compliance with rules. National
55 According to Putnam, Robert (1988), "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level 
games", International Organization, 42: 427-460, preferences are homogenous when competing actors 
agree on the aim of the agreement but disagree on the evaluation of the cost of no-agreement (i.e. 
spending ministers acknowledge the need for deficit cuts, but disagree on how to allocate budget cuts). 
Interests are heterogeneous when actors also disagree on the aims of the agreement.
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governments may be more willing to implement European directives if the initial cost of 
developing co-operation is low56 and if other European governments are able to offer 
side-payments.
The originality of actor-based network theories lies not only in the representation of 
actors' interests but also in the vision of how actors are organised into networks. A 
policy network is a system of representation of interests acting on the government 
through intermediation. This notion includes an interpretation of how groups are 
formed (what defines their identity), how organised they are, and their impact on 
policy-making. Rhodes57 distinguishes five types of networks from highly integrated 
policy communities to loose issue networks. 'Epistemic community' is one specific type 
of network and seems particularly relevant for budgeting. They are publicly-recognised 
groups with an unchallenged claim to understanding the technical nature of the regime's 
substantive issue-area and are able to interpret facts or events in new ways, thereby 
leading to new forms of behaviour. According to Haas58 cross-national epistemic 
communities contribute to the development of co-ordinated and convergent policy­
making, and are particularly active on technical issues. They direct their action to 
setting the international agenda, guiding their states towards support of international 
measures and supporting the process of learning.
56 Rosenau, James and Tromp, Hylke (eds) (1989), Interdependence and conflicts in world politics 
(London: Avebury).
57 Marsh, David and Rhodes, R. (eds) (1992), Policy networks in British government (Oxford: 
Clarendon press).
58 Haas, Peter (1989), "Do regimes matter ? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution 
control", International Organization, 43 3: 377-403.
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Finally, actor-based network theories' focus on change and complexity offers a 
framework for explaining changes in actors' expectations, strategies and in institutional 
arrangements. Many theories adopt a static perspective on budgeting as they focus 
more on explaining continuity than on how and why budgeting changes. Actor-based 
network theories combine change and conflict with the notion of complexity: "A 
system's complexity is generally thought to be a function of the number of elements, 
their heterogeneity, the number and variation of linkages and the degree to which the 
system is in transformation.”59 The degree of complexity in budgetary decision-making 
is therefore a function of the following variables: the lack of oversight and co­
ordination; the linking of national traditions through a system of transnational policy­
making; the fact that EU is a new and changing form of authority with new types of 
modes of regulation (e.g. subsidiarity); and the broadening of the scope and variety of 
budgetary issues influenced by the EU.
Actor-based network theories offer a framework relevant for studying micro-budgeting 
and for introducing European variables in a cross-national comparison. Since micro- 
budgeting focuses on intermediate level decisions, on departmental programmes and on 
power-dependence relationships between actors, chapters 5, 6 and 7 test the thesis’ 
proposition from the departmental perspective and investigate the influence of EU 
membership on budgeting in three spending ministries (Agriculture, Transport and 
Health). The thesis focuses on links and tensions between groups only to the extent 
that they affect budgetary choices and are linked to EU membership. The thesis does 
not describe the functioning of groups as such, nor does it emphasise the
59 Andersen, Svein and Eliassen, Kjell (eds) (1993), Making policy in Europe - The Europeification o f 
national policy-making (London: Sage): 11-12.
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Europeanisation of policy sectors. Rather it describes shifts in the strategy of groups 
and the consequences for budgetary decision-making because of EU pressures.
The strength of the approach lies in its ability to capture the visible patterns and 
connections between organisations. It stresses the splitting of policy-making into 
differentiated institutional groupings with distinctive strategies and power resources. 
Going down one level from national to departmental budgeting allows for the 
incorporation of sub-government relationships and the delineation of power- 
dependence and conflict between groups. The focus on micro-budgeting emphasises 
diversity within national budgeting which cannot be viewed as a unified whole, since it 
juxtaposes highly integrated sectors with sectors which are little constrained by the 
European Union. The approach underlines that the adaptation to EU influences is not 
a uniform process but varies in intensity and channels.
1.4. Conclusion
First, chapter 1 shows that the existing political science literature underestimates the 
adaptation of national budgetary mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership. 
Chapter 1 distinguishes between essentially outdated literature like Heclo and 
Wildavsky and contemporary literature on European integration that plays down or 
ignores the effect of the EU on budgeting. Conventional public finance literature 
adopts a national approach to budgeting: it describes budgeting as a process internal to 
national governments and excludes non-national variables that may affect budgetary 
strategies and mechanisms. The EU is not considered an actor in the budgetary
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processes nor an arena for decision-making. This neglect is paralleled by the fact that 
most contemporary works on integration in the European Union disregard budgetary 
matters because the EU has no formal responsibility for national budgets. A few works 
investigate the links between national budgeting and EU membership but their focus 
remains narrow since they offer a restrictive view of EU-related changes in budgeting. 
Also, most literature is normative and static since it does not describe changes in 
national budgeting. Zapico-Goni is an exception: he does not restrict EU influence to 
‘negatively oriented’ fiscal norms and ‘police-like’ activity since he sees a role for the 
EU in leadership and in decision-making. However, his work lacks empirical evidence 
of whether, and how, EU membership alters national budgetary institutions and 
decision-making. Therefore, chapter 1 has identified a gap to investigate. It argues 
there is a need for an empirical study of the adaptation process of bureaucratic 
budgetary mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership, which is why the thesis 
uses empirical evidence to identify changes in national budgeting in two cases, Britain 
and France, to evaluate whether these changes have occurred because of EU 
membership
Second, chapter 1 has explained the hypotheses and methods used in the thesis. The 
main issue addressed in the thesis is to determine whether EU membership caused a 
process of adaptation of bureaucratic budgetary mechanisms to EU pressures. The 
argument asserted throughout the thesis is that the impact is greater and different in 
nature than is widely assumed in the conventional literature presented at the outset. 
This argument rests on three hypotheses which will be evaluated in the forthcoming 
chapters: first, the thesis puts forward that the national approach is inappropriate for a
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study of budgeting because of the significant influence of EU factors on national 
budgeting. The two other hypotheses suggest that the adaptation of budgetary 
processes to EU pressures is proportional to the frequence and intensity of interactions 
between national and European actors during policy-making processes (hypothesis 
two) and to the amount of EU credits in the department’s budget (hypothesis three).
This main argument is subdivided into four types of questions which are enunciated in 
chapter 1 and will be evaluated as the thesis goes: one aspect measures the degree to 
which budgetary processes are affected; another assesses whether these changes 
improved national budgetary processes or not; the third determines which aspects of 
budgeting are more affected than others and illustrates that the adaptation of national 
budgeting is not uniform; finally the thesis identifies various sources of pressure on 
national budgeting. Chapter 1, also, in discussing the meanings of Europeanisation, 
defines the concept of Europeanisation as the process of adaptation of bureaucratic 
mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership.
Third, chapter 1 has discussed the main theoretical tools used in the forthcoming 
chapters. The thesis selects several approaches to budgeting as several complementary 
cases to test the proposition that budgeting is affected by membership of the European 
Union. To test the hypothesis in an overall way it selects the new institutional 
framework to focus on changes in budgetary institutions as the major factor and 
indicator of budgetary change. The institutional variables used are those defined by 
Hagen, who argues that budgetary procedures are synchronised in three stages:
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bargaining inside government on drafting the budget, the parliamentary stage with 
amendments and the vote of the Finance Bill, and implementation by the government. 
To. test the hypothesis at the sub-governmental level the thesis focuses on ‘micro- 
budgeting’ and uses Putnam’s two-level game metaphor to emphasise the role of 
actors. Micro-budgeting features intermediate level decisions on departmental 
programmes and line-items. The issue of budgetary Europeanisation is approached 
from the perspective of individual spending ministries (Agriculture, Transport and 
Health). Policy-making is seen as a bargaining process between groups of actors with 
various degrees of authority, who are linked by power-dependence relationships. The 
approach emphasises the totality of national and international political systems.
By combining these complementary approaches to budgeting the thesis seeks evidence 
of the Europeanisation of procedures and actors’ strategies at both macro and micro 
levels. In chapter 2 the thesis focuses on fiscal policy and assesses the degree of 
national sovereignty in the setting of taxes.
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Chapter 2
The scope for independent fiscal policy in the European 
Union: taxation in the United Kingdom and France
While subsequent chapters emphasise how EU membership influences spending 
decision-making, this chapter focuses on the revenue side of the budget.1 Fiscal policy 
in this context designates how governments distribute the cost of financing the public 
sector over current and future tax payers. Fiscal policy is a major instrument of 
regulation because of its macro-economic effects. Therefore, fiscal sovereignty is an 
important, issue, given the postulated loss of monetary policy within EMU. Chapter 2 
discusses the constraints on the design of taxes and social security contributions in the 
United Kingdom and France because of EU membership. The aim is to delineate the 
margin of manoeuvre of national governments in setting fiscal policy.
The normative approach does not offer a clear answer on the desirable scope for an 
independent fiscal policy in the European Union. Some authors argue that integration 
in the EU ultimately requires the harmonisation, or at least a greater convergence, of 
fiscal policy in individual countries. From an economic point of view the OFCE argues 
that production and consumption conditions should be similar in a unified market to 
protect and promote genuine competition. Fiscal policies should be co-ordinated to 
respond to exogenous macroeconomic shocks because the EU budget is too small to
1 Budgetary receipts include all direct and indirect taxes, and social security contributions.
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perform this role on its own.2 Wildasin demonstrates that increasing market linkage 
from economic integration may limit redistribution at the national level while creating 
pressure for increased redistribution at the EU level.3 On a political level Spahn argues 
“EMU will have an important impact on national fiscal systems of Member States as it 
will impinge on European intergovernmental fiscal relations.”4 He maintains that a 
number of taxes may be levied and designed at the EU level because EMU will increase 
the scope for EU responsibilities. This hypothesised evolution would represent a major 
threat to national fiscal sovereignty.
These views are opposed by the argument that EMU does not require fiscal uniformity 
and that Member States should retain their fiscal autonomy to correct regional 
imbalances, given the postulated loss of monetary and exchange rate policy at the 
national level. Bureau and Champsaur argue that only some co-ordination of national 
budgets is required since the main pressure on public finance is induced by 
competition.5 This second school uses empirical evidence to show that existing 
economic union and federations did not require fiscal harmonisation or approximation. 
Federalism in Swiss and the United States did not reduce regional fiscal disparities or 
the authority of sub-government levels to set taxes.6
2 CEPII-OFCE (1990), "Vers une fiscalite europeenne?", Observations et Diagnostics Economiques, 
Revue de I'OFCE, 31 (Apr.), 121-189.
3 Wildasin, David (1990), "The economics and politics of budget control: Budgetary pressures in the 
EEC, a fiscal federalism perspective", The American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, 80 2 
(May): 69-85.
4 Spahn, Peter, “The consequences of economic and monetary union for fiscal federal relations in the 
Community and the financing of the Community budget”, in European Commission (1993), “The 
economics of Community public finance”, European Economy Report and Studies, 5: 543.
5 Bureau, Dominique and Champsaur, Paul (1992), "Federalisme budgetaire et unification economique 
europeenne", Observations et Diagnostics Economiques, Revue de I'OFCE, 40 (Apr.): 87-98.
6 Blochliger, Hansjorg and Frey, Rene, “The evolution of Swiss federalism: a model for the European 
Community?”, in European Commission (1993), “The economics of Community public finance”, 
European Economy Report and Studies, 5: 213-243.
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The chapter tests two competing propositions about the scope for independent fiscal 
policy and the extent of national sovereignty in the determination of taxation in EU 
members. The first maintains that increasing competition in the Single Market and EU 
harmonisation directives on a number of taxes constitute an impelling force towards 
fiscal convergence. The second proposition posits that existing institutional 
arrangements and decision-making processes at the EU and at the national levels 
secure the ultimate sovereignty of national governments in the determination of 
taxation.
2.1. The forces promoting fiscal convergence
Proposition 1 maintains that EU membership reduces the margin of manoeuvre of 
national governments in the setting of tax and social security contributions because 
increasing competition in the Single Market and EU harmonisation directives constitute 
a force for fiscal convergence. One driving force towards fiscal convergence is 
competition. Competition has expanded to taxation and social security contributions 
because unharmonised taxes hinder the efficient functioning of markets. The pressure 
on tax levels to converge towards those of trading partners is higher when tax bases 
are mobile. The second driving force for convergence is EU legislation, since it sets 
obligatory or recommended tax levels for all EU members.
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2.1.1. Fiscal competition: the victory of economic over budgetary constraints?
The design of taxation reflects the trade-offs between budgetary constraints, which
imply having sufficient revenues to pay for public expenditure with an acceptable
deficit level, and economic requirements, which involve having tax levels comparatively
low to attract investment, promote employment and increase production and
consumption. There are also trade-offs within the strategies of Finance Ministries
because the maximisation of revenues does not always occur from high tax levels (as
underlined by Laffer): lower tax levels may ultimately generate more revenue because
of the consequential increase in consumption or production. A senior civil servant
from the Direction du Budget argued
“Corporation tax bases and rates are not harmonised. However, first right-wing 
then left-wing French governments lowered corporation tax from 50 to 33% ... 
This move was quite widely recommended to the government by the 
technocrats and put forward by government to public opinion as a necessity for 
harmonisation understood as the competitiveness of French companies vis-a-vis 
their foreign competitors. This argument has been an important doctrinal 
component of all political and economic debates since 1986 because the 
Finance Ministry has systematically put forward lower corporation tax levels as 
a neutral measure which benefits employment and companies ... On this 
subject, Europe created an intellectual leverage effect.”7
The liberalisation and the ffee-circulation of goods, services and labour within the EU
stimulate increasing economic competition. Proposition 1 maintains that competition
encourages national governments to favour economic constraints over budgetary ones
7 “L’impot sur les societes n’est pas harmonise, ni en assiette ni en taux. Ceci etant, les 
gouvemements frangais de droite d’abord et de gauche ensuite, ont fait baisser l’impot sur les societes 
de 50 a 33% ... C’est quelque chose qui a ete assez largement justifie par les technocrates aupres du 
gouvemement et mis en avant par le gouvemement vis a vis de l’opinion, comme etant une necessite 
d’harmonisation au sens competitivite des entreprises frangaises vis a vis de leurs concurrents a 
l’etranger. Cela a ete un element doctrinalement tres important dans tous les debats politiques et 
economiques depuis 1986 parce que Rivoli-Bercy ont systematiquement mis en avant la baisse de 
l’impot sur les societes comme une mesure neutre favorable aux emplois et aux entreprises ... C’est 
une zone ou l’Europe a ete un levier de pression intellectuel pour faire evoluer les choses.”, Interview, 
ref. 1.
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and to reduce differences between national and neighbouring tax levels on similar 
goods and services. With higher taxation national governments face four economic 
and budgetary risks.8 First, distortion of competition may modify consumption 
patterns by favouring substitution goods or low-taxed goods. Second, production 
dislocation may occur if companies choose or change their locus of production 
(country, region) because mobile production factors will be responsive to different tax 
treatments. Third, trade may be diverted while not optimising the allocation of factors. 
Fourth, different tax treatments stimulate tax evasion. Therefore, the pressure on taxes 
to converge in the EU depends on the degree of competition and the likelihood for 
these risks to occur for each tax base.
Proposition 1 posits that economic competition in the EU encourages fiscal
competition between Member States, especially on taxes with mobile tax bases. The
more mobile the tax base, the greater the impelling force towards fiscal convergence
for national governments. Fiscal convergence is stimulated by emulation, since Member
States watch the taxation of direct competitors and tend to align their tax levels to the
lowest practice if they can afford the fiscal opportunity cost. A British civil servant
compared the impact of competition on VAT and excise duties and argued
“[On VAT] there was enough proximity between the rates, the rapprochement 
was sufficient to allow there not to be distortions across borders. It is not 
necessary for us on the VAT side, but Denmark and Germany are the classic 
examples. It was the cross-border shopping issue that was really a problem: we 
have very high rates of excise duties and our immediate neighbours across the 
Channel have very low or zero rates on some of their products. We found that
8 Commission of the European Communities (1991), "France", Country Studies, 5 (Brussels, CEC, 
July).
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that has led to smuggling, to a drop in revenue which was expected. They have 
estimated that it has probably reduced our revenue by £340 m. in a year on the 
excise duty goods and there may be even more because of fraud which we are 
not aware of.”9
Tax approximation is not uniform because the pressure of competition is exerted on the 
most mobile tax bases. This proposition suggests that the taxation of savings is the 
most convergent because of the liberalisation of capital flows in the EU. The potential 
for tax competition among EU members based on existing VAT rates is illustrated by 
the diversity expressed in Appendices 2.2 and 2.3. The low mobility of labour in the 
EU permits widely decentralised public policies for redistribution.10
The pressure of competition would be likely to increase if the EU were to move to an 
origin system of VAT. Under the destination system goods and services compete in 
the EU on the base of their price before VAT. Similar goods and services support the 
same VAT rate in the country of consumption whatever their country of production. 
Under the origin system the VAT rate is that of the country where goods and services 
have been produced. Hence French products sold in the UK would bear the French 
VAT rate (20.6%), not the British (17.5%). Therefore, goods and services compete on 
the basis of their price including VAT.11 Higher tax levels have an impact on the 
competitiveness of national products. Producers from highly taxed countries need to 
achieve lower production costs to compensate for the effect of higher taxation on 
price.
9 Interview, ref. 16.
10 Bonnaz, Herve and Mills, Philippe (1993), “Perspectives du budget communautaire en Union 
Economique et Monetaire”, Economie et Prevision, 109: 41.
11 Boiteux, Marcel (1988), "Marche unique et moeurs fiscales", Futuribles, 127 (Dec.): 23-38.
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An official argued
“if the Commission were to propose an origin system, there could be distortions 
between Member States if the rates were very different... the pressure starts to 
build up for bringing the rates of VAT closer together at least, and possibly for 
harmonising, because under the origin system you would need to have 
redistribution of revenue between different Member States.”12
The proposition that competition fosters tax approximation is subject to stipulations 
and criticisms which limit its strength. First, the pressure from competition on 
consumption, production and trade depends on geographical and practical factors. A 
member of a Finance Ministry argued “if you look around in the Community you find 
that in countries with extensive land borders , the level of excise duties is very much in 
line with neighbouring countries. Where you have islands like Ireland and the UK, then 
excise duties tend to be higher.”13 The constraints from competition are weaker in the 
UK than in France because the cost of importing goods from the Continent 
compensates the fiscal gain from higher VAT rates or excise duties.
Second, different tax levels are justified by cultural differences in consumption habits 
and national productions. Large differences in taxation are not sufficient to modify the 
patterns of consumption (e.g. it is not certain French people would drink more beer if 
excise duties were lower). The gap between excise duties on beer and wine in the UK 
and the equivalent tax level in France does not distort competition because wine and 
beer are not a perfect substitute product and because the effect of trade distortion is 
small, according to a member of the Direction du Budget.
12 Interview, ref. 16.
13 Interview, ref. 12.
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He argued
“The harmonisation of excise duties on alcohol, which is not a great macro- 
economic issue, was the reason for gigantic disputes in Brussels where 
everybody tried to defend its national particularisms reasonably. After all, 
nobody cares. There is a folkloric traffic which would become disturbing if it 
became industrial, if all British went to Calais to buy beer. At the moment it is 
marginal.”14
Therefore, the pressure of competition sets an overall economic constraint over 
taxation, since market mechanisms could offer various sources of consumption, 
production and labour if national taxation were to become prohibitive. National 
governments must take into account the mobility and the comparative cost of substitute 
products imported from EU members to determine national tax levels. As a corollary 
the pressure of competition is weak when tax bases are not mobile or when the cost of 
importing substitute goods is high. This proposition suggests therefore that the 
pressure for tax convergence is not uniform across EU members (e.g. it is weaker in 
the UK than in France) or across tax bases (e.g. it is higher on capital than on labour, 
on globally rather than on regionally-consumed products, and on transportable rather 
than on heavy or short-lived products). Tax uniformity because of competition 
depends on the relative transaction costs on these goods.
Underlying the ‘competition-approximation effect’ lies the idea that national fiscal 
systems are also competing. First, integration in the EU encourages Member States to 
lower tax levels. A French senior civil servant reckoned that “the trend is to think that 
tax pressures will align to a certain level. Since there is a genuine single market, one
14 “L’harmonisation des accises sur les alcools, qui n’a pas une importance gigantesque 
macroeconomiquement, a ete le sujet de querelles bruxelloises gigantesques, chacim essayant de 
defendre convenablement ses particularites nationales. Apres tout, tout le monde s’en fiche. II y a un 
traffic folklorique, qui deviendrait genant s’il devenait industriel, si tous les anglais venaient acheter 
leur biere a Calais. Pour le moment c’est marginal.”, Interview, ref. 1.
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tends to think that it would be appropriate to homogenise tax levies effectively to 
equalise the cost of production factors.”15 However, data analysis since 1970 does not 
provide empirical evidence of approximation of tax pressure in EU members. Figure A 
of Appendix 2.1 shows the stabilisation of British and French tax pressures since the 
early 1980s. However, the tax burden in Britain and France varies by about 5 
percentage points. Budgetary figures provide insufficient evidence to maintain that EU 
membership has promoted more convergent tax levies at the macroeconomic level.
Second, the ‘competition-approximation effect’ implies that tax structures should 
become more homogenised and converge. Competition in the single market should 
incite national administrations to rely less heavily on consumption taxes and more 
heavily on direct taxes on income.16 This argument is not supported by empirical data 
gathered in Appendix 2.1. VAT is one of the main sources of revenue for the French 
budget (17% as against 15% in the UK) whereas income tax represents 14% of budget 
receipts in 1990 (as against 40% in the UK). The ‘competition-approximation effect’ 
does not explain the persistence of such differences among EU members (figures B-C). 
Moreover, the lower reliance on consumption taxes in France since 1970 is not present 
in the British case after 1978, when the government shifted the burden of taxation back 
to indirect taxes (figure D).
15 “La tendance est de penser qu’il va y avoir un alignement sur un certain niveau de prelevements 
obligatoires. Des lors qu’on a un vrai marche unique, on a tendance a penser qu’il conviendrait 
d’avoir effectivement une certain homogeneisation des prelevements pour egaliser le cout des facteurs 
de production.”, Interview, ref. 10.
16 Boiteux, Marcel (1988), "Marche unique et moeurs fiscales", Futuribles, 127 (Dec.), 23-38.
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2.1.2. Tax harmonisation in the EU
A second limitation to the independent setting of taxation by national governments is 
introduced by tax harmonisation in the European Union. Article 99 of the Treaty of 
Rome amended by the Single European Act calls for proposals “for the harmonisation 
of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect 
taxation to the extent that such an harmonisation is necessary to ensure the 
establishment and the functioning of the internal market within the time limit laid down 
in Article 8A”.17 EU legislation sets obligatory or recommended tax levels applicable 
in EU member countries to the extent that approximation is required to avoid 
unacceptable levels of distortion of competition, diversion of trade and tax fraud. The 
Commission approached pragmatically the issue of tax harmonisation and required only 
minimum changes. According to Easson the Commission tends to select areas in most 
urgent need of attention or on which agreement may be most easily achieved with a 
view to progressing to more difficult or contentious fiscal subjects. He called this 
progressive approach to fiscal harmonisation ‘salami tactics’.18
Tax harmonisation in the EU was justified by several arguments. First, differences in 
tax levels create fiscal barriers which contradict the idea of a Single Market without 
frontiers. Fiscal frontiers even form an integral part of the VAT system since they are 
necessary to ascertain that zero-rated exports have left the country. Under the 
destination system for VAT trade within EU members is more similar to international
17 Commission of the European Communities (1987), "Completion of the internal market: 
approximation of indirect tax rates and harmonisation of indirect tax structure", Com. 87 (320-322), 
(Brussels, CEC, 5 July).
18 Easson, Alex (1977), "Tax policy in the European Economic Community", Revue d\Integration 
Europeenne, 1 (Sept.): 31-46.
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than to national trade, since goods ‘exported’ are exempt from VAT in the origin 
country, and are then taxed at the local rate in the destination country. This ‘frontier 
effect’ has a number of economic and administrative implications for competition in the 
European Union. Second, fiscal competition to encourage consumption or production 
produces lower budgetary revenues, which is precisely what the EU is striving to 
avoid. Harmonisation at the EU level of national taxation aims to prevent such fiscal 
competition by fixing minima on the most mobile tax bases. Its objectives are to avoid 
lower revenues from taxes and to ensure that the financing of public expenditure does 
not excessively weigh on the least mobile tax bases (salary earners and real estate).19 
Tax harmonisation in turn creates legal constraints on Member States and reduces their 
margin of manoeuvre to set taxes. Therefore, the 1987 Commission White paper 
concluded “only then, when indirect tax levels are sufficiently close as between one 
Member State and another so as not to distort competition and patterns of trade, will it 
be possible for the European economy to work in a free and unfettered way.”20
Articles 99-100 of the Treaty of Rome amended by the SEA restrict tax harmonisation 
to most indirect taxes: mainly VAT and excise duties, and, implicitly, corporation tax 
and other indirect taxes which were left out of the 1992 programme. Because the 
pressure of competition varies depending on the mobility of tax bases, tax 
harmonisation in the EU is more or less constraining for each category of tax. Tax 
harmonisation in the EU is not uniform and the scope for independent national fiscal 
policy varies depending on each tax.
19 Dessaux, Pierre-Antoine (1993), “Les implications fiscales de l’Europe Communautaire”, Cahiers 
Frangais, 261 (May-June) (Paris: La Documentation Frangaise).
20 Commission of the European Communities (1987), "Completion of the internal market: 
approximation of indirect tax rates and harmonisation of indirect tax structure", Com. 87 (320-322), 
(Brussels, CEC, 5 July).
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Value Added Tax
The First and Second Directives on VAT in 1967 took measures to harmonise 
consumption tax mechanisms throughout the European Community. From 1967 to 
1973 a value added tax system very similar to the original French one replaced existing 
systems of cumulative multi-stage turnover taxes in all Member States. The United 
Kingdom introduced VAT in the 1974 budget. The administration of the VAT system 
is homogenous, except for the classification of goods and services, for exemptions and 
for some particular cases (e.g. oil and individual cars are not tax-deductible in France). 
The Community adopted VAT as a ‘European’ tax because of its neutrality and its 
good financial return.
The Sixth VAT Directive in 1977 was mainly concerned with harmonising the VAT 
base and regulating VAT-exempted goods and services (e.g. education, financial 
services). VAT-exemption became governed by European Law, and national 
governments may not modify the list of exempted goods and services on their own. 
The Sixth Directive recommended that zero-rating, except for exports, should 
eventually disappear when the internal market was completed. Zero-rating was 
considered a less efficient way of achieving social policy than measures more closely 
targeted towards those in need, and it distorts competition.21 In its 1987 proposal the 
Commission recommended again the abolition of zero-rating and faced a strong British 
opposition which had continued to apply zero-rating on 30% of consumer spending. 
The United Kingdom government questioned the mandate of the Commission to rule
21 Commission of the European Communities (1987), "Completion of the internal market: 
approximation of indirect tax rates and harmonisation of indirect tax structure", Com. 87 (320-322), 
(Brussels, CEC, 5 July).
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on this matter and recalled that zero-rating on food and children's clothing was its 
election commitment. In May 1989 a new proposal by the Commission attempted to 
accommodate UK and other countries' objections and allowed some zero-rating to 
continue as a ‘temporary derogation’.22
In 1987 the Commission proposed to harmonise the number of rates. As shown in the 
Appendix 2.2, all Member States except Denmark and the United Kingdom23 applied 
more than one rate in 1987. Indirect taxation systems in the EU had typically multiple 
rates and extensive exemptions because of distributional objectives (classification 
between ‘essential’ and ‘luxury’ goods) and for technical reasons. The Commission 
proposed to harmonise the number of rates and recommended the adoption of a 
reduced and a standard rate. The 1987 proposal would have had great consequences 
for France and the United Kingdom had it been applied. France would have had to 
suppress its increased rate while the United Kingdom would have had to introduce a 
reduced rate. The 1987 proposal imposed different obligations for the French and the 
British VAT systems and caused contrasting budgetary impacts. It offered the UK the 
opportunity to raise additional revenues by widening the tax base subject to indirect 
taxation. It implied France should have to rely less heavily on indirect taxes and find 
other ways of financing the budget. Therefore, the only limitations on the number of 
VAT rates are imposed by the 1992 Council Directive which decided Member States 
may apply either one or two reduced rates.
22 Commission of the European Communities (1992), "The United Kingdom", Economic Papers, 79 
(Brussels, CEC, July).
23 Both of these countries also apply a zero rate on basic goods.
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The Commission proposed to approximate VAT rates initially in 1987 and again in 
May 1989. The 1987 proposal offered a compromise between existing rates and total 
harmonisation. In 1987 the standard rates varied from 12% in Spain and Luxembourg 
to 25% in Ireland. The Commission proposed a range of between 14 and 20%. 
Theoretically eight Member States could leave their standard rate unchanged. For the 
reduced rates the Commission proposed a 4 to 10% range instead of the existing 1 to 
10%. The advantage of such a solution was to leave some scope for national 
governments to decide their desired tax rate. The Commission proposed a list of items 
subject to reduced rates.24 In 1989 the Commission revised the 1987 proposal to 
reduce the scope of fiscal approximation and accept marked inter-country differences 
on indirect taxation. However, the only constraints Member States agreed to were a 
15% lower limit on the standard rate and a 5% lower limit on the reduced rate. The 
Council specified a list of the supplies of goods and services subject to the reduced 
rate.25 However, Member States have resisted proposals to set an upper limit on the 
standard rate, and the other constraints are considerably reduced by the derogations 
granted to many countries.
Therefore, VAT harmonisation on taxation sets a number of constraints for the UK and 
France. First, EU membership has implied a major administrative and fiscal change in 
the UK with the introduction of the VAT mechanism in the early 1970s. This change 
has no equivalent in France since the European VAT system was inspired by the 
existing French one. Second, the existing constraints include a 15% lower limit on the
24 The Commission proposed to apply the reduced VAT rate to foodstuffs (except alcoholic drinks), 
energy products for heating and lighting, supplies of water, pharmaceutical products, books, passenger 
transports, newspapers and periodicals. This list represented one third of the consumer base.
25 Council Directive 92/77/EEC on 19 Oct. 1992.
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standard VAT rate and the complete harmonisation of VAT-exempted goods and 
services. Third, the budgetary impact of harmonisation varies from country to country. 
The French government strongly modified the VAT system as the number of rates went 
from 7 to 3 in the early 1990s (5.5%, 18.6% and 22%). In France the reduction of the 
increased rate from 33% to 22% between 1987 and 1991 cost FR. 26 bn. The 
suppression of the increased rate (22%) in 1991 reduced budgetary receipts by FR. 7.9 
bn. in 12 months.26
However, Member States have successfully resisted proposals to harmonise the number 
of rates, their level and the tax base. In particular the legislation leaves the UK free to 
continue zero-rating since there is no indication of when this ‘temporary’ measure is to 
end. The existing legislation leaves the UK and France free to increase their standard 
rate.27 A British official supported this view: “we could increase our VAT rates 
tomorrow without any problem if the government’s policy is to shift the burden of tax 
from the direct taxes to the indirect taxes. It is not impossible that our tax rates would 
change if we decided that that was the way we wanted to go.”28
Excise duties
For the first time in 1972 the Commission proposed to harmonise at EC level the 
excises on manufactured tobacco, mineral oils, spirits, wine and beer. In 1987 the 
Commission proposed the unification of excise duties, which was resisted by Member
26 Estimates by Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et FEurope - Quelques 
contraintes communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la 
Science Politique en France et a I ’Etranger, 6: 1680.
27 In 1991 the UK increased the standard VAT rate from 15% to 17.5%. In France the 18.6% 
standard rate was increased by two percentage points (20.6%) in August 1995.
28 Interview, ref. 16.
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States for several reasons. Receipts from excise duties vary greatly between EU 
members (4.4% GDP in the UK as against 2 to 3% in other countries);29 therefore the 
budgetary implications of uniformity vary between each EU member.30 Also, the 
structures of excise are disparate (e.g. on petrol as against diesel in France). Last, 
excise duties should not be considered exclusively as a revenue instrument since they 
serve other policy goals. Excises on tobacco and alcohol belong to the taxation of 
demerit goods. Taxation is expected to curtail consumption and reduce health hazards 
and related costs. Excises on hydrocarbon oils are part of energy conservation and 
environment control policies.31 Therefore, tax levels are difficult to harmonise because 
Member states have different attitudes to policy goals and are reluctant to cede national 
sovereignty.
Between 1989 and 1991 several propositions sought to accommodate these concerns. 
The Commission suggested setting minimum rates of duties with a theoretical 
convergence target. The approximation of excise duties in the EU is rather a 
convergence constraint based on the reduction of tax differences and bringing tax levels 
closer to the EU average than a binding harmonisation of rates. Appendix 2.4 gives a 
survey of existing tax rates for some excises in EU members and shows wide 
differences between Member States.
29 CEPII-OFCE (1990), "Vers une fiscalite europeenne?", Observations et Diagnostics Economiques, 
Revue de I'OFCE, 31 (Apr.): 121-189.
30 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a VEtranger, 6, mentions an estimate in 1990: the French government would 
increase its receipts by FR. 16 bn. if it were to align its excise duties on alcohol (taxes on wine should 
be trebled) and tobacco (+20%). However, larger reductions should be required on petrol duties.
31 Spahn in European Commission (1993), “The economics of Community public finance”, European 
Economy Report and Studies, 5: 556.
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The Council adopted a number of Directives in 1992 for the approximation of excise 
duty rates.32 Member States reached an agreement for a minimum rate of excise duty 
on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, tobacco and mineral oils with obligatory 
force by 1st January 1993. Therefore, membership of the European Union sets a 
number of ‘fixed points’ and reduces individual member countries’ capacity to lower 
tax levels below pre-determined thresholds. However, these Directives have little 
effect on the level of the most important excise duties in the United Kingdom and 
France: the minimum rate is well below the existing rates applicable to spirits in both 
countries, and to petrol in France. There is no agreement on a minimum rate on wine.
Corporation tax
The harmonisation of corporate taxation aims at stopping companies from choosing 
and switching the location of their headquarters to countries with a lower corporate 
income tax, or their production centres for tax reasons (e.g. regional tax reliefs). 
Proposals for harmonising different aspects of corporate taxation in the 1960s and 
1970s were not adopted largely because Member States sought to retain their national 
sovereignty over tax matters. The internal market White Paper held out the prospect 
of a Commission initiative on measures to remove obstacles to co-operation between 
enterprises. In 1990 the Commission set up the Ruding Committee, a group of 
experts, to evaluate the distorting effects of diverging corporate taxation in the 
Community. The Ruding Committee proposed the harmonisation of corporation tax, 
but there was little political will to implement its recommendations.33 Three
32 Appendix 2.5 summarises the minimum rates of excise duty which Member States agreed upon in 
October 1992.
33 Cowie, Harry (ed.) (1992), Federal Trust conference report - Towards fiscal federalism? Delors II 
budgetary proposals 1993-1997 (London: Federal Trust for Education & Research).
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‘Scrivener’ Directives were adopted in June 1990, Germany being allowed until 1996 
to comply fully with the first directive. These directives concern (a) easing crossborder 
mergers and assets transfers;34 (b) the taxation and double taxation of post-merger 
profits;35 and (c) the regulation of disputes between Member States on transfer pricing 
issues.36 These directives facilitate the tax treatment of cross-border mergers, 
acquisitions and investments in the single market.37 However, the existence of 
directives on corporate taxation is not sufficient to sustain an assertion that corporation 
taxes are harmonised.
Savings
The taxation of savings should be harmonised in theory because capital flows are nearly 
perfectly mobile, especially with the suppression of exchange rate risks within EMU. 
Convergence in taxes on savings is a direct consequence of competition. However, it 
is not certain that increasing competition and the lowering of tax rates is a product of 
European integration, as opposed to internationalisation or globalisation. Capital flows 
with countries outside the EU are as large as those with EU members in Luxembourg, 
UK and Germany.38
34 This directive deals with taxing the difference between the market and the book values of assets 
acquired through merger, treated as a national capital gain. Tax is deferred until capital gains are 
realised (Council Directive 90/434/EEC on 23 July 1990).
35 A proposal to restrict national taxation to profits generated within a particular Member State, 
excluding profits generated by a subsidiary in another state. There is no agreement on fully 
consolidated accounting in which losses from a foreign subsidiary could be offset against parent 
company profits, although this possibility had been included in earlier drafts of the proposals and has 
been reintroduced during recent discussion of a European company statute (Council Directive 
90/435/EEC on 23 July 1990).
36 This arbitration procedure is applicable when one company adjusts declared transfer prices between 
internationally associated companies to boost profits without an offset elsewhere (Convention 
90/436/EEC on 23 July 1990).
37 Commission of the European Communities (1992), "The United Kingdom", Economic Papers, 79 
(Brussels, CEC, July).
38 Bonnaz, Herve and Mills, Philippe (1993), “Perspectives du budget communautaire en Union 
Economique et Monetaire”, Economie et Prevision, 109: 42-45.
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Article 67 of the Treaty of Rome gives the EC a responsibility for achieving 
convergence; however, the taxation of savings is far less developed than with VAT.39 
The Commission proposed a minimum rate (15%) of withholding tax on interest 
deposits and bonds to prevent the liberalisation of capital movements encouraging tax- 
evasion to low-tax countries.
The European Court of Justice performs a significant role which reinforces 
harmonisation. A British senior civil servant40 mentioned the ECJ judgment on British 
excise duties on beer and wine in February 1980. It was alleged that by applying a 
higher rate to wine as compared to beer, despite their similar alcoholic strength, the 
UK was discriminating against an imported product competing against one produced 
domestically. It was argued this practice discriminated indirectly in favour of domestic 
products and against imported ones and thus contravened article 95 of the Treaty of 
Rome. The European Court of Justice found that this case constituted fiscal 
discrimination and required that taxation on wine be broadly in line with that on beer. 
In France a large number of taxes under Title E of the Finance Act {taxes parafiscales) 
were forbidden by ECJ judgments41 in application of articles 12, 13, and 92 to 95 of the 
Treaty of Rome. The number of these taxes went down from 117 in 1975 to 50 in 
1993, which had a significant budgetary impact.42 The ECJ has promoted tax 
harmonisation because its judgments have traditionally extended the application of 
harmonisation directives by giving a broad interpretation of the decisions and their 
application. According to Berlin, “the Treaty of Rome and case law of the Court of
39 See Appendix 2.1, figure F.
40 Interview, ref. 12.
41 e.g. ECJ, 25 June 1970, Aff. 47/69 Republique frangaise c. Commission.
42 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I 'Etranger, 6: 1686-1687.
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Justice have extensively applied prohibitions on fiscal discrimination and protection 
against products from other Member States.”43.
Tax harmonisation sets a number of limits to national governments’ fiscal policy. 
Although EU institutions have no capacity for organising a ‘European’ fiscal model, 
the completion of the Single Market incited Member States to seek the co-ordination 
of national taxation at the EU level on specific issues. The consequence of this co­
ordination lies in a number of ‘fixed points’ (minimum tax levels in general) which are 
more or less constraining. Member States have agreed on priority objectives, such as 
fiscal neutrality in trade and the removal of fiscal distortions. Also, they have agreed 
on fiscal techniques (VAT, excise duty), while leaving a large margin of manoeuvre to 
national governments on the setting of tax levels. Harmonisation directives set 
constraints on tax bases, tax rates and the procedures for levying taxes, although they 
are the Parliament’s exclusive responsibility according to the French constitution (art. 
34).44 This interference by EU legislation limits the powers of national Parliaments.
With Britain and France the minimum levels required by EU membership do not 
represent a great constraint because they are below existing tax rates (VAT, excise 
duty) and because of the derogations (zero-rating in the UK). Direct taxes, a major 
budget revenue, are not harmonised (Appendix 2.1 figure B shows that income taxes 
represent 40% of budget income in Britain, and social security contributions constitute 
44% of the French and 18% of the British budget revenue). Article 100 of the Treaty
43 “le Traite de Rome et la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice ont porte tres loin les interdictions de 
discriminer et de proteger fiscalement les produits des autre Etats membres” according to Berlin, 
Dominique (1989), "L'elimination des frontieres fiscales dans la CEE", Droit et Pratique du 
Commerce International, 15: 35-74.
44 This interference is legally possible because European law is superior to national law.
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of Rome does not give explicit power to EU institutions over direct taxation in the way 
it does for indirect taxation under article 99. It is unlikely that EU institutions will seek 
to harmonise those taxes because differences in taxation do not represent a threat to 
the Single Market because of the low elasticity of labour supply for these taxes.
2.2. Fiscal sovereignty secured?
Proposition 2 posits that existing institutional arrangements and decision-making 
processes at the EU and the national levels secure the ultimate sovereignty of national 
governments in the setting of taxation. National governments remain largely masters of 
fiscal policy since the constraints imposed by EU membership are weak and controlled 
by Member States.
2.2.1. Existing institutions: the legal protection o f national sovereignty
The European Union may impose legal constraints on national governments through 
directives with binding obligations for national taxation. However, these obligations 
do not restrict Member States’ fiscal independence because institutional arrangements 
at the EU level protect the sovereignty of EU members. Since decisions on taxes and 
social security contributions at the EU level require unanimous voting45, the voting 
procedure gives each Member State the possibility of vetoing decisions on taxes and
45 Articles 89 and 100 of the Treaty of Rome, as amended by the Single European Act.
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social security contributions should they not fit its interests. As argued by a member of 
HM Treasury,
“unanimous voting is a principle that is quite important to us. It is quite 
possible that the issue will be raised, not by the UK but perhaps by others, in 
the context of the Intergovernmental Conference next year. But from our point 
of view, we think it is very important to retain unanimous voting on tax issues 
which comes back to the point I was making earlier about how important this is 
to national sovereignty.”46
Unanimous voting offers an efficient protection of the fiscal sovereignty of national 
governments for a number of reasons. First, the requirement to gather unanimous 
consensus gives each Member State a strong instrument to resist further harmonisation 
(the veto from one country can impede the decision) whatever its size. A British civil 
servant underlined the point: “since the tax can only be changed by unanimity, each 
Member State is in a fairly strong position”.47 Therefore, EU members may impose 
strict conditions before accepting further harmonisation. The UK has set down four 
conditions which must be met before it is prepared to move to an origin system 48
Second, unanimous voting implies that Member States accept only those EU 
‘constraints’ which correspond to national priorities. EU decisions cannot impose 
obligations or add constraints unless Member States are willing to accept them. This 
argument was echoed by a British official when he discussed EU recommendations 
about corporation tax and argued “it would be up to the countries to decide whether 
they wished to be influenced or not.”49 European fiscal integration does not involve a
46 Interview, ref. 12.
47 Interview, ref. 16.
48 “The government has said it has an open mind and is prepared to move if the origin system is 
simpler for businesses, if it is less open to fraud, provided we get the right revenue coming to us at the 
right time and provided our zero-rates can remain. These are the four conditions which we have set 
down.”, Interview, ref 12.
49 Interview, ref. 8.
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hollowing out of the nation-state because EU decision-making has no autonomy vis-a- 
vis the Member States. EU institutions are not able to impose measures unless they are 
supported by every Member State. European integration has changed the locus for 
making decisions on harmonised taxes but decision-makers remain individual members 
of the EU. Therefore, the EU level does not constitute a ‘supranational’ level since it 
cannot oblige Member States to harmonise taxes unless they have decided to do so.
Third, Member States’ agreement for further tax harmonisation does not imply that
taxation in EU members is different from what it would be without tax harmonisation.
This argument challenges the view that the EU has a constraining power on national
taxation. A British official confessed that
“we accepted the rules on the rates because they did not have any impact on 
what we were doing. It was purely pragmatic. It did not actually restrict our 
freedom of movement. We did not want to reduce our rates of tax below 15%, 
we did not have a luxury rate and we did not have any reduced rates ... The 
Chancellor at the time was prepared to accept those rules because it did not tie 
his hands and it did not tie the hands of Parliament.”50
Therefore, national fiscal sovereignty is protected by existing institutional
arrangements. A French civil servant argued “French sovereignty has remained total
on fiscal matters ... Legally, up to now, there is no real transfer of power to the
Commission.”51
The principle of subsidiarity is another institutional arrangement used by Member 
States to resist further tax harmonisation. The European Union has no overall
50 Interview, ref. 16.
51 “La souverainete frangaise en matiere fiscale est restee totale ... Legalement, jusqu’a maintenant, 
aucun transfert reel de pouvoir n’a ete fait a la Commission.”, Interview, ref. 10.
73
responsibility for national taxation and social security contributions. The Commission 
has some powers to propose tax reforms provided they are required for the better 
functioning of the Single Market for which it is responsible. It intervenes only by 
default, since it supplements decisions by Member States. A member of HM Treasury 
noted
“we take the line that, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, we should only 
agree to tax measures at the Community level where that is strictly necessary to 
ensure that the Single Market works effectively, or to achieve objectives that 
cannot be achieved by the Member States acting individually. We feel that the 
principle is particularly important in the tax field because taxation is so 
important to our national sovereignty. The freedom, the independence to raise 
tax revenues as it is necessary and appropriate for national circumstances, is a 
very important part of national sovereignty. We probably apply the principle of 
subsidiarity with particular rigour in the tax field.”52
2.2.2. The margin o f manoeuvre o f national governments within taxation
National governments retain a large margin of manoeuvre because the EU has no 
overall responsibility for the approximation of national tax systems and tax burdens. 
Lindicht recalls MPs’ strong opposition to the provision in the Commission’s proposal 
that the eco-tax should not increase the tax burden and that extra receipts from the 
eco-tax must be balanced by an equivalent decrease in other taxes.53 The influence of 
the EU is restricted to a limited number of taxes, because competition constrains only 
the highly mobile tax bases and harmonisation concerns only a few taxes. The EU 
constraints on some taxes must be set against the margin of manoeuvre national 
administrations have within taxation and the flexibility they have to raise other sources
52 Interview, ref. 12.
53 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a TEtranger, 6: 1687.
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of income. Constraints on some taxes do not suppress the fiscal sovereignty of
national governments as long as the EU does not set constraints on the size of the
public sector and the degree of state intervention. While EU integration and market
liberalisation create a context favourable to smaller public sectors, wide differences
between tax burdens in EU members54 were not raised as a matter for concern at the
EU level. A British official argued
“membership of the Community is entirely compatible with having very 
different levels of social spending and public spending in general ... There is 
nothing about being part of the Community that forces a convergence in terms 
of levels of spending or tax as a share of GDP. Clearly there are pressures, 
partly political pressures, towards convergence of public finances in the sense of 
eliminating excessive deficits. But that is a different issue because the level of 
your deficit has nothing to do with the level of your spending.”55
The uniformity of tax burden seems rather an effect of globalisation since similar trends 
affect countries outside the EU. The ‘off-loading’ of central government spending 
upwards (to supra-national authorities), downwards (to national sub-government 
levels) and laterally (to the private sector)56 is a wide-ranging process not restricted to 
the EU. Therefore, because the EU does not set constraints on tax systems and tax 
burden levels, national administrations remain sovereign for fiscal policy at the overall 
level. They are free to determine the overall progressiveness and the amount of 
receipts from each category of tax because the EU has no responsibility for defining the 
role of taxation, the desirable degree of redistribution or progressiveness.57
54 see Appendix 2.1, Figure A.
55 Interview, ref. 12.
56 Leonardi, Robert (1995), Convergence, cohesion and integration in the European Union (London: 
Macmillan).
57 For a comparison of the progressiveness of the British and French tax systems, see Appendix 2.1, 
figure G.
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Second, EU institutions have no independence from Member States on tax issues 
because there is no ‘European’ tax or tax authority. The 1987 proposals included a 
transfer of powers to the Commission because the creation of a EU clearing body 
would have added a level of decision-making independent of individual Member States. 
At the moment the Commission may put together only projects unanimously 
supported. A civil servant mentioned a decision on excise duties in 1994 where 
Member States decided the implementation of the tax would be set up within bilateral 
conventions, which was in contrast to the Community’s stance.58 Furthermore, there is 
no ‘EU’ tax which is set and levied by EU institutions on their own. The system of 
receipts for the EU budget is based on national tax systems, since the EU cannot levy 
resources directly from EU citizens, companies or consumption in the single market.59
2.2.3. The margin o f manoeuvre o f national governments within policy-making
First, tax harmonisation is not implemented strictly by all Member States, which 
indicates they have a margin of manoeuvre in the implementation of harmonisation 
directives. This flexibility is illustrated by the British ‘temporary derogation’ to apply 
the provision of the Sixth Directive that zero-rating should disappear. A British official 
remembers
“At that time we had almost total flexibility, we were entirely free to do what 
we wanted .... We said that the zero-rate was a real rate of tax. The tax applies 
in exactly the same way as if it were a standard rate, you register for the tax, 
you claim your input tax back, you get tax returns, but it just happens to be 
zero. When the Sixth Directive was being negotiated, we had to protect that 
position because it was politically very sensitive.”60
58 Interview, Ref. 10.
59 The introduction of a carbon tax as proposed by the Commission would introduce a change in this 
respect.
60 Interview, ref. 16.
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The United Kingdom has secured zero-rating for the consumer base (e.g. children’s 
clothes, and food). However, the UK may not extend zero-rating any further under 
EU law.
Second, national governments used the need for tax approximation in the Single 
Market as an argument for implementing measures at the national level. Convergence 
in the EU is used as an external constraint for pushing ahead policies which would have 
been difficult to justify with domestic arguments. With the reduction of the increased 
VAT rate in France, a French member of the DB acknowledged “we put forward the 
objective of European harmonisation but it was absolutely secondary. It was an excuse 
and even a camouflage.”61 Another French civil servant described this technique of 
national governments as one of ‘wrong-footing’ the European Union62 by which he 
meant Member States use tax approximation to serve domestic interests.
Third, national administrations and other national organisations influence the 
Commission’s proposals. National tax administrations are in contact either 
multilaterally in European Councils and Working Groups, or bilaterally to co-ordinate 
views before a negotiation. National tax administrations are in touch with business 
lobbies, such as the Confederation of British Industry, which are often considered by 
national governments a more efficient lobby than bureaucrats. A British official argued 
“we get UK businesses to lobby either directly to the Commission or via the European 
Trade Association. We told them to make their views known because if they are
61 “L’objectif d’harmonisation communautaire etait celui qu’on a mis en avant, mais c’etait totalement 
secondaire. C’etait un pretexte, et meme une tenue de camouflage.”, Interview, ref. 1.
62 “prendre l’Europe a contre-pied”, Interview, ref. 10.
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saying it, it has perhaps more influence than what the tax administration says ... it is our 
own businesses who are the major contacts with the Commission.”63
2.3. Conclusion
The constraints of EU membership on taxation in the Member States is the preferred 
illustration of an hypothetical budgetary integration in the EU for most of the authors 
discussing budgetary Europeanisation. Taxation is usually considered to be the area 
most exposed to EU pressures because of tax harmonisation and, therefore, Member 
States are thought to have lost a great part of their fiscal sovereignty by losing control 
over tax decisions to EU institutions.
Chapter 2 has determined the margin of manoeuvre of national governments in taxation 
in the EU context by contrasting two competing propositions. The first maintains that 
competition and regulation create contraints on national tax levels and tax systems. 
The second argues that Member States remain sovereign on tax matters because of EU 
decision-making procedures and because of the lack of EU responsibility for tax 
matters. Therefore, chapter 2 addresses the issue of the scale and scope of the impact 
of EU membership on taxation. It stands in contrast with the conventional literature 
and argues that the impact is smaller on taxes than is asserted in the literature. By 
arguing that the impact of EU pressures on taxation is smaller than usually maintained, 
chapter 2 implies that presumed Europeanisation of budgeting affects more spending
63 Interview, ref. 16.
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than taxing, which is why the forthcoming chapters focus on the processes of decision­
making over spending at the national and at sub-governmental levels.
Chapter 2 has distinguished between various degrees of EU constraints.
First, EU pressures depend on the intensity of competition: competition sets a pressure 
for the approximation of national taxes depending on the mobility of the tax base. 
Because competition is more intense for mobile production factors and consumption 
goods, tax approximation in the EU is not uniform, and the scope for independent 
national fiscal policy varies depending on each tax (it is higher on capital than on 
labour, on internationally than on regionally-consumed products, on transportable than 
on heavy or short-lived products). Also the pressure for tax convergence is not 
identical within EU members, since peripheral countries are less affected by EU trade 
flows.
Second, tax harmonisation has precise binding implications: tax harmonisation 
promoted by the Commission sets a number of binding guidelines on indirect taxes 
(VAT, excise duties), corporation and savings taxes. Existing constraints include a 
15% lower limit on the standard VAT rate and the complete harmonisation of VAT- 
exempted goods and services. VAT harmonisation has implied a major administrative 
and fiscal change in the UK with the introduction of the VAT mechanism in the early 
1970s. This change has no equivalent in France since the European VAT system was 
inspired by the French.
However, the field of action of tax harmonisation is restricted to a limited number of 
taxes because most taxes are not harmonised. Income taxes and social security
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contributions are not harmonised because the supply of labour is not perfectly mobile 
across the EU and does not depend primarily on tax levels.
Therefore, chapter 2 contributes to the ovearching argument of the thesis by showing 
that the impact of EU membership has been different in nature than might have been 
presumed from an examination of the literature. Fiscal Europeanisation is a case-by- 
case adaptation process of some some aspects (rate structure, rate levels, tax base) of a 
limited number of taxes. Furthermore, even in the case of precise EU regulation, the 
effect on EU members varies from country to country depending on the tax structure 
applicable in each EU member and the derogations granted.
Chapter 2 has reviewed the mechanisms which contribute to protect national 
governments’ fiscal sovereignty. First, existing institutional arrangements for making 
fiscal decisions at the EU level protect the sovereignty of EU members. Since 
decisions on taxes and social security contributions at the EU level require unanimous 
voting, the voting procedure gives each Member State the chance of vetoing decisions 
on taxes and social security contributions should they not fit its interests. Unanimous 
voting implies that Member States accept only those EU ‘constraints’ which 
correspond to national priorities or do not imply any change in national taxation. 
Sometimes national governments use the objective of tax approximation in the Single 
Market as an argument for implementing measures they favour on domestic grounds. 
The second mechanism is subsidiarity: Member States use the principle of subsidiarity 
to resist further tax harmonisation because the European Union has no overall 
responsibility for national taxation and social security contributions.
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Third, national governments retain a large margin of manoeuvre because the EU has no 
overall responsibility for the approximation of national tax systems and tax burden. 
Tax harmonisation is rather a tool than an ultimate objective of building the European 
Union. The priority given to the convergence of economic policy, while economic and 
social structures diverge among Member States, may indeed require different tax 
treatments and structures across the EU.Also, European institutions have no 
independence from Member States on tax issues because there is no ‘European’ tax or 
tax authority.
Last, national administrations retain a large margin of manoeuvre in the setting of taxes 
because they are sovereign in deciding the level of tax burden and raising other 
revenues than the harmonised ones.
Chapter 2 has argued that Member States have different tools to resist EU tax 
harmonisation pressures, which implies that EU fiscal ‘constraints’ are only those that 
Member States were willing to accept. This argument weakens the idea that EU 
institutions have a constraining power independent from what Member States decide 
unanimously. This argument implies that the main pressures involved in the 
membership of the European Union are on the expenditure side of budgeting, the topic 
of forthcoming chapters.
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Chapter 3
The influence of EU membership on national budgetary 
institutions: compliance or hybridisation?1
The relations between national budgetary institutions and membership of the European 
Union have traditionally been tackled with a normative approach and from the 
perspective of EU institutions. The conventional literature examines what budgetary 
rules, procedures and structures should be adopted by the EU Commission for 
European convergence and budgetary discipline. The approach in this chapter is 
different since it emphasises empirical evidence of institutional change caused by EU 
membership from the perspective of national governments. The chapter does not 
describe budgetary processes in Britain and France, but determines the impact of EU 
membership on budgetary institutions. Institutions are useful in indicating the power 
distribution between the various players in the budgetary game and delineating the 
state’s constraints and powers.
The second objective of the chapter is to reflect on the mechanisms of Europeanisation 
and to emphasise the processes by which budgetary institutions change. The chapter 
explores the impact EU integration has on methods and processes of budgeting in 
Britain and France. It assesses whether convergence of budgetary institutions occurs
1 A revised version of this chapter was published under the title “The influence of EU membership on 
methods and processes of budgeting in Britain and France, 1970-1995” in Governance, April 1998.
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and, if so, whether it is promoted by an obligation of compliance or by a hybridisation 
effect. Compliance refers to changes in national budgetary institutions made 
compulsory by membership of the EU. Hybridisation recognises that budgeting is no 
longer a process internal to national governments because part of decision-making on 
national expenditure is made at the EU level and because the national budget is closely 
linked to the EU budget in both financial and policy aspects.
Compliance and hybridisation convey different views of how budgetary processes 
changed because they adopt different approaches to institutional change. The 
compliance approach focuses on formal rules and sanctions whereas hybridisation 
emphasises practices and informal processes. The impetus for change is located at the 
EU level with compliance, while the hybridisation approach maintains that the national 
and the EU levels are hybrid and may not be analysed independently. Both approaches 
adopt different definitions of how EU institutions operate. Compliance stresses the 
regulatory powers of EU institutions, whereas hybridisation views the EU level as a 
locus of intergovernmental negotiations and decision-making. Therefore, new 
institutionalism can be used to support competing propositions about the extent of 
change which can be related to European Union membership.
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3.1. Compliance, the basis of institutional change in the EU
Proposition 1: Budgetary targets and criteria imposed on EU members stimulate 
change in national budgetary institutions because Member States must 
ensure that national budgetary procedures comply with the 
requirements for an Economic and Monetary Union.
Several scholars have analysed the interactions between the EU and national budgeting 
on the basis of compliance. Hagen has extensively used the new institutional 
framework to assess the ‘quality’ of national institutions and their propensity to 
stimulate fiscal discipline as a way of recommending institutional change ‘required’ by 
EU membership.2 The focus here is different since the emphasis is not normative. 
However, the institutional framework of Hagen is used later in the chapter.
3.1.1. EU rules and the adaptation o f budgetary institutions
According to proposition 1, national budgetary institutions are becoming Europeanised 
because they have to comply with objectives and rules defined at the EU level to be 
included among the qualifying members of the third stage of EMU. The rule-based 
approach focuses on how obligations introduced by EU membership in budgeting 
directly impact on national budgetary institutions. This approach focuses on the 
limited number of EU budgetary constraints as a means of differentiating 
Europeanisation from other influences such as globalisation or New Public
2 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.).
84
Management. Europeanisation involves the process of adaptation of national 
institutional arrangements to incorporate specific obligatory requirements formulated at 
the EU level into the national budgetary system, and to integrate new procedures 
involving EU bodies into the national budgetary process.
Europeanisation is an adaptation process which leaves Member States responsible for 
deciding whether present institutions comply with the set guidelines or whether they 
need to be amended.3 This responsibility derives from the Maastricht Treaty provision 
that “Member States shall ensure that national procedures in the budgetary area enable 
them to meet their obligations in this area deriving from this Treaty.”4 Member States 
determine the extent and the type of institutional change required since the Treaty of 
Maastricht stipulates objectives that need to be achieved and not the means through 
which they should be achieved.5 The margin of manoeuvre in the interpretation of the 
changes required explains why institutional changes stemming from the application of 
the Treaty of Maastricht may vary from country to country.
Formal European constraints on national budgeting are limited in number6 and fairly 
recent. Only in the Treaty of Maastricht did Member States accept a number of ‘safe-
3 Ian Harden argues “It is not the job of the Community to design national budgetary procedures. It is 
not necessary for it to do so since ... it is in the interest of each State to control deficits” in Wildavsky, 
Aaron and Zapico-Goni, Eduardo (eds) (1993), National budgeting for Economic and Monetary 
Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff): 75.
4 Treaty o f Maastricht, Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Article 3.
5 According to Interview, ref. 14.
6 The European budgetary constraints can be listed as follows:
- Prohibition of overdraft facilities and other credit facilities in favour of government authorities 
(article 104 para. 1).
- Prohibition of privileged access by government authorities to financial institutions (article 104a).
- Prohibition of bail-out (article 104b).
- Member States should avoid excessive government deficits. Deficits are excessive when the ratio of 
the planned or actual government deficit to GDP at market prices exceeds 3% and when the ratio of
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guards’, in the shape of budgetary aggregates, to create a general framework
conducive to discipline in the context of the political agreement to move on to EMU.
Since the constraints included in article 104c do not apply to the United Kingdom7,
compliance may not explain institutional change in the UK because one cannot relate
changes in budgetary institutions to the EU targets. This argument underlay the
statement of a member of HM Treasury, who argued
“to be quite honest, the impact on our national budgeting is nil. The reason for 
that is that we want to reduce the PSBR anyway and we are doing it anyway, 
and the driving force behind it is the government’s wish to cut back taxation ... 
In other countries, the requirement to converge is used as an excuse for 
imposing unpopular policies. If we were doing that in the UK, that would 
contribute to make policies more unpopular.”8
The connection between changes in budgetary institutions and the obligations 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty can be established in the French case. The 
independence of central banks required by the Treaty of Maastricht has put an end to 
the privileged relations between the Banque de France and the French Ministry of 
Finance. This obligation has increased by 2% the budgetary resources financed at 
market conditions.9 Furthermore, the Loi Quinquennale de Maitrise des Deficits 
Publics (23 October 1994) incorporates the deficit targets and the calendar agreed in 
the Maastricht Treaty into the French budgetary statute. Every budget is linked to a 5- 
year rolling law that sets targets for the main budgetary aggregates. The Loi
government debt to GDP at market prices exceeds 60% (article 104c completed by the Protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure).
7 Treaty o f Maastricht, Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, para. 5. The British government is exempted from the obligation to avoid an 
excessive deficit and may not receive deficit reduction measures or sanctions from the Council 
according to Cowie, Harry (ed.) (1992), Federal Trust conference report - Towards fiscal federalism? 
Delors II budgetary proposals 1993-1997 (London: Federal Trust for Education & Research).
8 Interview, ref. 7.
9 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I ’Etranger, 6: 1695-99.
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Quinquennale explicitly emanates from the Maastricht obligations and because a major 
policy of the French government is that France will participate in the core EMU group 
when it is created. However, the French government is keen to emphasise that the 
objective of reducing the budgetary deficit and the public debt existed before 
Maastricht, and in theory the Law would survive any amendment or cancellation of the 
Maastricht Treaty obligations. As an illustration of this claim, the annexe to the Loi 
Quinquennale mentions the demands of the Treaty of Maastricht as the last reason for 
the need to improve budgetary management. It cannot be denied, though, that the Loi 
Quinquennale creates an environment in which the focus of budgetary procedure is 
directed explicitly towards controlling budgetary deficits in the medium-term.
This shift in focus is apparent from slight changes during the budgetary process: first, 
budgetary negotiations between the Direction du Budget and spending ministries 
(Budgetary Perspectives in February and Budgetary Conferences in June), and the 
presentation of the draft budget to Parliament, now include discussions, ‘les 
Quinquennales\ on public finance within a five-year time-frame.10 These discussions 
give the Direction du Budget the opportunity to introduce macro-level considerations 
into the negotiations with the ministries to lower departmental credits and to create an 
interministerial solidarity in the fight against a deficit. This new procedure is a way of 
making explicit the DB’s constraints to reduce departments’ expectations of an 
increase in their credits.
10 According to Interview, ref. 9.
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Second, since the Loi Quinquennale sets targets for actual deficits, the focus of the DB 
was re-directed towards the implementation of the budget or making the draft budget 
more reliable. This shift in focus reflects the fact that EU targets are set for actual or 
planned budgetary deficits. Also, it results from the increasing difference between the 
planned and the actual deficit since 1991: the actual budgetary deficit was 2.5 times 
larger than forecast in 1992, then 1.9 times larger in 1993.
Third, although the traditional French definition of budgetary deficit is more exhaustive 
than the EU one, civil servants underlined that the Direction du Budget had started to 
use the definition of the European Union system of integrated economic accounts and 
was more concerned about deficit control for expenditure included in it.11 This 
practice supports the argument by Zapico-Goni that “imposed budgetary rules may 
imply formal compliance (make-up, creative budgeting) rather than the adapting of 
budget spending to a disciplinary framework.”12
Fourth, the figures of the Lettre de Cadrage (letter of guidance) sent by the Prime 
Minister to ministers in the Spring, which sets direct constraints on expenditure,13 
translate the aggregate constraints from the Loi Quinquennale into departmental 
budgets. The letter sent by Prime Minister Balladur in April 1994 acknowledges the 
link between the Maastricht Treaty obligations and these guidelines since he explains 
that the reduction of the budgetary deficit “is a priority objective as much to respect 
our commitments taken in the framework of the Treaty on European Union as to
11 According to Interviews, ref. 9 and 32.
12 Wildavsky, Aaron and Zapico-Goni, Eduardo (eds) (1993), National budgeting for Economic and 
Monetary Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhofl): 120.
13 For instance, the reduction of 15% of the non-priority dotations d 'intervention was required in the 
1995 letter.
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loosen the constraint derived from the increasing interest payable on public debt 
because of accumulated deficits.”14 Therefore, these shifts in the French budgetary 
procedure and targets are closely connected with the Loi Quinquennale and the 
Maastricht obligations. Changes in budgetary institutions support the argument that 
Europeanisation may be defined as the compliance of Member States’ institutions with 
‘good practice’ guidelines agreed to at the European Union level.
To some extent, it is possible to relate the more stringent budgetary procedures to the 
Maastricht obligations. Indeed, the Direction du Budget has modified the budgetary 
game, in particular a number of ‘traditional’ budgetary practices, to accommodate 
aggregate constraints on public deficit and debt. For instance, it has become more 
difficult than previously to carry forward appropriations for credits under chapter 5 
(government’s direct capital outlays) and 6 (government’s subsidies for capital 
outlays), as the procedure leaves less room for the defence of its credits by the 
department. This change in the budgetary procedure is because credits carried forward 
to year n+1 increase the deficit in year n. Therefore, policy-making became more 
‘short-sighted’ with the need to reach set annual targets.
Shifts in budgetary techniques in France highlight the greater control by the Direction 
du Budget over departmental budgeting. In 1992 and 1993 the DB required the 
authorisation for departments’ spending be duplicated (thus involving the approval of 
the relevant Chef de Bureau in the Direction du Budget) although formally only the
14 “C’est un objectif prioritaire, autant pour respecter nos engagements pris dans le cadre du traite sur 
l’Union europeenne que pour desserrer la contrainte que fait peser l’augmentation des interets de la 
dette publique sous le poids des deficits accumules.” in Le Monde, 27 April 1994.
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authorisation of the Financial Controller is required. This double-authorisation was 
justified on the grounds of compatibility of expenditure with the aggregate spending 
framework, which again indicates the introduction of macro-level reasoning into 
departmental budgeting. Along similar lines the centralisation of credit allocation early 
in the budgetary procedure was reinforced by a ‘pre-arbitration’ practice. In 1994 and 
1995 the Directeur du Budget sent a letter to departments, along with the Lettre de 
Cadrage from the Prime Minister’s Office, to set the tone for savings and spending.
These shifts in budgetary practices reflect the priority given to the reduction of the 
French public deficit, and the Maastricht criteria have increased the political impetus 
for success in this endeavour. However, it is difficult to establish a strong direct link of 
causality between European integration and the shifts in specific budgetary techniques. 
As underlined by a former Directeur du Budget, changes in budgetary techniques do 
not date back to the Treaty of Maastricht but have always existed as a way of creating 
uncertainty in departmental expectations.15 Because Directeurs du Budget have 
continuously used changes in budgetary techniques as part of the traditional game 
between the Direction and the spending ministries, namely to affect power distribution, 
it is not really possible to assess the extent of change, and to relate budgetary 
stringency specifically to the introduction of the Maastricht obligations. Therefore, 
these institutional changes are secondary illustrations of the compliance effect.
15 Interview, ref. 3.
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S. 1.2. EU procedures to sanction national budgeting
The obligatory targets and ‘code de conduite’ for budgeting have a greater impact on 
institutions than the introduction of procedures involving EU bodies in the national 
budgetary procedure.16 The European Community has offered a framework for 
reflecting on national budgetary matters since 1964 with the creation of a Budgetary 
Committee (decision 64/302). Member States agreed to co-operate informally in 
budgeting and to accept the recommendations of the European Committee involving 
consultation with the Commission and the Council. For instance, the committee 
recommended a reduction in the growth of public expenditure (less than 5%) in its 
decision of 15 April 1964. However, the procedure remained informal, since Member 
States did not want to surrender their sovereignty in budgeting. The Werner Report in 
1970 followed this line when it recommended the adoption of a budgetary deficit at the 
EC level and growth margins for annual and multi-annual planning. It implied a 
transfer of budgetary powers to EC institutions to harmonise the management of 
national budgets which the Council had agreed to.17
Most of the procedures set up at the EC level in the 1970s still exist, namely the 
Monetary Committee and the Committee for Economic Policy which offer ad hoc 
channels for the transmission of information between Finance Ministers and European
16 The new European budgetary procedures include (article 104c):
- the surveillance of the level of public deficits by the Commission and the Committee.
- the decision by the Council on a recommendation from the Commission that an excessive deficit 
exists.
- the recommendations by the Council to the Member States, which can be made public.
- a wide range of sanctions for Member States failing to put these recommendations into practice. 
They do not apply to the United Kingdom (Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, para. 5).
17 Resolution on 22 March 1971.
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institutions.18 The Treaty of Maastricht bases future intergovernmental budgetary co­
ordination within EMU on these existing structures, which originally operated 
informally. In particular in the Maastricht Treaty the Committee for Economic Policy 
has become an Advisory Committee (art 109c), reporting directly to the Council and 
the Commission in promoting budgetary co-ordination. It will become the Economic 
and Financial Committee in the third stage of EMU. It prepares Council debates on 
economic and monetary policy. It associates the Member States with the 
Commission’s proposals since each Member State has met periodically since 1974 to 
discuss Member States’ budgetary choices and to prepare a report that is sent to the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Council (ESC) on national 
budgetary orientations for the coming year. However, these recommendations are not 
obligatory for the Member States, although a Directive in 197419 required Member 
States to implement economic policy according to the orientations of the Council. 
Similarly, the assessment and recommendations of the Commission, included in the 
annual report and transmitted for approval by the Council after consultation with the 
European Parliament and the ESC, have only a pedagogical value.20
The Treaty of Maastricht is not the first Community attempt to create institutions 
which could alter national budgeting. However, the inclusion of precise targets, 
agenda and sanctions creates a more constraining context where European Union 
institutions are integrated into national budgetary institutions. Article 103 of the 
Treaty sets up a voluntarist co-ordination of economic policy and a multilateral
18 Decision on 18 February 1974.
19 Council Directive 74/122/ EEC.
20 Hertzog and Weckel (1994), “Union europeenne et coordination des politiques budgetaires des Etats 
membres”, Revue Frangaise de Finances Publiques, 45: 177-193.
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surveillance of whether orientations and recommendations have been followed by the 
Member States. In 1992 and 1993 Member States submitted national programmes of 
convergence to the Commission, including a concerted French-German convergence 
initiative. The Union may sanction the non-attainment of the targets, namely the 
Commission may declare that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State - which 
happened for ten Member States in October 1994 - and formulate recommendations 
during the Eco-Fin meeting. Until 1995 this procedure had no impact on the 
preparation of the French budget because the declaration was made while the draft 
budget was poised for submission to the Parliament. The timing of the declaration was 
amended under the French presidency of the Commission so that it now fits in with the 
national agenda. While it is not committed to reaching the Maastricht deficit targets, 
the United Kingdom escapes neither the monitoring procedure by EU institutions nor 
the excessive deficit procedure, and the Council’s policy recommendations could be 
made public.21 Therefore, the UK accepted a similar degree of surveillance to other 
EU members while escaping any obligation or penalty. However, these procedures 
involving European institutions have not been constraining to date because Member 
States are sovereign on budgetary matters during the second stage of EMU and there 
are no potential institutional sanctions from the Union.
21 Cowie, Hany (ed.) (1992), Federal Trust conference report - Towards fiscal federalism? Delors II 
budgetary proposals 1993-1997 (London: Federal Trust for Education & Research).
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3.1.3. Other EU rules
Part of European legislation, although not directed in the first place to the regulation of 
budgetary management, includes provisions with side-effects on the determination of 
national budgets. The purpose here is not to offer an exhaustive account of such 
provisions but to underline that the scope of compliance should not be restricted to 
explicit budgetary rules. First, free-market and competition policies have imposed a 
clearer distinction between the budget for central government and for public 
companies. Several French annexe budgets have been affected by this requirement. 
The budget of the ‘Poste et Telecommunications’, which amounted to 165 bn in 1987 
(i.e. 15% of the central government budget), was taken off the national budget in 1991. 
The ‘Poudres’ (gun powder) budget was suppressed in 1976 and there is a proposal to 
transform the ‘Imprimerie Nationale’ (National Press) into a private company. 
Similarly, the banning of taxes with an equivalent effect to forbidden taxes (art. 13 of 
the Treaty of Rome) has had a significant impact since it led to the suppression of 67 
out of 117 taxes under title E of the French budget between 1975 and 1993.22
Second, European Union legislation regulates several types of public expenditure such 
as state subsidies. State subsidies to companies are limited in principle by art. 92 when 
they are likely to distort trade patterns and competition between Member States. This 
principle has been given a particularly large coverage since the notion of aid to 
companies has been widely interpreted by the European Court of Justice. It includes 
all measures creating a burden for the state by adding spending or diminishing receipts,
22 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I'Etranger, 6: 1695-99.
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and public stakes in the capital of companies. The restrictions on state subsidies have a 
significant budgetary impact: the European Union investigated about ECU 82.3 bn 
grants in the EU and FR. 210 bn in France in 1993.23 EU legislation caused a large 
decrease in such expenditure in France (the ‘subventions d'exploitation’ decreased 
from FR. 90 bn in 1982-84 to FR. 5.1 bn in 1989, and repayments of FDES loans 
offset new loans since 1990).24
Third, some categories of public expenditure have been transferred from the national to 
EU level. The transfer of spending power to European authorities originates from the 
combination of two complementary interests: national states may be willing to delegate 
the financing of some projects to the central level as a way of reducing their domestic 
spending and of obtaining community financing of projects which would otherwise be 
financed nationally. In the meantime, they cannot be held accountable for the policy 
implemented. Other categories of expenditure are systematically transferred to the EU 
following an institutionalised process which does not require annual approval by 
national states. With community grants, the delegation of spending power is designed 
to guarantee a certain degree of social protection for farmers and is part of a wider 
protectionist policy for agriculture. European spending on community grants remains 
marginal (it represented 3.6% of Member States’ budgets in 1988) but increased 
rapidly over the last decade (annual spending per inhabitant amounted to ECU 45 in 
1979, 135 in 1988 and 182 in 1992). The impact of these grants on national budgets
23 The European Union currency has been named in many different ways across countries and time, 
e.g. Ecu in France, ECU for European Currency Unit, and Euro or euro since 1995. Throughout the 
thesis we use the abbreviation ECU, which is most commonly used in Britain.
24 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques fran?aises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I 'Etranger, 6: 1695-99.
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varies according to the schemes. The direct impact on the French budget was 
estimated at FR. 7 bn dispersesd between 80 ‘fonds de concours'25 in 1990, but the 
overall financial influence of the EU seems much greater. The selection of 
programmes at the national level is likely to take into consideration the co-financing of 
schemes by the community, although the funds do not go through the general budget 
(the Guidance section of the EAGGF covers 20-25% of the costs for projects included 
in EU schemes). Therefore, the EU has an influence over the choice of spending if not 
over the amount. Also, EU aid to the private sector which in theory has no impact on 
national budgets (e.g. funds under the Guarantee section of the EAGGF do not go 
through national budgets), indirectly reduces charges normally supported by national 
governments.
Compliance is a significant cause of change in budgetary institutions as it ensures that 
outcomes, procedures and practices follow a defined ‘European’ pattern. However, 
proposition 1 presents a number of limitations. The rule-based approach is minimalist 
in the sense that Member States do not need to amend their institutions as long as they 
comply with the European guidelines. For instance, the requirements for fiscal 
discipline in the Maastricht Treaty did not generate much institutional change in the 
UK and France since both countries have been committed to budgetary discipline for a 
long time on national grounds and have set up adequate institutions. Therefore, in 
spite of the effect of political expediency, formal rules pronounced by the EU do not 
necessarily imply great institutional upheaval in national budgetary systems.
25 ‘Fonds de concours’ are credits assigned for the financing of specific projects. They are an 
exception to the public finance principle of non-assignment.
96
The function of EU institutions lies in the setting up of a preventive framework and 
organising mechanisms for co-operation. Also, they monitor the budgetary 
performance of the Member States and control the nature of institutional compliance. 
The EU is the ‘watch-dog’ or the ‘Supreme Court’ distributing rewards (the main 
reward being qualification for the third stage of EMU) and sanctions to governments 
on the basis of their success in meeting budgetary requirements. The EU can impose a 
scale of political sanctions ranging from making recommendations on excessive deficits 
in stage 2 to deciding on non-qualification for the third stage of EMU.
Although legally binding, the Treaty of Maastricht has limitations which render the
sanctions less credible. The procedure is not automatic; the final decisions on
excessive deficit and debt require discretion; the criteria are more benchmarks than
rules; and they are not bereft of ambiguity and vagueness. Target figures became both
abstract and unrealistic in the current economic context, since they reflect the strongly
voluntarist and optimistic views of the Maastricht Treaty where targets were used as a
political signal. The setting of tight budgetary targets takes for granted that spending
behaviour has the capacity to adapt. Moreover, Hagen argues discipline cannot be
achieved unless sanctions become credible.
"To be effective, such a strategy must rely on the credibility of the penalties it 
entails for violating these criteria. Experience with the budget norms in the US 
suggests that governments find ways to circumvent fiscal restraints in practice, 
with the result that they are largely ineffective. In the European context, the 
absence of a strict enforcement mechanism of fiscal constraints among 
sovereign nations other than the threat or possible application of peer pressure 
and financial sanctions raise the problem of how to ensure the prospects of 
budget criteria are successful".26
26 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.): abstract.
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While a compliance effect cannot be denied, the rule-based proposition is subject to 
several criticisms. First, the EU stance of legalising compliance seems naive or 
illusory, since it rests on the assumption that adopting an agenda for building the Union 
and overall objectives are sufficient to ensure Member States will comply with the 
requirements, although there is no credible sanction against free-riding. Hertzog and 
Weckel underline
“the inadequacy of current co-ordination mechanisms and the partially illusory 
character of the strategy for building EMU adopted in the Maastricht 
Treatywhich rests on the idea that a set calendar for the achievement of the 
Union, together with the definition of general objectives for economic and 
budgetary policies - whose attainment would be monitored by the Community 
institutions - would be sufficient to compel states to follow converging 
economic and budgetary policies.”27
It is all the more doubtful that compliance is an efficient basis for convergence since 
scholars have uncovered a large body of evidence that this strategy is unsuccessful for 
budgeting. Harden28 recalls that the US experience has shown that it is not efficient to 
impose substantive norms and procedures attempting to force agreement between 
participants in the budgetary process. In 1985 the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, that 
fixed annual declining targets, proved to be a failure. Similarly, Pliatzky recollects that 
“Parliament has in the past approved the legislation setting up these procedures, but the 
legislation left it with no say in the payments year by year.”29
27 “l’insuffisance des mecanismes actuels de coordination et le caractere partiellement illusoire de la 
strategic de construction de l’Union economique et monetaire adoptee par le Traite de Maastricht, qui 
repose sur l’idee que la fixation d’un calendrier de realisation de l’Union, assorti de la definition 
d’objectifs generaux des politiques economiques et budgetaires, dont le respect sera controle par les 
institutions communautaires, suffira a contraindre les Etats a pratiquer des politiques economiques et 
budgetaires convergentes.” quoted from Hertzog, Robert and Weckel, Philippe (1994), “Union 
Europeenne et coordination des politiques budgetaires des Etats membres”, Revue Frangaise de 
Finances Publiques, 45: 177.
28 “A constitutional analysis of budgetary norms and procedures in the framework of EMU” in 
Wildavsky, Aaron and Zapico-Goni, Eduardo (eds) (1993), National budgeting for Economic and 
Monetary Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff): 75-77.
29 Pliatzky, Leo (1989), The Treasury under Mrs. Thatcher (Oxford: Blackwell): 77.
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Second, the compliance approach tends to consider the EU level as a variable 
exogenous from national states and does not explain how European rules are created. 
Isolating EU from national administrations is unrealistic, since it does not account for 
the complex interactions between the two in decision-making.
Third, the notion of compliance emphasises the control and coercion functions of EU 
institutions. It conveys a ‘negative’ approach to convergence, based on enforcement 
and sanctions. It neglects the possibility for positive leadership and long-term 
budgetary guidance. The compliance focus is too narrow. Therefore, it is important to 
expose other and complementary views of how budgetary methods and processes in 
Britain and France are subject to Europeanisation.
3.2. Institutional hybridisation: are budgetary processes still ‘national9?
Proposition 2: Budgetary institutions can no longer be understood in a nationalist 
perspective because of the entanglement of national and EU policy-making 
levels. Budgetary processes have become hybrid because budgetary decision­
making is simultaneously made at the national and the EU levels with actors 
and institutions operating across boundaries. Budgeting at the national and 
the EU levels should be considered as parts of the same process.
Proposition 2 considers the European Union as a locus of decision-making rather than 
as a regulatory body and adopts a wider definition of institutions. This proposition has 
two implications for the study of changes in national budgetary institutions. First, the 
budgetary decision-making process is a hybrid of national and community rules and
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procedures because EU institutions and procedures have replaced some national ones, 
or have been added to them. Second, the hybridisation of institutions is not uniform 
but varies according to policy areas. National budgetary processes differ widely 
depending on whether decision-making involves EU institutions and procedures. This 
uneven hybridisation creates a two-track budgetary process, characterised by the 
juxtaposition of areas of conventional budgeting and areas where institutions are 
hybrid.
3.2.1. Hybridisation
The conventional literature traditionally isolates national from EU budgeting and 
considers that these processes are independent from one another. Proposition 2 
underlines the links between national and EU budgets, and between decisions over 
spending at the national level and policy-making at the EU level. Analysis of public 
finances in EU members may no longer be restricted to that of the national budget 
because the national budget is closely linked to the EU budgeting, both finance and 
policy. At the macro-economic level there are clear financial links between national 
budgets and the EU budget. Not only do EU-own resources represent an opportunity 
cost for national governments, but financing the EU budget implies a direct cost for 
national budgets since it is increasingly financed by direct contributions (see 
Appendices 3.1 and 3.2). In the UK the British contribution to the EU budget was 
estimated at ECU 8,110 m. in 1993 (about £4,620 m.). In France the direct ‘cost’ of 
financing the European budget has increased fivefold since 1980 and reached FR. 82.5 
bn in 1996 (about £9,700 m.), that is 6% of French budget resources (see Table 3.1.
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below). The contribution to the EU budget is the third most important cost centre for 
the French budget.30 It is greater than the budget for the Ministry of Employment and 
for the Ministry of Interior.
Table 3.1. The French contribution to the EU budget (1989-1997)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
as planned in the draft 
budget in bn. FR. 64,5 63,5 70,7 84,2 83,5 90,8 88,0 89,0 87,0
as a % budget receipts 5.6% 5.2% 5.5% 6.3% 6.4% 7.3% 6.7% 6.3% 6.2%
actual contribution 
in bn. FR. 61,2 56,1 74,7 72,6 77,0 82,5 78,2 82,5* -
as a % budget receipts 5.2% 4.7% 6.1% 5.8% 6.4% 6.6% 6.0% 6,0% -
* Estimates of the actual contribution
Sources: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1994), Projet de loi de finances pour 1995, 
Relations financieres avec I ’Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) : 28. and 
Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec I'Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) : 39.
Financing the EU budget became a significant cost for national budgets because of its 
growth while national governments’ budgets remained stable over years, particularly as 
they were required to respect the Maastricht criteria (see Appendix 3.3). Most 
Member States have applied growth norms far below that of the EU budget (3.1% 
growth in credits in the 1995 planned draft EU budget and 7.7% in 1996). In addition, 
the actual growth rate of the EU budget largely overstepped the forecasts (8.7% 
growth in 1995 instead of 3.1% planned). In France the target of 0% growth in real 
terms requires dramatic budget cuts considering the service of public debt and the 
commitments on staff wages. French representatives alleged that the EU budget, an 
intervention budget which could vary from year to year, should take into account the
30 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I 'Etranger, 6: 1694.
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objectives of stringency in individual Member States. The 1997 EU budget plans a 
more moderate growth in expenditure, which may indicate the stabilisation of the 
weight of national EU contributions in national budgets.
The French budget document is hybrid since it does not clearly isolate the financial 
flows with the EU from national receipts and expenditure: some EU receipts go 
through the budget and part of national budget resources directly finance the EU 
budget. Therefore, Linditch recommends distinguishing the financial flows between 
national governments and the EU budget in national budget documents.31 In its 1993 
annual report on French public finances the Cour des Comptes, the equivalent to the 
National Audit Office, criticised the government’s calculation of public spending for 
“arbitrarily” excluding a number of disbursements. It recommended the EU 
contribution be integrated into the economic estimate of actual government 
expenditure.32 The EU contribution constitutes an important element of tax pressure 
since it adds up to 1.1% GDP in 1993. As a corollary EU expenditure should be added 
to the spending totals of national governments of EU members since it increases the 
size of the public sector. Also the contribution affects the PSBR, and the way it is 
accounted for is not neutral in budgetary deficit calculations: from 1985 to 1989 the 
French annual deficit was reduced by 72% if the EU contribution is not taken into 
consideration, or by 36% if it is included.33 Therefore, the EU budget should be 
considered as an ‘extension’ of the national budget in the same way as the budget
31 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I ’Etranger, 6: 1681-89.
32 Les Echos (1994), “La Cour des Comptes souhaite que le budget de FEtat soit plus sincere” (28 
Sept.).
33 Ecole Nationale d’Administration (1993) “Le financement de l’Union”, La mise en oeuvre du 
Traite de Maastricht et la construction europeenne (July): 29-30.
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allocated to local authorities represents the ‘local branch’ of general government 
expenditure.34 From this perspective EU budgeting corresponds to a collegial decision 
on how to spend national resources.
At the departmental level it is often misleading to consider national expenditure in 
isolation from EU spending programmes. Budget allocations at the national level are 
often determined on the basis of what the EU spends on similar programmes. First, 
national expenditure is complementary to the EU budget. The British government 
investment aid and grants scheme for farmers is a small programme designed to 
complement the broader EU scheme under regulation 2328. The French suckling cow 
premium scheme was set up as an addition to the existing EU expenditure. The design 
of national budgets is thus modelled on EU spending. Second, with national schemes 
co-financed by the EU budget such as the agri-environment schemes, there are 
restrictions on what national governments may finance. The more national 
governments spend on a programme, the more EU expenditure rises. EU expenditure 
is induced by national spending. Third, for a number of policy areas (especially 
agricultural) EU expenditure has totally evicted national spending, with the effect that 
national governments do not allocate credits to these programmes to complement EU 
expenditure (e.g. intervention on the beef market). Many of the credits under CAP do 
not go through the budget of the Ministries of Agriculture but through agencies (e.g. 
Onilait and Ofival). Agricultural sectors in individual Member States receive more 
from the EU than from the domestic budget for agriculture. Financial information from
34 This argument rests on two facts. First, local government expenditure is included in the assessment 
of the size of general government in the UK. Second, part of the revenues of local authorities’ budgets 
are centrally financed by grants from national taxpayers.
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national budget documents would convey a misleading view about the extent of public 
spending for a particular policy. Credit allocations by national governments must not 
be analysed in isolation from the EU budget on similar programmes because the 
coverage of national budgets is defined by the boundaries of EU expenditure.
Not only are national and EU budgets linked, but national budgetary decision-making 
is also closely dependent on non-budgetary EU policy. Dowding argues “all 
departments must keep a close eye upon developments in Europe, for even policy 
initiatives which prima facie have little to do with the EC may in fact contradict 
European Law or European Directives.”35 A French senior civil servant mentioned 
that it has become vital for departments to check that national credits are compatible 
with EU regulation.36 For instance, French credits for the tearing up of ship holds 
(“dechirement des cales ”) required the prior agreement of EU institutions. Therefore, 
the development of EU non-budgetary competence impacts on national budgeting.
Moreover, EU policy-making generates budgetary issues for Member States because it 
is a major locus of policy-making. Many policy issues with budgetary implications 
debated in the Commission and the Council are the starting point for inter-ministerial 
conflicts over national government’s budgetary priorities. Negotiations at the EU level 
are regularly suspended to allow national representatives to consult their Finance 
Ministries. Therefore, EU negotiations oblige national governments to engage in 
interministerial co-ordination and determine a budgetary stance.
35 Dowding, Keith (1995), “European Union, new opportunities” in The civil service, chap. 7 
(London: Routledge): 130.
36 Interview, ref. 9.
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It is vital to bring national and EU budgets together to understand the impact of 
European membership on budgetary processes. In a context of budgetary stringency, 
EU credits have become so significant for many departments and bureaux that 
decision-making on EU budget allocations has a revived importance. EU budgeting 
represents an other source of finance which most departments seek to optimise. For 
instance, the TENs programme offers a possibility of extra financing for the TGV-East 
project which the Ministere des Transports tries to maximise. Therefore, departments 
are encouraged to participate actively in EU budgetary decision-making as well as in 
the bargaining with the Finance Ministry for domestic funds. Budgetary processes are 
duplicated since departmental actors are involved in EU budgetary negotiations in 
addition to conventional budgetary bargains.
The argument that budgeting in the UK and France has become hybrid rests on the 
following. First, while only national governments are entitled to levy resources to 
finance public expenditure, there are two institutions for allocating public expenditure, 
the national budget on the one hand, and the EU budget on the other. Therefore, 
departments need to participate and be represented in budgetary decision-making at 
both levels. The participation of departments in budgetary negotiations at each level 
depends on how they value the respective benefits from them. For instance the 
Department of Health may not be willing to participate actively in EU budgeting 
because it assumes that the ‘cost’ of participation outweighs the financial returns. The 
Ministries of Agriculture put much emphasis on EU budgeting because CAP spending 
is larger than domestic spending. Therefore budgetary negotiations at the EU level are 
more important than the bilaterals with the Treasury on the domestic budget. In some
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departments such as Transport the emphasis given to EU budgeting is unrelated to the 
relative size of the EU returns. Actors expect from the EU budget the financial 
flexibility at the margin that national governments cannot offer them and the political 
impetus for taking policy decisions. Therefore, budgeting is a hybrid process since 
departmental actors need to participate in two budgetary decision-making processes.
Second, hybridisation is reinforced by the fact that processes for allocating domestic 
funds, or ‘conventional budgeting’, have also become hybrid. First, EU membership 
has imposed new budgetary rules, targets and procedures which bind national 
governments. Second, decisions on the allocation of domestic credits are no longer 
made in a totally independent fashion but proposals are linked to policies on similar 
projects at the EU level. Because both EU institutions and national governments have 
the capacity to spend, and since there is no division of competence or policy areas 
between them, national governments cannot ignore EU public-spending policy. 
National budgetary choices take into account the EU budget to complement, reinforce 
or correct its effects.
Third, EU budgeting itself is hybrid because it simultaneously involves EU and national 
actors, institutions and procedures. Decisions over the allocation of European Union 
funds involve national civil servants who are simultaneously participating in national 
interministerial budgetary negotiations. Decisions at the EU level involve 
representatives of national administrations called to contribute to, and to approve, 
decisions. While the adoption of decisions is a EU process, the approval of each 
national representative is backed by its national government. Therefore, the choices 
made by EU institutions are closely linked to those of national governments.
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With unanimous decisions EU budgetary decisions reflect national choices. The role of 
actors operating across boundaries allows EU and national budgets to be co-ordinated, 
complementary or substitute. Therefore, EU budgeting is a hybrid system of 
bargaining between national actors and governments, and EU institutions 
(Commission, Council, Economic and Social Council, European Parliament) and EU 
procedures. The reciprocal involvement of national institutions in EU budgeting and 
vice versa creates a complex institutional system where budgetary decisions at both 
levels are so closely entangled that they cannot be isolated one from another. 
Budgetary processes have become hybrid because decision-making is simultaneously 
made at the national and the EU levels with actors and institutions operating across 
boundaries. Because of the linkages between the two levels, policy co-ordination is a 
major constraint and obligation. The hybridisation of national and EU decision-making 
institutions represents a major institutional change. Table 3.2. below considers the 
budgetary institutions defined earlier in the first chapter to see the changes involved 
and the effects on power distribution. With points 1.1 and 1.2 of Table 3.2, 
hybridisation has introduced limitations on the ability of departments to make 
proposals about EU spending decisions. While for conventional budgeting, 
departmental expenditure projections are discussed between departments and HM 
Treasury or the Direction du Budget, no spending decisions are drafted by national 
governments or ministries on their own because the framework and conditions for 
much spending in Member States are set at the EU level.
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Table 3.2. Institutional change because o f hybridisation
1. Public expenditure projections
1.1 Division-of- 
Labour
The power of making proposals for policy decisions lies in the hands of the 
Commission, not the department. Ministerial departments are not in charge of 
proposing policies, and they are not supposed to develop formal direct links with 
the Commission to influence it (relations are filtered by the permanent 
representation). Ministries may seek to use informal channels to influence 
proposals at the EU level, but so may various non-administrative bodies (interest 
groups, experts) and administrative institutions either internal to the department 
(EU bureaux) or external to it (e.g. Ministry of European Affairs in France).
1.2 Labour 
Specialisation
Departments are required to co-ordinate their projections with a large number of 
administrative bodies (permanent representation, Prime Minister’s Office, CO 
and FCO in the UK, SGCI and Quai d’Orsay in France) and other ministerial 
departments involved.
1.3 Leadership The fragmentation of spending decision-making into a large number of stages 
(interministerial bargaining stage, working group stage, European Council stage) 
modifies the definition of departmental leadership into a role of negotiator 
seaking compromise.
1.4 Power 
distribution 
within 
government
HM Treasury / Direction du Budget has little control over European spending in 
the Member States and are exogenous actors in most negotiations. Therefore, 
they set up institutions for administering European expenditure (Euro-PES in the 
UK, rates-of-retum in France) to regain control.
Arbitration within government is horizontal as well as vertical.
1.5 Multi-year 
budgeting
Department projections must fit in with the five-year budgetary planning of the 
European Union budget.
2. Vote of public expenditure allocation
2.1 Scope of
parliamentary
authorisation
- The size of EU Own Resources and the national contributions to the EU budget 
do not need to be authorised by national Parliaments.
- National Parliament loses control over expenditure and policy decisions of 
‘Europeanised’ policy areas.
2.2 Voting 
procedure
Qualified majority voting applies to most Council decisions on public 
expenditure. Member States need to form alliances and coalitions to influence 
decisions. Departmental representatives use bargaining techniques.
2.3 Discipline Members in the Council represent the views of their national government which 
need to be defined before and often during the negotiations.
3. Execution of the budget
3.1 Power of FM 
to block 
expenditure
Once the EU regulation or budget is voted on, the Finance Minister cannot 
amend it to cut expenditure. Therefore national programmes are more easily cut 
than others.
3.2 Degree of 
commitment
Commitment is financial as well as political in the international sphere.
3.3 Transfer of 
expenditure
European funds are used within the limits of what they have been allocated for. 
In general the conditions of use of EU funds are flexible.
3.4 Time period Inertia effect, therefore EU programmes tend to be renewed.
3.5 Flexibility for 
new demands
Because of the complexity of the drafting stage, there is little flexibility for 
making new demands.
3.6
Accountability
Shared between national and EU administrations.
3.7 Control on 
execution
Juxtaposition of controls by national and EU administrations creates a problem of 
frontiers-of-control mandates and lack of synergy.
3.8 Sanctions Recommendations on excessive public deficit; non-qualification for EMU.
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Division and specialisation of labour have dramatically changed at the expense of 
ministerial departments: the power of making proposals for policy decisions lies in the 
hands of the Commission. Ministerial departments may not propose budgetary 
allocations and they are not supposed to develop formal direct links with the 
Commission to influence it (relations are filtered by the permanent representation and 
the CO-SGCI). Ministries may seek to use informal channels to influence proposals at 
the EU level, but various non-administrative bodies (interest groups, experts) and 
administrative institutions either internal to the department (EU bureaux) or external to 
it (e.g. Ministry of European Affairs) are allowed to do so.
The procedure for making spending decisions is fragmented into a large number of 
stages (interministerial, working group, European Council). Each of these stages must 
be concluded by a compromise so the proposal may pass to the next stage. Arbitration 
between national actors is as much vertical (ultimate arbitration by the Prime Minister) 
as horizontal (interministerial). With the introduction of an horizontal dimension at 
level 1, arbitration represents a major institutional change in the French conventional 
budgetary process. French budgetary negotiations are traditionally hierarchical and 
‘top-down’, with unsolved disputes arbitrated for at the next level. Decisions on 
expenditure plans give an advantage to bilateral relations between each ministry and 
the Direction du Budget. Other departments are unaware of the contents of the Lettre 
de Cadrage sent by the Prime Minister, and Budgetary Conferences are bilateral. 
Negotiations at the EU level, because they require the definition of a ‘national’ stance, 
reinforce interministerial co-ordination and horizontal links within national 
governments.
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At level 2 the arbitration process between national representatives is complex, 
involving the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. No institution at the 
European Union level is entitled to arbitrate in the last resort, since decisions must be 
supported by the consensus of all parties involved. This shift has an impact on the 
department’s leadership function (1.3) which can no longer be described as a bilateral 
power relationship with HM Treasury and within the Cabinet, but encompasses 
negotiation procedures and consensus building in a multi-institutional environment. 
The shift in leadership is not best analysed by new institutionalism since this shift is less 
in institutions and more in strategies and role perceptions. New institutionalism 
usefully emphasises key functions, but the network approach would be more valid for 
understanding the complex strategies and power relationships between the various 
players of the budgetary game.
It is important to emphasise the shift in the Treasury’s traditional function since it is left 
out of EU negotiation arrangements. Finance Ministries participate in the setting of the 
overall EU budget but they do not actively participate with departmental 
representatives in the decisions over detailed EU programmes. Hybridisation implies 
that Finance Ministries lose power over the control of expenditure. They may impose 
constraints on departments, but the direct responsibility for control of expenditure 
decided at the EU level lies in the hands of departments. Finance Ministries have set 
up specific institutions to regain leadership and control over EU expenditure which are 
discussed in chapter 4. Regarding point 1.5, departmental projections must fit in with 
the EU five-years’ budgetary planning. MAFF public expenditure plans are designed
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within the broader framework of the EU agricultural budget, namely the stabilisation of 
expenditure under the Guarantee Fund and the CAP reform.
Budgetary hybridisation implies a great “hollowing” of Parliament’s role of voting the 
budget. French Members of Parliament do not authorise the transfer of the national 
contribution to the EU budget and other EU Own Resources, although the 
contribution increases public expenditure. In France this arrangement was made legally 
possible since 1973 thanks to an institutional artifice whereby the French contribution 
to the EU budget is treated as a pre-budgetary levy on global receipts, not as a 
disbursement. The contribution to the EU budget is not integrated into public 
expenditure. Although this practice in theory contradicts both traditional public 
finance principles of comprehensiveness and non-assignment, a Conseil Constitutionnel 
decision37 authorised it under the organic ordinance, on the grounds that the financing 
of the EU budget is authorised by Heads of States at EU summit meetings. However, 
this ‘acquired privilege’ of the EU and of Heads of States represents an interference 
with the intrinsic power of Parliament to vote on all credit allocations, and French MPs 
have expressed their concern, for example the report by Richard requests more national 
control over EU spending. Following an initiative from the socialists and centrists, the 
government indicated the level of the French contribution in the 1993 Finance Act (art. 
36).38 However, this clause operates only to make the French budget more transparent 
and informative since MPs are not entitled to challenge the level of the contribution.
37 Decision 82/154 on 29 December 1982.
38 Fressoz, in Cahiers Frangais (1993), “Le budget de l’Etat”, Cahiers Frangais, 261 (May-June) 
(Paris: La Documentation Frangaise).
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Amselek has criticised this practice which maintains the illusion that they are ‘accepted’ 
by the Parliament while spending decisions are taken by the Council.39
Equally, the scope of parliamentary authorisation shrank as a result of the transfer of 
policy-making and spending power to EU authorities. To some extent spending levels 
are not so much decided by Parliament as by the administration. A member of the 
Direction du Budget underlined the dangers of a EU budgetary process uncontrolled 
by Parliament.40 EU receipts and expenditure bypass the parliamentary stage at both 
the national and the European levels. Some categories of expenditure such as 
community aid are systematically transferred to the EU following an institutionalised 
process which does not require annual approval by Member States. The corollary is 
that governments cannot be held accountable by Parliament for decisions made or 
policies implemented (point 3.6).
The reduction in the scope of parliamentary authorisation is reinforced by a larger 
trend involving a shift in the relative weight of the successive stages of decision­
making. The hybridisation of budgetary institutions emphasises the drafting stage of 
budgetary proposals while decreasing the importance of voting the law by Parliament. 
One explanation for this shift is that actors tend to secure a compromise acceptable for 
all participants well before the voting stage. Since decisions are taken on the condition 
they satisfy the expected desires of Parliament, one can argue that Parliament does not 
lose its intrinsic power. However, in practice, bargaining tends to become longer and
39 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I ’Etranger, 6: 1681-89.
40 Interview, ref. 1.
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more complex in the first rather than in the second stages. Decisions in the Council 
(point 2.2) involve lengthy negotiations because they require the agreement of a 
majority of level 2 participants, who themselves are backed at level 1. The definition 
of a national policy stance gives a specific leadership power to ‘horizontal’ actors: 
departments in charge of the settlement of interministerial disputes and European 
bureaux in charge of setting the departmental stance on European matters (Cabinet 
Office, SGCI). The degree of discipline (point 2.3) reflects how tight the link between 
level 1 and level 2 decisions is.
Because institutions are hybrid and entangled, the implementation of budgetary 
decisions is characterised by a lack of flexibility. First, ministerial departments’ 
proposals must fit in with the EU calendar (e.g. CAP price-fixing is determined once a 
year). Second, since the drafting stage is complex and involves many actors and 
interests, it is difficult to amend decisions once they are made (point 3.5), and 
programmes tend to be renewed because of inertia (point 3.4). Third, because 
decisions simultaneously involve levels 1 and 2, and because national governments are 
responsible for implementing some EU programmes, it is not always easy to determine 
the level accountable for each expenditure programme (point 3.6). One effect of 
hybridisation, which is a corollary of the vagueness about the allocation of 
accountability between institutions, is the multiplication of administrative controls over 
the use of public funds (point 3.7). A better definition of who is accountable for what 
would make it possible to create synergy instead of repetitions in expenditure controls.
113
3.2.2. A two-track budgetary process
The integration of EU and national processes has a number of consequences for 
descriptions of budgeting. At the departmental level the process of budgeting differs 
widely depending on whether the EU has gained a responsibility in the area. 
Responsibility means the authority to make regulations and the ability to spend in a 
particular policy area. The conventional description of the budgetary process by 
Hagen as "the rules according to which budgets are drafted by a government, amended 
and passed by parliament, and implemented by the government"41 and the underlying 
power distribution between national administrations is valid for budgeting on those 
programmes where the EU has no responsibility, such as health provision. However, 
in an increasing number of issues national budgetary procedures have been dramatically 
modified to accommodate EU decision-making procedures and expenditure. With the 
French Ministere de l’Agriculture, while the decision on the amount allocated to 
education and training, and the conditions regulating the programme, emerge from 
internal bargaining between the Ministry, the Direction du Budget and French 
agricultural associations, the processes for making similar decisions on subsidies to 
farmers are different since they involve other bodies and new procedures. Hybridisation 
is equivalent to a major upheaval in the budgetary process which may no longer be 
described in Wildavsky’s or Hagen’s terms. It is best described as a dual process 
characterised by the juxtaposition of conventional budgeting, and hybrid national and 
EU institutions.
41 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.): 2.
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Many of the processes described by Wildavsky42, Hall43 and Hagen are not directly 
affected by EU membership because they are outside the responsibility of the EU. The 
chapter does not intend to discuss at length these mechanisms of conventional 
budgeting, because it is difficult to assess the extent to which they have been affected 
by European Union membership as against New Public Management. It is indeed 
significant that Hagen44 does not adopt a dynamic approach to changes in institutional 
arrangements linked to the EU but concentrates on a static assessment of the ‘quality* 
of national institutions on the basis of European requirements (i.e. compliance).
The budgetary pressures set by membership of the European Union have even been 
extensively used within conventional budgetary negotiations. Some budgetary 
institutions invoke membership of the EU during traditional budgetary negotiations to 
alter the power distribution within national administrations. Central agencies (HM 
Treasury, Direction du Budget, Prime Minister’s Office) have used EU membership as 
an argument to consolidate their power in budgetary bargains with spending ministries. 
The Maastricht targets and procedures are used as an external constraint to keep public 
expenditure projections low. Obligatory targets are particularly efficient since they 
constrain central agencies while being determined exogenously. Therefore, ministries 
cannot hope to alter the external constraints in their negotiations with the Treasury. As 
underlined by a French civil servant of the DB, “before the Loi Quinquennale, we did 
not have such a powerful tool. For the Direction du Budget, it is a very good deal.
42 Wildavsky, Aaron (1986), Budgeting: a comparative theory o f budgetary process, 2nd edition 
(Oxford: Transaction books).
43 Hall, Peter (1986), Governing the economy - The politics o f state intervention in Britain and 
France (Cambridge: Polity press).
44 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.).
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Before the Loi Quinquennale we could not clearly highlight or make the global 
constraint visible.”45 The constraint makes departments aware of the need to think in 
aggregate rather than departmental terms and about budgetary execution rather than 
initial estimations in the draft budget.
Budgeting in the United Kingdom and France is characterised by the juxtaposition of 
conventional and hybrid budgetary processes with the following implications. First, the 
traditional representation of uniform national budgetary institutions has been 
challenged by the increasing budgetary and policy-making responsibility of European 
Union institutions. Conventional and hybrid national-EU budgetary institutions are 
juxtaposed, creating a two-track budgetary process. The shift from conventional to 
hybrid budgeting varies greatly depending on the policy area and is typically greater in 
the Ministry of Agriculture than in the Department of Health, which is why the thesis 
goes down to budgeting at the sub-governmental level to study the adaptation to EU 
pressures in policy domains which are more or less exposed to EU influences. Hybrid 
institutions create a much more complex decision-making process involving a 
considerable increase in negotiations, policy fragmentation and administrative control. 
As a consequence departments may be reluctant to seek further Europeanisation.
Second, the boundaries between conventional and hybrid budgetary processes are not 
formally established because they are blurred and moving. The Maastricht Treaty, with 
its new definition of obligations accompanied by new fields of competency for the
45 “Avant la Loi Quinquennale, on n’avait pas d’instrument aussi puissant. Pour la Direction du 
Budget, c’est une tres bonne affaire. Avant la Loi Quinquennale on ne pouvait pas faire apparaitre 
clairement et faire visualiser la contrainte globale”, Interview, ref. 4.
116
Commission and the Council (namely on health matters), has enlarged the coverage of 
‘Europeanised’ decisions. Spending ministries which used to be little involved in 
European decision-making, such as health, start a learning process on how best to 
represent the national spending priorities at the EU level. They learn the limits of 
conventional budgeting and become familiar with new budgetary decision-making. 
Traditional methods for elaborating rules and for making decisions are disturbed by the 
introduction of new levels of decision-making. This change creates conflicts of 
authority since the frontier between conventional and hybrid institutions is not static.
We may wonder why such an institutional change in national budgeting has not been 
described before and why national civil servants are not always fully aware of this shift 
in decision-making mechanisms. The first element to this answer is that the internal 
organisation of national administrations has not yet adapted to the changes in decision­
making. Only recently have the governments in the United Kingdom and France 
requested the creation of a European bureau in each ministry to represent the 
department’s view at interministerial meetings and to be the national representative at 
the EU level. In France the former Minister for European Affairs created in each 
ministry a position whose role is to liaise with the European Parliament and the 
appropriate commissions to represent national interests in a sector and to inform the 
department of developments in the EU decision-making process.
Second, the integration of EU financial flows with Member States is not yet complete: 
the contribution and returns on the EU budget in national public finance are not 
integrated in the budget, and the constraints on EU expenditure in the Member States
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are not always the same as those on national spending. HM Treasury and the Direction 
du Budget give little information on the financial flows with the European Union, and 
it is doubtful whether they have this information: since part of the returns on the EU 
budget do not go through the central government’s budget but are directly allocated to 
local authorities or the private sector, the financial relations between Member States 
and the EU are not always transparent.
Third, the persistence of conventional budgeting in some policy areas, and the lack of 
adaptation of institutions (learning process), blur the extent of institutional change. 
The perception that the involvement of the EU within national budgeting is small is 
because not all institutional arrangements have yet assimilated this shift in practice and 
to date there is no formal recognition of this institutional shift either in government 
self-representation or in academic work.
3.3. Conclusion
Chapter 3 has enunciated and assessed a number of discoveries about the impact of EU 
membership on national budgetary processes. First, the chapter provided empirical 
evidence of the Europeanisation of national budgetary institutions and procedures. It 
proposed two interpretations of the type of adaption of bureaucratic mechanisms 
caused by EU membership, and concluded that the degree to which national budgetary 
institutions are affected is greater with the hybridisation than with the compliance 
proposition. Also, it concluded that, while both propositions are valid, institutional
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hybridisation is a wider process with greater long-term implications for national 
budgeting than is compliance.
Second, compliance and hybridisation do not qualify the impact of EU membership on 
national budgetary institutions in the same way. The concept of compliance was 
originally used within normative approaches to refer to changes in budgetary 
institutions. Compliance rested on the idea that EU institutions could impose ‘good’ 
procedures to ensure budgetary discipline in the EU (e.g. excessive deficit procedure, 
peer surveillance). Compliance rests on the presupposition that budgetary 
Europeanisation contributes to enhancing national bureaucratic mechanisms.
Hybridisation is opposed to this ‘optimistic’ view of budgetary Europeanisation. It 
underlines that the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms to EU membership caused 
increased complexity of budgetary decision-making processes. Indeed, budgetary 
processes are duplicated since departmental actors are engaged in budgetary 
negotiations at the EU level in addition to conventional domestic budgetary bargains. 
The reciprocal involvement of national institutions in EU budgeting and vice versa 
creates a complex institutional system where budgetary decisions at both levels are so 
closely entangled that they cannot be isolated from one another. The duplication of 
decision-making processes involves a considerable increase in negotiations, policy 
fragmentation and administrative control. Traditional methods for elaborating rules 
and for making decisions are disturbed by the introduction of new levels of decision­
making. In the meantime, hybridisation has emphasised the drafting stage of budgetary 
proposals while decreasing the importance of the voting by national Parliaments; it has 
stressed the need for more interministerial coordination.
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Third, compliance and hybridisation processes allow a number of EU pressures to urge 
national governments to adapt their budgetary processes to changing EU requirements. 
With compliance the main pressure implied by EU membership on budgetary processes 
to change is regulation. Europeanisation is the process of adaptation of national 
budgetary processes to incorporate specific obligatory budgetary requirements 
formulated at the EU level and to integrade new procedures involving EU bodies into 
the national budgetary process. The chapter provided empirical evidence of the impact 
of EU regulation on institutional changes in France, in particular with the inclusion in 
the French budgetary statute of the targets, agenda and sanctions defined in the 
Maastricht Treaty.
In the context of hybridisation the main cause of Europeanisation lies in the links 
between the national and the European budgets and between their budgetary 
procedures. The national budget is closely linked to the EU budget in finance and 
policy: at the macroeconomic level financing the EU budget is a major cost on national 
budgets; at the departmental level public expenditure by national governments may not 
be considered in isolation from EU expenditure because EU programmes are the basis, 
the complement or the substitute for national spending programmes. National and EU 
budgetary processes are entangled because budgetary decision-making is 
simultaneously made at the national and the EU levels with actors and institutions 
operating across boundaries. Therefore, hybridisation substantiates the hypothesis that 
the adaptation of budgetary processes to EU budgeting depends on the frequence and 
intensity of interactions between national and European actors.
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Fourth, because of the types of EU pressure identified, the nature of the adaptation 
process of bureaucratic mechanisms to EU pressures is different in the two 
propositions. By restricting EU pressures on budgeting to formal binding rules, 
compliance conveys a restrictive view of the Europeanisation of national budgeting. 
The influence of the EU is restricted to negatively-oriented fiscal norms and 
procedures and to police-like legislative rules which establish limits that EU members 
cannot surpass. The compliance proposition conveys the view that Europeanisation is 
a ‘top-down’ process. It does not explain how EU rules are formed and the 
involvement of national governments in the designing of EU budgetary institutions. 
Furthermore, scholars have identified multiple historical examples to argue that 
Europeanisation may not arise from compliance only, because EU institutions have 
inadequate enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance in hard times. Therefore, 
compliance to EU regulation cannot be denied but it is too restrictive to capture the 
whole process of adaptation of national budgetary institutions to EU membership.
With hybridisation the nature of the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms to EU 
pressures is different because hybridisation emphasises EU influences on leadership and 
on the roles of various institutions within budgetary processes. Hybridisation implies 
that budgetary Europeanisation is not uniform as it depends on whether decision­
making involves both EU and national institutions and procedures. It contributes to 
creating a two-track budgetary process, characterised by the juxtaposition of areas of 
conventional budgeting and areas where institutions are hybrid.
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Finally, the concept of hybridisation constitutes a promising contribution to the 
literature since it could be used not only to explain the mechanisms of integration in the 
European Union but also to challenge the traditional definition of budgeting. 
Hybridisation emphasises that the frontier between national and European budgets and 
budgetary processes is blurred. Budgetary procedures of EU members have been 
dramatically modified to accommodate EU decision-making procedures and 
expenditure. Therefore budgeting is best described as a dual process characterised by 
the juxtaposition of conventional budgeting, and hybrid national and EU institutions. 
Therefore, hybridisation substantiates the main hypothesis of the thesis because it 
reflects a wider definition of budgetary institutions and expresses the links between 
national and EU budgeting. Budgetary institutions can no longer be studied in a 
national perspective alone because of the entanglement of national and EU policy­
making levels. Budgeting at the national and the EU levels should be considered as 
parts of the same process.
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Chapter 4
National budgetary institutions administering the financial 
relations with the EU: impact on national strategies
One effect of institutional hybridisation entails that the centre of gravity for the setting 
of expenditure plans is displaced from the Finance Ministry to individual departments. 
Departmental actors participate in decision-making at both levels 1 and 2 while the 
Finance Ministry is mostly excluded from level 2 decisions on sectoral policies. In 
addition, a large part of expenditure is determined not at the national but at the 
collegial EU level. The Europeanisation of national budgeting through the process of 
hybridisation represents a challenge to the direct control of expenditure traditionally 
exercised by Finance Ministries in EU members.
Considering the dominance of HM Treasury and the Direction du Budget within 
respectively the British and the French central administration, and knowing the priority 
given to the control of public spending in both countries, the British and the French 
governments have adopted budgetary mechanisms to protect the control of public 
funds by the Finance Ministry. National governments in Britain and France have set up 
specific national financial rules for managing financial relations with the EU (including 
Euro-PES in Britain and the ‘principe de Constance’ in France) to ensure the ultimate 
control of national governments over EU spending. In both systems the budgetary 
mechanism aims to avoid the simultaneous financing of similar programmes by the 
domestic and the EU budgets and to maintain the level of public expenditure (when EU
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expenditure increases in a Member State, the domestic budget should decrease 
proportionally). These budgetary mechanisms allow the Finance Ministry to regain 
control over the financial flows with the EU budget. They alter the interministerial 
power distribution in favour of the Finance Ministry and affect the strategy of actors.
The chapter analyses these mechanisms and their impact on the strategies of national 
actors and more widely on national budgeting. The mechanisms set up in France and in 
the UK are different, and the interest of the chapter is to assess the impact on the 
strategies of national administrations of the EU budget and of the financial relations 
between the EU and national budgets.
4.1. In the United Kingdom, an efficient locking mechanism
In the mid-1980s the British government instituted a number of budgetary mechanisms 
for administering the EU contribution and receipts throughout Whitehall. The 
strategies of different groups within British administration are constrained by two 
‘layers’ of financial mechanisms. First, departments are individually constrained by the 
Euro-PES and the attribution mechanisms. Second, the Fontainebleau agreement sets 
overall pressures on the financial relations between the British government and the EU. 
The juxtaposition of these mechanisms creates particularly complex and somewhat 
paradoxical effects on budgeting in the United Kingdom.
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4.1.1. The Euro-PES mechanism
The Euro-PES (European Public Expenditure Survey) was established in 1984 in
response to three main concerns. First, it reflected the government’s priority of
controlling increases in the EU budget as part of its general policy of maintaining the
level of public expenditure, since an increase in the EU budget is directly translated into
an increase in the British contribution. A British official argued
“The UK government has a principle of what is called ‘non-additionality’ which 
means that, because one of the main themes of the British government is to 
control public expenditure, it does not want expenditure that originates in 
Europe to increase total public expenditure in the UK. Because it would be all 
too easy in the eyes of Treasury for them to try to squeeze down a particular 
programme in domestic terms if the same policy-makers could go off to 
Brussels.”1
Second, the Euro-PES mechanism affects the behaviour of spending departments in
negotiations at the EU level. It creates a context where ministerial departments try to
ensure that national priorities and constraints (such as value-for-money) are well
represented in the EU plans. It offers a solution to the problem of the duplication of
financing for matching programmes by the national and the EU budgets. Therefore,
the Euro-PES is a tool for HM Treasury to regain control of public spending in the
UK, whether domestic or European.
“Ministers feared that spiralling EC expenditure would undermine their efforts 
to curb domestic expenditure by increasing the UK’s net contribution; and so 
they instituted Euro-PES as a device to restrain EC spending by threatening 
government departments with reduced domestic budgets in the event of 
excessive EC spending. With this incentive, departments would, it was hoped, 
become more actively involved in EC budget planning and exert more control, 
not only in reducing expenditure but also in scrutinising projects for value-for- 
money, ensuring minimal duplication of work at UK and EC levels and 
attempting to uphold UK priorities in the EC.”2
1 Interview, ref. 48.
2 Department of Transport (1992), A basic guide to Euro-PES, July.
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Third, the Euro-PES mechanism shares out the burden of the British contribution to 
the EU budget among spending departments. It rests on the idea that departments 
should contribute to financing the British contribution as a proportion of the relevant 
EU policies. Indeed, it is not possible to offset departments’ budgets by the amounts 
that the European Union spends in Britain on specific programmes because EU funding 
cannot always be matched with a particular budgetary line and also because part of the 
EU funds are not allocated to central government but to local authorities or to the 
private sector. Therefore, the Euro-PES system is based on what the EU budget 
actually costs the British budget. In short, Euro-PES is a systematic tool for dividing 
the cost of financing the EU budget within Whitehall.
The technical details of how the Euro-PES mechanism works explain the strategies of 
the British administration on EU budgeting. The first stage of Euro-PES mainly 
involves HM Treasury and leaves little margin for departmental negotiations. It 
consists in breaking down EU expenditure into sectoral ‘cost centres’ which are then 
allocated to relevant spending ministries within Whitehall. The Treasury deducts from 
the PES baseline for departmental budgets the EU budget lines (the term denoting 
areas of EU expenditure) allocated to individual departments with related 
responsibilities, and adds to it the eligible public sector receipts3 with no consideration 
for the identity of the final recipient of these grants. For instance, the initial PES 
baseline of the Department of the Environment is reduced by the British share (11.4%) 
of the relevant EU budget and increased by anticipated UK public sector receipts. This 
mechanism creates the effect that the Department of the Environment pays for 1.4% of
3 The eligible public sector receipts are EU grants which have been part of the Programme and have a 
PES cover, i.e. have gone through the government accounting books.
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the British contribution to the EU budget when the European Union spends 1.4% of its 
budget on environmental policies.4 Departments can reduce the size of their baseline 
reductions by claiming credits for eligible public sector receipts, those EU grants which 
have been integrated into UK central government expenditure. The baselines are then 
raised by the size of these grants. However, most EU grants are sent directly to the 
private sector and cannot be claimed against PES baseline deductions.
The second stage consists in allocating the cost of Euro-PES within the department’s 
budget. With the Department of Health where EU expenditure is small relative to the 
domestic budget, the baseline reduction is taken off the overall department budget with 
no allocation to individual programmes. However, with larger EU budgets Euro-PES 
means that EU spending in the UK is balanced by a reduction in individual domestic 
programmes at the departmental level. Dowding5 gives the example of a £30 m. 
expenditure on youth training schemes by the EU, of which £6 m. would be spent in 
Britain. Under Euro-PES the Department of Employment will have to cut £6 m. from 
its own budget, although it is not entitled under matching agreements to reduce the 
budget it would have spent on youth training in the absence of EU spending. 
Departments have to cut other schemes or find savings in their core budget. This 
budgetary mechanism affects significantly the strategy of British civil servants during 
the implementation of EU schemes in Britain.
4 Estimation, Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1994), Projet de loi de finances pour 1995, 
Relations financieres avec I ’Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale).
5 Dowding, Keith (1995), “European Union, new opportunities” in The civil service, chap. 7 (London: 
Routledge).
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Dowding argues Euro-PES
“has decreased Whitehall enthusiasm for the EC, given that civil servants’ own 
pet schemes may have to be casualties of the commissioners’ pet schemes ... it 
means that sometimes no department wishes to be the ‘lead’ department on 
issues which do not obviously come under its own sphere of influence. Rather 
than departments squabbling to be ‘lead’ departments in order to empire-build, 
they fight shy of new initiatives. Thus in 1994 no department wanted to be the 
lead department for the EC’s ‘Youth in Europe’ initiative and negotiate on 
Britain’s behalf.”6
The Euro-PES mechanism has several financial consequences at the macroeconomic 
level. First, Euro-PES indicates that the UK government treats EU expenditure the 
same as domestic credits. As an illustration, the Euro-PES baseline is set at 1984 
levels and is upgraded annually at the standard PES rate (the rate of increase in 
domestic expenditure). By doing so the government ignores EU budgetary projections 
and identifies EU expenditure trends with domestic public expenditure trends. The 
Euro-PES baseline has thus become artificial.7 Second, Euro-PES affects the extent to 
which the principle of additionality operates in practice within British budgeting. At 
the departmental level Euro-PES is a systematic tool for proportionally reducing 
domestic credits when EU credits increase. Therefore, at departmental level, EU 
funding is not additional but a substitute for domestic funding.
Since Euro-PES is mainly directed at the EU budget for Internal Policies, the Overseas 
Development Aid budget and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office budget are not 
affected by Euro-PES but by attribution. The attribution mechanism is the simple 
deduction from their budget of the UK share of the Common External and Security
6 Dowding, Keith (1995), “European Union, new opportunities” in The civil service (London: 
Roiitledge): 138-139.
7 In the case of non-R&D transport expenditure for 1992, the Euro-PES baseline was ECU 42.5 m. 
while EU’s proposed 1992 budget sets the expenditure at ECU 121.1 m., which leaves an ‘overspend’ 
of ECU 81. 9 m., nearly twice as large as the Euro-PES baseline.
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Policy (CESP). As a consequence, increases in multilateral EU programmes lead to 
corresponding cuts in British bilateral aid. Attribution differs from Euro-PES to the 
extent that the deduction from the departmental PES baseline is based on actual EU 
expenditure, not on the UK contribution to the CESP budget. However, since the 
impact of attribution on additionality and actors’ strategies are similar to that of Euro- 
PES, the rest of the discussion about Euro-PES applies also to attribution.
4.1,2. The Fontainebleau agreement
As early as 1974 the United Kingdom requested financial compensation based on its 
structural net contribution to the EC budget. It was felt the UK should obtain financial 
compensation for at least three reasons. First, 80% of the EC budget was allocated to 
the CAP when the agricultural sector in the UK was fairly small. Therefore, EC 
expenditure priorities did not match with the UK’s. Second, the Guarantee mechanism 
increased the price of UK agricultural products in comparison with world - namely 
Commonwealth - market prices. Joining the EC represented a cost for British 
consumers and fuelled some inflation. Third, the country allocation for financing the 
EC budget did not ensure perfect equity. Equity may be assessed by comparing for 
every country the share of financing the EC budget to the relative weight of its GDP 
within the overall EC GDP, which represents its capacity to contribute economically. 
Table 4.1. shows that with Germany, Italy and the UK, there are differences between 
the share of the contribution to the EC budget and the economic weight of these 
countries in the EC. With the United Kingdom the relative larger share of financing the 
EC budget partly results from the VAT resource of the EC budget which weighs more
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on countries with a large private sector and low savings such as the UK. With Member 
States where the public sector is larger, the VAT base is smaller.
Table 4.1. An assessment o f equity in the financing o f the EU budget (1992)
National % of Bel Dn Ger Gre Sp Fr Irel It Lux N1 P UK
contribution to 4 1.9 30.2 1.3 8.6 18.6 0.8 14.7 0.2 6.2 1.5 12
EC budget
GDP/EC GDP 3.1 2 26.3 1.2 8.5 18.8 0.5 18 0.2 4.3 1.1 16
Source: Ecole Nationale d’Administration (1993) “Le financement de rUnion”, La mise en oeuvre du 
Traite de Maastricht et la construction europeenne (July): 32.
The principle of financial compensation to the United Kingdom was agreed as soon as 
UK joined the EC. In Dublin, Member States established a mechanism for 
reconsidering contribution levels of the UK, Ireland and Denmark whenever these 
countries faced an economic crisis and an excessive contribution to the EC budget.8 
The United Kingdom and Ireland used the Dublin mechanism in 1978 and 1979 to 
revise their contributions, but from 1980 the improvement of the British balance-of- 
payments precluded the UK from fulfilling the required conditions. However, the 
British government claimed a reduction of its EC contribution. From 1980 to 1983 the 
EC granted two financial measures to the UK: the British contribution was directly 
reduced (see Table 4.2.) and the EC agreed to finance special multi-annual 
programmes designed by the UK in the framework of the ERDF.
8 The two conditions required for using the Dublin mechanisms are:
- a difficult economic situation which may be found when the average GDP per person is less than 
85% of the average GDP in the EC, the real growth rate of the GDP is less than 120% of the average 
EC rate and the balance-of-payments is in deficit.
- an excessive contribution to the EC budget which exists when the contribution share is at least 10 
points more than the share of the national GDP within the GDP of the EC.
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Table 4.2. Reduction in the British contribution to the EC budget (1980-1983) 
in m. ECU
1980 1981 1982 1983
Reduction 1,175 1,410 1,187 1,750
Source: Ecole Nationale d’Administration (1993) “Le financement de l’Union”, La mise en oeuvre du 
Traite de Maastricht et la construction europeenne (July): annexe 3.
The Fontainebleau agreement was concluded in June 1984 in response to British
concern about the cost of the EU budget and the size of UK’s net contribution. Using
Mrs. Thatcher’s famous slogan, “I want my money back”, the British government
obtained a lump-sum compensation of £7 bn. for 1984 (i.e. half the UK net
contribution in that year) and the restitution of 55% of the net contributions of the
previous years.9 Also, the British government succeeded in securing that in future
years two-thirds of the difference between the British contribution to the EU budget
and the EU spending in the UK would be paid back to the UK. In 1993 a ECU 3,181
m. compensation was granted the UK, thereby reducing by two-thirds the British net
contribution and amounting to 40% of the British contribution to the EU budget (ECU
8,110 m.).10 The British compensation represents a cost to the EU budget which is
then financed by the other Member States (e.g. the French share of financing the
British compensation was ECU 800 m. in 1993). In short, the British net contribution
to the EU budget has been cut by 66% since 1984. This measure in favour of the UK
has not been challenged since, despite the decreasing share of CAP within the EU
expenditure (46% in 1997 as against 80% in the 1970s).
9 Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques contraintes 
communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science 
Politique en France et a I ’Etranger, 6: 1694.
10 Ecole Nationale d’Administration (1993) “Le financement de l’Union”, La mise en oeuvre du Traite 
de Maastricht et la construction europeenne (July): 32.
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4.1.3. The effect of budgetary institutions on the strategy of the British administration
A French senior civil servant recognises the close link between existing budgetary
mechanisms and the strategies of national governments. She argues that
“from the budgetary point of view, they [the British] have this vision of things 
because their system of Euro-PES equates the cost of community financing to 
that of national financing ... The existence or not of such a mechanism has an 
impact on the fundamental positions which may be defended by Member 
States.”11
There are several conclusions on the effects of these mechanisms on the strategy of 
British civil servants for EU expenditure. First, because of Euro-PES and attribution 
British departments adopt a ‘resource-minimising’ approach during negotiations on the 
EU budget. The interest of British departments is to keep the overall EU budget low 
to reduce the British contribution, which is the amount to be divided within Whitehall. 
Also, British departments seek to minimise the EU budget line allocated to their areas 
of expenditure as a way of reducing the proportion of the contribution to be set against 
departmental PES baselines. Departments prefer a smaller share of EU spending in 
their jurisdictions because it determines the percentage of the British contribution paid 
by the departmental budget. Therefore, ministerial departments are not seeking to 
maximise the resources available at the EU level, but rather to minimise the funds 
available for distribution among the Member States.
Second, once the EU budget and budget lines are agreed, the strategy of the 
department consists of staying within the agreed limits. Any EU spending in a
11 “Sur le plan budgetaire, ils ont cette vision des choses parce que leur systeme de gage europeen fait 
que pour eux le cout est egal entre le financement communautaire et le financement national ... 
L’existence ou pas d’un tel mecanisme a une incidence sur les positions de fond qui peuvent etre 
defendues par les Etats Membres.”, Interview, ref. 2.
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departmental area in excess of the Euro-PES baseline is designated an ‘overspend’ by 
HM Treasury, and individual departments pay the UK’s share of the overspend from 
their budget. In other words, when the Union spends more on a programme than the 
agreed budget line, overspending in turn increases the British contribution to the EU 
budget, increases the percentage of the contribution supported by the department and 
reduces the relevant department’s baseline further. This mechanism explains the reason 
why British departments ensure EU expenditure does not exceed the agreed limits.
Third, the Euro-PES mechanism on its own would give departments incentives to 
adopt a resource-maximising approach and seek to maximise British government 
receipts once the EU budget is agreed on. This behaviour would include having a large 
coverage to get maximum public sector receipts within the set budget, since any 
receipts to the private sector are lost to the department. However, this effect of Euro- 
PES is contradicted by the impact of the Fontainebleau agreement on the British 
government’s strategy on EU expenditure. Since the government gets back two-thirds 
of its net contribution to the EU budget, the more the European Union spends in the 
UK, the less the government gets back. HM Treasury’s strategy consists of 
maximising the financial compensation under the Fontainebleau agreement as a way of 
minimising the cost of the EU for the domestic budget. This behaviour is because part 
of EU spending in the UK is allocated to local authorities and the private sector, while 
being ultimately financed by the budget; therefore it would be less costly for the 
government not to finance this expenditure. The Fontainebleau agreement creates the 
effect that there is no particular financial incentive for the government to prefer EU to 
domestic financing: the cost for the British budget is nearly the same whether spending
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is incurred by the EU or by the British budgets. Therefore, HM Treasury prefers 
spending to be decided at the domestic level, according to the government’s criteria 
and priorities, rather than at the EU level.12
The consequence of the Fontainebleau agreement is that HM Treasury puts pressures 
on departments to minimise their take in EU expenditure. Financial mechanisms in the 
UK set incentives for departments to offer a small coverage and to obtain a small share 
of EU spending within a set EU budget. This conclusion contradicts Downs’ and 
Niskanen’s models which support the argument that departments should, in theory, try 
to maximise their resources to maximise their influence, the satisfaction of their users 
and their budget size in comparison with other departments.13 This example illustrates 
how institutions may alter departmental strategies by introducing the values of HM 
Treasury into departmental activity.
The financial mechanisms discussed have an impact on the distribution of the cost of 
financing the EU budget throughout Whitehall. In particular, Whitehall departments 
not only support the weight of EU policy in their own policy areas, but also support the 
cost of CAP. Indeed, considering that the mechanism of attribution operates fairly 
similarly to the Euro-PES system, the only Whitehall department not concerned with
12 The fact that EU expenditure in the UK is considered to be equivalent to domestic financing by the 
British government explains the reluctance of Whitehall to accept the allowance offered by EU 
institutions for the slaughtering of potentially BSE-affected cows in Britain. The EU allowance did 
not put financial pressures on the EU budget since any additional spending in the UK would have been 
deducted from the British compensation under the Fontainebleau agreement (therefore, the cost for the 
EU budget could have been small). The mechanisms described in this chapter explain the British 
hesitation to accept a EU financial support: it is as costly for the British government to pay farmers 
with domestic as with EU funds. In addition, large EU spending in the UK under CAP would have 
compromised the existence of the Fontainebleau agreement since Britain would no longer have been 
able to argue that it is largely contributor to the CAP budget.
13 Dunleavy Patrick (1991), Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf): 148-162.
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financing of the UK contribution to the EU budget is MAFF. This exemption seems 
paradoxical at first glance since 46% of the EU budget is allocated to CAP (1997). 
Agriculture is not included in the Euro-PES mechanism for two reasons: first, it would 
be impossible to offset the British share of the CAP budget from the department’s PES 
baseline, since the former largely exceeds the latter. As a broad indication domestic 
agriculture spending is only one third of entire agricultural expenditure in the UK, and 
CAP constitutes two-thirds of this spending. Second, Euro-PES is irrelevant for 
agriculture since the nature of EU and national spending is different: EU expenditure 
does not duplicate or replace existing national expenditure. Not only does MAFF not 
participate in financing the CAP, but the rest of Whitehall bears part of the cost of 
CAP. Indeed, the government does not reallocate to departments the money received 
from the EU under the Fontainebleau agreement. Instead, it uses it to cover part of the 
British contribution to the EU budget not covered by the Euro-PES - clearly CAP and 
the Structural Funds.
Existing budgetary institutions for administering EU contributions and receipts at 
central government level form an efficient locking mechanism, which offers the British 
government full control over expenditure in the nation in all possible areas, except 
spending by local authorities. Actors throughout Whitehall do not adopt a resource- 
maximising approach to EU finance. At departmental level actors do not seek to 
maximise EU resources because EU funding is not additional but a substitute for 
domestic funding under Euro-PES. In addition, the cost of EU policy in a sector is 
apparent in departmental budgets, while the financial returns are difficult to assess.
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Decision-making at the EU level is more complicated, and the negotiations with HM 
Treasury to get EU funding in the UK are as intense as those in national funding. As 
argued by a senior civil servant from HM Treasury, “why it [the Euro-PES mechanism] 
is worth it, is because of the effect it has on the behaviour of the spending departments 
in the negotiations with Brussels”14 rather than because of the amount of money saved. 
At central-govemment level actors are not resource-maximising because it is as 
expensive to have a programme financed by the EU as domestically under the 
Fontainebleau agreement. Illustrating this British view, Nicholas Ridley, British 
Minister and former Secretary of Transport, used to declare that EU finance is just a 
‘merry-go-round’ by which UK pays money to the EU and gets it back through other 
channels. Although not part of a co-ordinated EU-wide system, some Member States 
including the Netherlands have copied the Euro-PES mechanism, and Sweden, 
Germany and France have expressed their interest in it.
Euro-PES represents a major obstacle for the extension of additionality, and there have 
been calls for its reform or even its abolition. Michael Heseltine, as Secretary of State 
for the Environment in late 1991 and for the Department of Trade and Industry in June 
1992, led a number of Ministers in suggesting it would be appropriate to dismantle or 
reform Euro-PES in the light of the increase in EU spending under the Delors II budget 
package. This proposition was resisted by HM Treasury, although it acknowledged 
there were problems.
14 Interview, ref. 7.
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4.1.4. Additionality
Additionality is a fundamental principle of budgeting in the European Union, stating 
that EU funds should be additional to, and not a substitute for, domestic expenditure. 
Sir Bruce Millan, the British EU Commissioner, publicly condemned the British 
substitution practice and, with the backing of the European Court of Justice, made it 
conditional that European funds would be additional to domestic expenditure. Despite 
Whitehall’s original disagreement, Sir John Kerr, the British Ambassador to the EU, 
finally accepted this principle (so-called ‘Kerr-Millan agreement’). The purpose of the 
next section is to see the effect of these institutional mechanisms on effective 
additionality and on the strategy of varied groups of civil servants.
While additionality does not operate at the central government level, it is more difficult 
to assess precisely the extent of additionality at the local government level. The 
European Union requires that Structural Funds expenditure be additional, which means 
that the attribution of a EU grant to local authorities should not reduce the original 
central government spending plans. This requirement is designed to prevent 
substitution occurring, as has happened in the past. A British official acknowledged 
that
“previously, we had quite simply pocketed the money which came from the 
Regional Funds and taken it both in the national budget and in the distribution 
mechanism so that if a particular Local Authority got a grant, its national grant 
is cut by that amount. In economic terms, it makes a good deal of sense 
because if you are going to build a Margaret Thatcher bridge and the 
Commission is going to build a Jacques Delors bridge, you are not going to 
build both.”15
15 Interview, ref. 7.
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Additionality is now supposed to operate at the local government level since central 
government cannot formally undertake an offset. However, it is difficult to conclude 
that EU funding has become effectively additional at the local government level 
because it is extremely difficult to prove that central government continues to spend 
more than it would have otherwise by virtue of the fact that the European Union was 
paying. A civil servant recognised that “that is actually unmeasurable and I doubt it is 
true ... As far as the national distribution mechanism is concerned, we changed the 
rules so that a particular area getting a grant would not lose national grants. We also 
make sure we put less money through local government so that this question would not 
arise!”.16 We cannot therefore assert that EU funding through ERDF is additional at 
local level except in the case of block allocation grants (minor schemes under £2 m.) 
and ‘recycled money’ (local authorities must spend the money on programmes 
approved by central government).
4.2. In France, a less constraining framework
The government and the Direction du Budget have adopted several principles and 
mechanisms for administering financial relations between the French and the EU 
budgets but they create a less constraining framework than in the United Kingdom. 
The main French budgetary mechanisms, the ‘principe de Constance’ and the rate-of- 
retum approach, are principally targeted to influence the spending behaviour of 
departments and solve the problem of matching expenditure programmes.
16 Interview, ref. 7.
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4.2.1. The ‘principe de Constance ’
The French government has adopted the non-written principle that domestic 
expenditure should decrease when EU spending increases. The €principe de 
constcmce’ was formulated by former European Affairs Minister Lamassoure in 1993, 
but it has been implicit since the 1960s. As underlined by a former Directeur du 
Budget, “the Direction du Budget considers that as soon as a policy is undertaken at 
the European level, it should cease at the national level... I do not recall maintaining 
any other opinion since 1967-68.”17 The ‘principe de Constance’ originates from the 
fact that most EU programmes are by nature a duplicate of, or at least can be 
correlated to, national programmes. This principle aims to rationalise public spending 
by suppressing the domestic financing of matching EU and national expenditure. The 
rationale of the principle stands in opposition to that of the principle of subsidiarity, 
since the higher rather than the lower level of financing is favoured.
The ‘principe de Constance’ implements the decision to stabilise the size of the public
sector in the framework of raising EU expenditure in the Member States. Also, its
revived importance, as demonstrated by the Lamassoure declaration in 1993, is caused
by the increased budgetary stringency required to reach the Maastricht targets. An
official from the Direction du Budget argued
“it is a non-written principle which exists implicitly since, because we are 
committed to Economic and Monetary Union, because there is inevitably a 
policy to reduce or control public deficits and because the contribution to the 
community budget increases, we need to find savings somewhere.”18
17 “la Direction du Budget estime que des le moment ou une politique est prise en charge au niveau 
Europeen, elle doit cesser au plan national. (...) Je ne me souviens pas avoir soutenu d’autre these que 
celle-la depuis 1967-68.”, Interview, ref. 3.
18 “C’est un principe non-ecrit qui existe implicitement puisque, comme nous nous sommes engages 
dans l’Union Economique et Monetaire, comme il y a forcement une politique de reduction ou de
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This principle institutes a mechanism different from that of the United Kingdom and 
causes opposite strategies. In contrast to the UK, the rising French contribution to the 
EU budget does not weigh on departments’ budgets as a proportion of the relevant EU 
policies, but is top-sliced off the overall receipts of central government as a pre- 
budgetary levy. This choice is a response to political concerns and practical problems 
for implementing a budgetary offset at departmental level. First, EU expenditure may 
not always be set against a specific budget line because of the irregular pattern of EU 
expenditure. For instance, the growth in the EU Science and Technology budget under 
the Fourth Framework is going to be so considerable over the next decade that it 
would be very difficult to cut back domestic Research and Development spending 
while still maintaining some form of domestic expenditure. Second, technical 
difficulties are numerous such as uncertainty about the level of returns or the impact of 
exchange rate variations on the contribution. Therefore, the ‘principe de Constance’ is 
more a general policy guideline since there is no formal financial offset mechanism in 
departmental budgeting to parallel the Euro-PES.
The application of the ‘principe de constcmce’ is more in policy than in finance. A 
member of the Direction du Budget underlined that the DB used the principle rather for 
information purposes than as a fundamental argument to cut departmental credits. He 
argued “bureaux get the information but there is no particular work session which 
would point out matching expenditure in this national budget and that type of action of 
the Union.”19 For instance, the creation of a suckling cow premium scheme at the EU
maitrise des deficits publics et comme la contribution au budget communautaire augmente, il faut bien 
trouver des economies quelque part.”, Interview, ref. 2.
19 “Les bureaux sont informes mais il n’y a pas de seance de travail particuliere qui consisterait a dire 
sur tel budget national et sur tel type d’action de l’Union, quels sont les recoupements”, Interview, 
ref. 5.
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level did not lead to the reduction in the existing French credits for this area. 
Therefore, there is no systematic ‘policy offset’ largely because departments did not 
account to the Direction du Budget on matching EU and national programmes until 
1994.
Increased budgetary stringency and the need to achieve the Maastricht targets have 
directed the attention of the French government to matching national and EU 
expenditure in recent years, reinforcing the application of the ‘principe de Constance \  
For the first time in the 1994 Perspectives the Direction du Budget asked each bureau 
to write a note on EU credits allocated to schemes similar to the national ones when 
preparing their budget. A French official explained “things have changed a little 
because we are systematically requested when preparing the budget to get information 
at an early stage on credits within the European credits allocated to the same types of 
activities as within national budgets.”20 The procedure is internal to the Direction du 
Budget and involves more an exchange of information about the impact of the EU than 
the operation of a formal financial offset. However, this procedure introduces the 
notion of offset in the negotiations between the bureaux of the Direction du Budget 
and spending ministries.21 The reason why the application of the *principe de 
constance’ was reinforced lately lies in a prescription from the Prime Minister’s Office. 
The Lettre de Cadrage (Lettre of Guidance) for 1994 sent by Prime Minister Bahadur
20 “Les choses ont un peu change parce qu’on nous demande systematiquement, lorsqu’on prepare le 
budget, de s’informer dans un premiere etape sur les credits consacres aux memes types d’actions que 
ce qu’on a dans les budgets nationaux, dans les credits europeens.”, Interview, ref. 5.
21 According to Interview, ref. 4.
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to individual spending ministries urged them to
“take into account the development of community interventions in the areas 
which come under the responsibility of your departments, for the determination 
of your budgetary bids. The rationale of building Europe must ... allow, 
whenever possible, a redirection of national actions when these are taken on by 
community action.”22
The Lettre de Cadrage for the 1995 budget calls departments again to focus on 
community interventions with matching national schemes. The underlying ‘principe de 
Constance’ figures among the six arrangements imposed by Prime Minister Bahadur on 
spending ministries.23
The ‘principe de constance’ has different impacts on the strategies of French civil 
servants depending on which ministry they belong to. Departments consider EU funds 
additional, while the Direction du Budget considers them a substitute for domestic 
financing. At the overall level the Direction du Budget has incentives for setting the 
EU budget as low as possible to reduce the French contribution. At departmental level 
there is a financial incentive to maximise funds available at the EU level. However, it is 
difficult for them to do so because French policy-making on EU matters is very 
controlled, particularly since the Direction du Budget is a major player in the 
interministerial negotiations at the SGCI. Therefore, the French system for controlling 
trends in the EU budget and the French EU contribution relies more on the effect of
22 “vous tiendrez compte, pour la determination de vos demandes budgetaires, des developpements des 
interventions communautaires dans les domaines qui entrent dans les competences de vos 
departements. La logique de la construction europeenne doit... permettre des que cela est possible un 
redeploiement des actions nationales lorsque celles-ci sont prises en charge par les actions 
communautaires.” in Linditch, Florian (1993), “La souverainete budgetaire et l’Europe - Quelques 
contraintes communautaires sur les finances publiques frangaises”, Revue du Droit Public et de la 
Science Politique en France et a VEtranger, 6: 1695.
23 Prime Minister Balladur wrote “You will also take into account the development of community 
interventions in areas coming under your department” (“Vous tiendrez compte egalement du 
developement des interventions communautaires dans les domaines qui relevent de votre departement 
ministeriel”), quoted from Le Monde, 27 April 1994.
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the power distribution within government and the dominance of the Direction du 
Budget in interministerial bargaining than on a systematic financial offsetting at the 
departmental level.
4.2.2. The rate-of-retum approach
The Direction du Budget takes the cost of EU budgeting for the French budget into 
account by focusing on financial returns at departmental rather than at the global 
budgetary level. The Direction du Budget assesses the rates-of-retum for each 
department and compares them with the French share in the financing of the EU budget 
(17.8% in 1997). This method allows for the assessment of the budgetary impact of 
the EU in each policy sector and for the determination of sectors in which French 
interests are not well represented. For instance, European agricultural expenditure is 
profitable for the French budget since the rate-of-retum on the CAP is about 24%, 
while expenditure under Internal Policies is not (12%). Departments have incentives 
for maximising the French take in EU expenditure as a way of improving the rate-of- 
retum on the relevant EU policies. Resource-maximisation can appear paradoxical for 
all policies where France is a net contributor, except in agriculture. Indeed, since 
departmental returns on the EU budget are lower than the French share of financing the 
EU budget, it would be altogether less costly to finance these policies domestically. 
The choice to resource-maximise does not arise so much from existing budgetary 
institutions but rather from political decisions.
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Paradoxically, the only exception to the rate-of-retum approach is the European Affairs
bureau in the Direction du Budget, which represents France in the process of EU
budget-making, implements EU spending and co-ordinates controls on EU expenditure
in France. Spending by the European Affairs bureau is assimilated to any other
spending department bureau, and the bureau is partially assimilated to the budgetary
procedure applicable to other bureaux (e.g. it submits Perspectives to the Bureau de la
Synthese which evaluates the implementation of the programmes). This approach
stands in contrast to British reasoning about net contributions. Indeed, this approach is
paradoxical, since it considers the financial relations between France and the European
Union from the expenditure side only, even at a time when France was a net creditor to
the EU budget. As stated by an official from the Direction du Budget,
“we have always had a different rationale from the British. Thanks to Margaret 
Thatcher, that is to say thanks to the British Treasury, the British have always 
based their rationale upon the issue of the net contribution. This is probably 
because of their accounting methods since they do not treat the EU contribution 
as a pre-budgetary levy on global receipts. We were not a net contributor, we 
had to defend the Common Agricultural Policy, however the Direction du 
Budget considered it absolutely essential to watch over the increase in 
community expenditure and control the Common Agricultural Policy. It was 
considered a ‘spending ministry’ whose rate of expenditure growth we 
monitored.”24
24 “On a toujours eu un raisonnement different de celui des Britanniques. Les Britanniques ont 
toujours raisonne grace a Margareth Thatcher, c’est a dire grace a la Tresorerie britannique, sur le 
probleme de la contribution nette. Cela vient probablement de leur mode de comptabilisation, ils 
n’ont pas de prelevement sur recettes. Nous n’etions pas contributeur net, on avait a defendre la 
Politique Agricole Commune, mais la Direction du Budget considerait qu’il etait absolument 
indispensable de veiller neanmoins a l’augmentation des depenses communautaires et a la maitrise de 
la Politique Agricole Commune. C’etait un ‘ministere depensier’ dont on surveillait le taux de 
croissance des depenses.”, Interview, ref. 1.
144
4.2.3. The net contribution approach
The Direction du Budget started to introduce rationales for net contributions in the late 
1980s. This shift in focus corresponds with the period in which France became a net 
contributor to the EU budget. Indeed, until 1988 any increase in the EU budget was 
financially profitable since the returns on the French contribution were positive. The 
net balance of financial flows between France and the EU (a ‘deficit’ of about ECU 
2,620 m. in 1994) indicates that France is a small net contributor in comparison with 
Germany (ECU -13,640 m.). France is the second greatest contributor to the EU 
budget before Italy (ECU -2,540 m.), Netherlands (ECU -1,830 m.) and the United 
Kingdom (ECU -1,160 m. in 1994 as against -2,200 in 1992).
Table 4.3. French budgetary balance with the EU budget (1988-1994)
in m. ECU 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
EU expenditure in France* (1) 7,314 5,676 6,285 8,152 9,050 10,526 9,925
French share of EU budget (2) 9,095 8,623 8,090 10,602 10,493 11,546 12,551
Balance (1) - (2) -1,781 -2,947 -1,805 -2,450 -1,443 -1,020 -2,626
* Estimates published by the Cour des Comptes, however the returns per country are known for only 
86 to 90% of EU budget expenditure. For instance, the country returns on expenditure on research 
and other internal policies cannot be accurately measured.
Sources: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1994), Projet de loi de finances pour 1995, 
Relations financieres avec I'Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) : 33. and 
Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec I'Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale): 43.
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Table 4.4. Net contributors and net recivients to the EU budget (1994)
Share of Share of Share of Share of Rate-of- Rate-of- Overall
EUown EUown EU EU return on return on rate-of-
resources resources spending spending EAGGF- Structural return
(m. ECU) (%) (m. ECU) (%) Guarantee Funds
__________________________________________ (1991) (1991)__________
Belgium 2,822 4.4 2,513 4.2 1.11 0.27 0.89
Denmark 1,296 2.0 1,495 2.5 1.96 0.34 1.15
Germany 21,366 33.3 7,729 12.8 0.56 0.17 0.36
Greece 992 1.5 4,844 8.0 4.84 7.00 4.88
France 12,551 19.6 9,925 16.5 0.99 0.54 0.79
Ireland 638 1.0 2,390 4.0 5.78 9.93 3.75
Italy 7,760 12.1 5,219 8.7 1.07 0.77 0.67
Lux. 165 0.3 419 0.7 0.05 1.32 2.54
Neth. 4,246 6.6 2,416 4.0 1.29 0.26 0.57
Portugal 1,215 1.9 3,043 5.0 0.75 10.55 2.50
Spain 4,718 7.4 7,835 13.0 1.28 2.91 1.66
UK 6,417 10.0 5,259 8.7 0.63 1.02 0.82
Sources: Ecole Nationale d’Administration (1993) “Le financement de I’Union”, La mise en oeuvre 
du Traite de Maastricht et la construction europeenne (July): annexe 7 and Ministere de 
l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, Relations 
financieres avec I'Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) : 43.
The objective set by the Direction du Budget is not to have positive rates-of-retum for 
all policies, nor to become a net creditor again, because this objective would be illusory 
since France is one of the richest members of the European Union. The net 
contribution approach consists of introducing a rate-of-retum rationale at central 
government level to balance the focus on departmental returns. This shift to an 
aggregate strategy motivated by a net contribution approach is not really apparent as 
yet because the government’s official guidelines remain geared towards maximising 
returns on the French contribution. However, a number of civil servants interviewed 
acknowledged this shift.25
The Direction du Budget relies, although not heavily, on the net contribution approach 
for political reasons, in particular the priority given to solidarity inside the Union.
25 According to Interview, ref. 3.
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Also, the budgetary balance between Member States and EU institutions is not an 
accurate indicator of the economic goodwill that Member States gain from membership 
of the EU. First, non-budgetary advantages are not taken account for. Second, the net 
contribution calculation ignores the rules of EU policies. For instance, a large part of 
CAP spending in France aims at compensating for the difference between EU and 
world prices. Lower restitution expenditure in France does not necessarily indicate the 
worsening of national positions but may arise from higher world prices. In this case, a 
higher deficit in the budgetary account between France and the EU has no impact on 
the French economic welfare.26
4.3. Conclusion
Chapter 4 examined how national budgeting is affected by the various financial links 
between the national government budget and the European budget. It emphasises that 
the way the European budget is financed and the methods to account for received EU 
credits greatly impacts on the strategies adopted by national bureaucracies towards EU 
programmes and may explain differences in the nature of Europeanisation between 
member countries.
First, on the scope of budgetary Europeanisation, chapter 4 argued that budgeting in 
the United Kingdom is less affected by the financial links between the central 
government budget and the European budget than in France. The main reason for this
26 Ecole Nationale d’Administration (1993) “Le financement de l’Union”, La mise en oeuvre du Traite 
de Maastricht et la construction europeenne (July): 31.
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major difference lies in the way the European budget is financed and the treatment of 
the returns from the EU budget by each national budgetary system. In Britain the 
Euro-PES mechanism and the Fontainebleau agreement create a context where 
departments are encouraged to minimise the resources available at the EU level (which 
involves keeping the overall EU budget low, minimising the EU budget line allocated 
to their areas of expenditure and staying within the agreed limits) and to minimise the 
UK take in EU credits. EU credits are not additional to domestic funds at the 
departmental level, and central government has no particular incentive to prefer EU to 
domestic financing. Therefore, the British central government and spending 
departments individually do not seek to be financially influenced by European Union 
spending priorities translated in the budget. The efficient locking created by the Euro- 
PES mechanism and the Fontainebleau agreement organises the control of policy and 
spending choices by HM Treasury to ensure that budgetary choices are influenced by 
national policy priorities not European financial incentives.
In France the ‘principe de Constance’ does not constitute a systematic tool for dividing 
the cost of financing the European budget across departments as Euro-PES does, and 
there is no equivalent to the Fontainebleau agreement. Therefore, departments are 
financially encouraged to maximise funds available and the French take of the EU 
budget. Since EU credits are additional to domestic financing at departmental level, 
and since the Direction du Budget encourages the maximisation of departmental rates- 
of-retum, the French bureaucracy seeks to be financially influenced by EU spending 
programmes. Therefore, it is legitimate to assume that French national policy choices 
are more largely influenced by EU policy priorities than are the British. This argument
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based on budgetary mechanisms at the overall level needs to be confirmed by a more 
thorough analysis of the influence of EU membership on national spending programmes 
at the departmental level. The three subsequent chapters focus, therefore, on the scope 
and nature of EU pressures on budgeting at the sub-governmental level to confirm, 
refine and substantiate this argument.
Second, on the impact of the various financial links between national government 
budget and the EU budget in a qualitative perspective, chapter 4 concluded that 
existing budgetary mechanisms contributed to defining a much stronger and more 
consistent policy on EU financing in Britain than in France. In the United Kingdom the 
Euro-PES mechanism and the Fontainebleau agreement create a context where all 
actors seek to minimise the EU budget and the British take within the EU budget. The 
strategy of British actors is particularly constant over time, across departments and 
inside departments, which shows that mechanisms in place are efficient in diffusing HM 
Treasury’s values within Whitehall.
In France the policy line on EU credits has varied over the years and across 
departments. Chapter 4 enunciated a number of inconsistencies. First, because the 
‘principe de Constance’ is rather a general policy guideline than a formal financial 
offsetting mechanism, departments consider EU funds additional to domestic credits, 
whereas the Direction du Budget considers them a substitute. Second, the Direction 
du Budget has incentives for minimising the EU budget to reduce the French 
contribution whereas some spending ministries (especially Agriculture) are encouraged 
to maximise the funds available at the EU level because of their positive rate-of-retum.
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Third, the rate-of-retum approach encourages all departments to maximise their take in 
the EU budget but there is no formal pressure on departments to scrutinise EU 
expenditure and ensure it matches national policy priorities. Departments feel little 
concerned that the French government is a net contributor to the European budget. 
They adopt a positive attitude towards EU programmes since they consider they 
supplement domestic funds. Fourth, since France has become structurally a net 
contributor to the European budget the Direction du Budget is starting to add to the 
rate-of-retum approach, which has been used for years, a net contribution approach 
which is not unanimously supported. Therefore, the Direction du Budget seems less 
successful than HM Treasury in imposing its policy on EU financing on central 
government. As a consequence, EU membership largely affects the determination of 
the French budgetary line because of the financial implications of European spending 
programmes.
Chapter 4 explained the differences in the degree and the nature of the adaptation of 
the British and the French bureaucratic mechanisms to EU budgeting. Central 
government accounting methods to finance the contribution to the European budget 
and the treatment of received EU credits create an overall context which is more or 
less favourable to the Europeanisation of national spending programmes and conditions 
the strategy of British and French actors during the budgetary process. However, 
differences between the effect of EU pressures will be refined in the forthcoming 
chapters, since the focus on sub-governmental budgeting enables an analysis to be 
made of different groups’ strategies and role perceptions.
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Chapter 5
The end of national budgeting? The case of Agriculture
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the most important EU sectoral policy in 
expenditure and historical significance. During the 1970s-80s the CAP took about 
two-thirds of EC expenditure, and even if this share is declining it is likely to remain by 
far the biggest item of the EU budget during the 1990s.
It is widely accepted that the influence of the European Union on budgeting in the
department of Agriculture in France and the United Kingdom is great because of the
size of transfers from the EU to individual Member States. The EU exerts a pressure
in both policy (i.e. the choice of policies implemented) and decision-making (i.e. the
way national administrations make policy decisions). Likierman argues
“United Kingdom membership of the European Community is central to the 
department’s role, and means that its expenditure differs in an important respect 
from that of other departments. Control over policy, and therefore expenditure, 
lies outside the United Kingdom, and the department’s expenditure is largely 
determined by the Community’s common agricultural policy.”1
The conventional view maintains that spending on agriculture is mainly determined by 
decisions at the EU level, and that the margin of manoeuvre for national governments 
lies at the fringe of programmes. However, this assessment is not satisfactory. First, if 
one accepts the view that most spending is financed by the EU, and knowing that most 
EU agricultural expenditure does not go through the budget of the Ministries of
1 Likierman, Andrew (1988), Public expenditure - Who really controls it and how (London: Penguin): 
31.
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Agriculture2, how does one explain that national outlays on agriculture still represent 
an important share of national budgets? Second, if “membership of the European 
Community is central to the department’s role”, how does one explain that the 
Agriculture team in both HM Treasury and the Direction du Budget is split into two 
branches or bureaux, one looking at the CAP and the other at domestic spending 
programmes. Given the small work force available for checking budgetary allocations 
in these institutions, this organisation reflects the fact that spending under the national 
part of agricultural policy is significant in a government’s eye. Third, if control over 
policy and expenditure lies outside the Member States, how does one explain that 
agricultural lobbies still seek to influence national governments? Therefore, one may 
question the view that budgeting for agriculture is fully determined at the EU level.
This chapter challenges the argument that “control over policy, and therefore 
expenditure, lies outside the United Kingdom”. It emphasises that national government 
representatives are involved in decision-making at the EU level. The participation of 
national actors in control over policy at the EU level may imply that national 
governments have the means to exercise a large share of the control of policy and 
expenditure in individual Member States.
The hypothesis of the thesis is that budgetary pressures in Ministries of Agriculture 
have adapted to a greater extent than other departments to EU pressures because CAP 
has been running for three decades and is financially important (for both the EU and
2 CAP cash flows go through agencies (e.g. ONIC, ONILAIT, OFIVAL in France) and the 
Intervention Board in the UK. For funding under Objective 5b the recipients are at the regional not 
the central level.
152
the Ministry’s budgets). The question is whether budgeting in this ministry is fully 
determined by budgetary processes at EU level, and if not, what is the margin of 
manoeuvre of national governments for making decisions about agricultural 
programmes.
To assess the impact of EU membership on budgetary decision-making processes, and 
to compare the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms to EU pressures in the Ministry 
of Agriculture in France and Britain, chapter 5 is divided into four sections. The first 
presents a historical introduction to the evolution of CAP and to the main categories of 
spending programmes at EU level. Section two measures the extent to which public 
spending is financed by the European budget by comparing the sizes of EU and 
national expenditure on agriculture. This section contributes to quantifying the 
financial impact of EU membership. The third section highlights the impact of EU 
spending programmes on the strategy of bureaucrats: it explains how national 
administrations have adapted to European budgetary pressures. Finally, section four 
discusses whether all policy and budgetary decisions are determined by EU pressures 
or whether national administrations retain a large margin of manoeuvre. This section 
contributes to quantifying the impact of EU membership in policy-making.
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5.1. The EU budget and agriculture
5.1.1. The evolution o f CAP3
From 1962 to 1972 the CAP mainly relied on market price support which already 
operated in the six EEC founding members. Direct payments to farmers were not a 
realistic option then because national administrations did not have appropriate 
administrative infrastructures. Three instruments were set up that still exist: import 
levies forced external producers to sell above a ‘threshold’ price inside the EC and 
insulate the Community against fluctuations; export refunds compensated EC 
exporters for the difference between Community and world prices; and intervention 
prices became the trigger for the purchase of EC farm products by EC authorities when 
oversupply pushed market prices below predetermined levels. Also, the original CAP 
plan envisaged the allocation of one third of the budget to the Guidance section for 
structural measures, fostering the creation of larger farm units. However, little was 
achieved under this section.
The first EC enlargement in 1973 could have challenged the existing structure because 
it was soon clear the UK would be a net loser in budgetary and economic terms. Since 
unanimity was generally required at the time, one country could block decision-making 
and change the system. However, proposals for reform were weak, while both support 
prices and surpluses increased. CAP spending doubled in a decade while real 
agricultural incomes fell.
3 Useful references for the history of the CAP are European Commission (1994), “EC agricultural 
policy for the 21st century”, European Economy Report and Studies, 4: 1-40 - European Commission 
(1994), “The economics of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)”, European Economy Report and 
Studies, 5: 71-112 - European Commission (1993), “The economics of Community public finance”, 
European Economy Report and Studies, 5: 295-315.
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In the 1980s a variety of uncoordinated reforms tried to discourage over-production. 
Co-responsibility levies on sugar were extended to milk (1977) and cereals (1986). 
Guarantee thresholds were applied to cereals, oilseeds and some fruits. Domestic 
consumption was stimulated for several commodities through consumer subsidies and 
marketing campaigns. Marketing quotas for sugar were extended to milk (1984). 
Production diversification encouraged cattle farms to switch from milk to beef 
production. However, these measures did not solve the fundamental problem of the 
CAP. Farm incomes remained static, surpluses reached record levels4 and budgetary 
concerns persisted. In 1984 the invention of the ‘green ECU’ sought to avoid some of 
the difficulties of Monetary Compensatory Amounts and in 1988 a ceiling for 
agriculture expenditure was instituted.
The 1992 reform not only sought to provide ad hoc measures to reduce EU
expenditure and agricultural surpluses but introduced a fundamental reshaping of the
rationale for agricultural support. It acknowledged the failure of the market-price-
support approach on which the CAP rested. The lesson learnt at the time was
summarised by the European Commission.
“Market support measures such as those of the traditional CAP tend to become 
less and less transfer-efficient as the price elasticity of agricultural production in 
the process of economic development implying the increased use of purchased 
input becomes more elastic. Benefits to producers are eroded by higher land 
and other input prices, while consumers pay high food costs and rising 
surpluses lead to ever-higher taxpayer costs. Indeed, the circle becomes a 
vicious one, with taxpayer-financed export subsidies helping to depress world 
prices which then require more subsidies to dispose of surpluses on world 
markets.”5
4 In 1990 there were 14.4 million tonnes of cereals, 600,000 tonnes of daily products and 530,000 
tonnes of beef in public stores according to European Commission (1994), “EC agricultural policy for 
the 21st century”, European Economy Report and Studies, 4: 17.
5 European Commission (1994), “EC agricultural policy for the 21st centuiy”, European Economy 
Report and Studies, 4: 27.
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The idea of a vicious circle between higher subsidies, increased surpluses, falling 
agricultural real income and high consumption prices underlay the conclusion that CAP 
should break away from the price support logic and become more market-based. Also 
in accordance with the so-called ‘green box’ of non-trade distorting measures agreed in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, income payments should be ‘decoupled’.6 The 
MacSharry reform involved a switch from market price support to direct compensation 
to farmers.7
5.1.2. EU spending programmes on agriculture
Most of EU agriculture spending is financed by the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) under the Guarantee section (ECU 40.8 bn. in the 1997 
budget). The CAP budget has grown in nominal terms from ECU 3 bn. in 1974 to 
ECU 34.5 bn. in 1995. Although it remains the most important item within the EU 
budget, the share allocated to CAP expenditure has relatively declined since the 1960- 
70s. In 1992 the Guarantee section represented 53% of the overall EU budget as 
against 90% in the 1970s. The CAP share is expected to decline further following the 
Edinburgh summit decision to develop structural policies (46% planned in 1997). Also 
the adoption of an ‘agriculture guideline’ sets limitations which stand in contrast to the 
conventional view that CAP expenditure is open-ended because demand-driven. Since
6 ‘Decoupled’ payments mean that compensatory payments are made per hectare and are not based on 
production volumes to favour the extensification of production methods.
7 The support prices of cereals and beef, and the ceiling of normal beef intervention, were substantially 
reduced, and price support for oilseeds and protein crops was suppressed. Financial compensation was 
granted to farmers depending on historical base areas and regional yields subject to a percentage of 
rotational set-aside except for small farms. For the livestock sector direct compensation was made 
through direct headage payments subject to a maximum stocking rate. Male bovine and suckling cow 
premiums were increased. A number of accompanying measures were implemented under the 
EAGGF-Guarantee.
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1988 the ceiling for CAP expenditure, the ‘agriculture guideline’, is mathematically 
calculated from a baseline set in 1988 (ECU 24,914 m.) and a growth rate (74% of the 
corrected GDP growth in EU members). This method of calculating annual cash limits 
implies that agriculture credits are linked to EU average economic growth. It implies 
the share of CAP expenditure will be declining within the overall EU budget because 
the growth of CAP credits is lower than that of the EU budget.
There are four main programmes within the Guarantee section of the EAGGF.8 
Direct aid to farmers (ECU 25,554 m. in 1997) amounts to 62.6% of the agriculture 
budget in 1997 (as against 52% in 1995). Grants have greatly increased since 1993 
because of the CAP reform (May 1992). The MacSharry reform favoured direct 
income support to producers by EU institutions to compensate for falling guaranteed 
prices and the obligation for rotational set-aside land. Direct grants are mainly for 
oilseed, protein crops and cereals producers and represent 88% of total EU spending in 
the vegetal sector. Direct aids to farmers are important in the beef and sheep livestock 
sectors and tobacco too.
Market intervention (ECU 7,445 m. in 1997) used to be the main EU agriculture 
support scheme until the CAP reform and represents 18.3% of the EAGGF-Guarantee 
budget in 1997. The decision to lower guaranteed prices in the main sectors (cereals 
and meat) to bring them closer to the world market has considerably reduced the 
credits allocated to market intervention in favour of direct aid to farmers.
8 The figures in this part are extracted from Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de 
loi de finances pour 1997, Relations financieres avec I ’Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale): 19.
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Export refunds (ECU 5,969 m. in 1997) are a traditional instrument for the support of 
production and exports. Their share (14.6%) has diminished since the CAP reform, 
because lower market intervention prices reduced the difference between EU- 
guaranteed and world prices.
Accompanying measures (ECU 1,837 m. in 1997) were created in May 1992 to offer 
incentives for the restructuring of agriculture. The new EU framework offers 
opportunities for EU financing of national schemes on agri-environmental measures9, 
afforestation of agricultural land10 and early-retirement of farmers. Although the 
accompanying measures remain small (4.5% of the budget), they are important because 
they introduce structural concerns within the Guarantee section which was traditionally 
devoted to production support. Therefore, the frontier between the Guidance 
(structural policies) and the Guarantee sections of the EAGGF has become blurred.
The second source of funding in the EU budget lies under structural policies (ECU 
31,477 m. in 1997). However, assessment of the funds available for agricultural 
purposes is less precise than with EAGGF-Guarantee because not one fund or 
Objective matches exclusively agricultural programmes. The budget of the Guidance 
section of the EAGGF amounts to ECU 4,026 m. in 1997, which is equivalent to 
12.8% of the Guarantee section budget. However, agriculture projects are eligible for 
financing under the European Regional Development Fund (ECU 12,990 m.) and 
Community Initiatives (ECU 3,173 m.). For instance, the LEADER programme
9 The seven agri-environment schemes under Council regulation 2078/92 are designed for the 
protection of the rural environment and the management of the landscape. They encourage less- 
intensive and environmentally friendly production methods and farmers’ training.
10 The afforestation of agricultural land programme under regulation 2080/92 provides financial 
support for establishing, improving and maintaining woodlands and compensates for the loss of 
agricultural income whenever the holding has been turned into a wood.
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allocated ECU 1,400 m. to rural development and PESCA has ECU 250 m. credits for 
restructuring the fishery sector in 1995. With the ERDF and Community Initiatives it 
is difficult to have a precise indication of the share of agricultural projects within the 
total budget. The budget allocated to structural policies is split between three items, 
including Community Initiatives, transitory measures and the main EU framework 
which comprises several Objectives. Agriculture is concerned with only three 
Objectives but not all the credits for each objective are allocated to agriculture.11 
Therefore, it is also difficult to measure the share of agriculture within structural 
policies.
5.2. The effect of EU expenditure on the budget for Agriculture in Britain and 
France
5.2.1. EU expenditure and the MAFF budget
The UK share of CAP spending is £2.9 bn. in 1995-96, while the domestic agriculture 
spending in the Agriculture departments including Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland is £1.1 bn. Therefore, the ratio of EU to domestic financing of British 
agriculture is roughly 3 to 1. However, caution must be exercised when interpreting 
the recently rising EU agricultural spending in Britain because of the effect of non­
agriculture-linked spending factors. In 1992 there were two contradictory trends in the
11 Agricultural projects may be funded under the following structural policy schemes:
- Objective 1 (ECU 14,156 m. in 1995) for the development and adjustment of the least prosperous 
regions.
- Objective 5a (ECU 1,036 m. in 1995) for the adaptation of agricultural and fishing structures.
- Objective 5b (ECU 1,054 m. in 1995) for the development and the adjustment of rural zones.
159
level of CAP spending in the UK.12 On the one hand, monetary fluctuations and the 
devaluation of the pound in 1992 increased CAP spending in the United Kingdom 
because payments to farmers were made in the national currency while the EU budget 
was set in ECU. Devaluing the pound increased the cash size of CAP spending in the 
UK for schemes budgeted in ECU (half of the CAP schemes, e.g. market intervention 
and export refunds). Also, although the agri-monetary system seeks to prevent any 
budgetary implications from monetary fluctuations, schemes set in green ECU were hit 
by relatively smaller fluctuations. The appreciation of the green ECU from 1.145 to 
1.207 market ECU between June 1992 and May 1993 implied a 6% increase in EU 
spending purely because of monetaiy fluctuations. On the other hand, rising cash-flows 
under CAP should not conceal the fact that CAP reform reduced the level of 
intervention in the United Kingdom. Therefore, the increase in CAP spending since 
1992 was driven by monetary fluctuations unrelated to the CAP reform of that year.
Table 5.1. Spending in Britain under Objectives 5a and 5b and the British rate-of- 
retum on these Objectives (1994-1999)
in m. ECU 1995
EU expenditure 
in Britain
Rate-of-retum
Objective l13 2,398 2.5%
Objective 2 4,616 29.9%
Objective 3 and 4 3,431 22.2%
Objective 5a 457 7.0%
Objective 5b 830 11.9%
Community Initiatives 1,170 8.6%
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec VUnion Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale): 23.
5.2.2. EU expenditure and the budget o f the French Ministry o f Agriculture
12 According to Interview, ref. 13.
13 Objective 1 is for les developed regions; Objective 2 is for industrial reconversion regions; 
Objectives 3 and 4 are for measures against unemployment; Objective 5a is for agricultural structures; 
and Objective 5b is for rural development.
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Conclusions about the influence of CAP on the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture 
are conflicting depending on how EU and French expenditure are compared. With 
direct grants to farmers most of the public expenditure is made by European Union 
institutions directly (FR. 71 out of 84 bn.) or indirectly (half of 13 bn. French grants 
co-finance EU programmes). Therefore, the European Union is responsible for about 
90% of the grants to French farmers. The French government has few financial means 
to support farmers (7 out of 84 bn.) and there is little scope for an independent French 
agricultural policy. These figures suggest that the spending on agriculture, and 
therefore the decision on what to spend, is mostly determined at the EU level.
Table 5.2. Government expenditure in the agricultural sector in France (1993) 
in billion French francs
EU MA budget Social security Total
budget______________________________________________
Total expenditure 75 30 (40)* 75 (65)* 180
incl. income & price support 71 13_____________  84______
* 10 bn. out of social security expenditure for farmers are not financed by Social Security Funds but by 
the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture.
Source: Interview, ref. 6.
The picture is different when considering total expenditure in the agricultural sector by 
central government and Social Security Funds. Included here is spending on social 
protection and pensions (FR. 75 bn.) and on education and training (FR. 10 bn.). The 
figures show that domestic agricultural spending by the Ministry of Agriculture (FR. 40 
bn.) and Social Security Funds (FR. 65 bn.) is important in comparison with the CAP. 
This approach shows all agricultural budgeting does not take place only at EU level 
and the role of domestic financing in social and policy terms remains significant.14
14 This approach was suggested by Interview, ref. 6.
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From a financial perspective the transfer of agricultural budgeting at EU level is partial.
While direct support is mainly under EU’s financial responsibility, a large part of
spending in the agricultural sector is made by national governments. A former French
civil servant recognised
“the nature of the budget has completely changed because of the European 
budget since all interventions are now financed by the community budget. 
What is extraordinary is that the Agriculture budget has not diminished much 
because there has been an argument for the existence of an Agriculture 
administration to deal with agricultural education and all the authorised aids to 
investment which are permitted.”15
He reflects the rationale of the ‘principe de Constance’ emphasised by the Direction du 
Budget which considers the increasing Agriculture budget a paradox - or an anomaly - 
given the increasing CAP credits. The Direction du Budget expects domestic credits to 
decrease as the EU budget increases. But empirical evidence shows that such trends 
have not occurred in France, because the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture doubled 
from 1981 to 1993. This increase in the national budget demonstrates that the 
‘principe de Constance’ was not applied in Agriculture, which suggests domestic 
expenditure does not match EU programmes.
5.2.3. The future o f CAP and national budgets
Although the changes discussed here are so recent that they must be interpreted with 
caution, their likely impact on national budgeting is so great that they need to be 
considered. First, one impact of the 1992 CAP reform is an increased budgetary cost
15 “Le budget a completement change de nature du fait de l’existence du budget communautaire 
puisque toutes les interventions sont maintenant prises en charge par le budget communautaire. Ce 
qu’il y a d’extraordinaire, c’est que le budget de 1’agriculture a peu diminue parce qu’on a justifie 
1’existence de l’administration de l’agriculture par l’enseignement agricole et toutes les aides a 
l’investissementautorisees”, Interview, ref. 1.
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of the CAP. Before the MacSharry reform part of the cost of the CAP was supported 
by consumers who ultimately bore the cost of market price support (i.e. higher food 
prices). The decision to lower intervention prices and to grant direct compensation to 
farmers involved lower market prices but higher budgetary expenditure. Therefore, the 
reform favours consumers at the expense of taxpayers. In 1994 and 1995 the 
Guarantee section budget reached the maximum level authorised at the European 
Summit in Edinburgh. It is expected that this higher budgetary cost is temporary, and 
substantial savings were made in 1996.
Second, the last enlargement of the EU, and the possibility of Eastern Europe 
membership, gave more credibility to the possible nationalisation of farmers’ income 
support. The entry of big cereal and livestock producers, who would contribute little 
to EU growth and the EU budget, risks disrupting the CAP system. The need for 
direct income support differs in each Member State depending on the severity of its 
structural problems, standard of living, pension schemes, unemployment benefits and 
other social provision. Also compensation to farmers may be more or less a political 
priority or may be defined differently in each Member State. In particular the CAP 
target of encouraging farmers to stay within the agricultural sector may not be 
desirable in East European countries. A centralised income support scheme may not be 
appropriate since compensation needs are not similar across the EU.
The evolution of the CAP towards more direct support and less intervention has 
weakened the rationale of EU financing. The EU has not recognised any responsibility 
for redistributive policy so far. EU financing by a central authority is not fully justified.
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The European Commission argues “in line with the subsidiarity principle, the 
responsibility for direct income support, i.e. for deciding on criteria of eligibility, on 
size and on duration of such payments, should therefore be allocated to the Member 
States, on condition that the payments do not distort competition.”16 The 
‘nationalisation’ of direct income support would imply a major transfer of the 
budgetary cost of the CAP back to the Member States. It would not mean the end of a 
European agricultural policy since the overall policy framework would still be set at 
EU level. However, the financial burden and political decisions on eligibility and 
transfer size would be the responsibility of national governments.
Section two of this chapter has contributed to quantifying the impact of EU 
membership financially. It shows that the EU budget finances nearly all intervention 
expenditure in member countries, which suggests that decision-making over these 
choices is located at the EU level. However, the section underlines that the national 
budget for agriculture remains significant as all domestic expenditure does not match 
with EU spending programmes. Therefore, financially, all budgeting in agriculture is 
not EU-determined. The next section highlights the impact of EU budgeting on the 
strategy of bureaucrats and explains how national administrations have adapted to 
European budgetary processes.
16 European Commission (1994), “EC agricultural policy for the 21st century”, European Economy 
Report and Studies, 4: 34.
5.3. The effect of EU budgeting on players’ strategies and decision-making
5.3.1. Level 1 negotiations 
In the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom the strategy of the actors involved in the process of decision­
making over credits allocated to Agriculture at level 1 is greatly affected by the UK 
being a net contributor to the overall EU budget and to the CAP specifically. Level 1 
negotiations involving MAFF are affected by similar constraints as other policy areas 
because the Fontainebleau agreement encourages the reduction of the agriculture 
guideline of the EU budget and CAP spending in the UK (see chapter 4). However, 
MAFF is the only government department to escape the Euro-PES mechanism17 and 
attribution for two reasons. First, there are few domestic credits which may be cut 
when CAP increases, because domestic and EU programmes do not match. CAP 
expenditure does not replace or duplicate national spending programmes but is 
additional to them. CAP and MAFF budgets supplement one another because they 
pursue different policy targets, and thus the nature of expenditure varies. Second, the 
Euro-PES mechanism would be infeasible to operate since the reduction in the 
Department’s baseline would be too great in comparison with the domestic budget for 
Agriculture. An official argued
“if you had to offset the CAP programme, it would have a very damaging effect 
on domestic spending. One of my colleagues calculated that if the upward 
trend in CAP spending would continue, then the only way you could preserve 
the net total broadly constant would be for the domestic budget to decline and 
within six years it would have disappeared! That is clearly politically a non­
sense because that would include sacking 10,000 staff and not having a 
ministry. That is why you do not have a global one for one trade-off.”18
17 MAFF is not affected by the Euro-PES arrangements except for the Research and Development 
budget (the baseline reduction is about £ 3 m.).
18 Interview, ref. 13.
165
The evolution and the size of CAP spending explain why MAFF would never agree to
a formal ‘principe de constcmce’ or Euro-PES. However, decision-making practices
show HM Treasury has succeeded in creating efficient substitutes for the Euro-PES
mechanism. First, ad hoc budgetary offsetting seems to operate although it is not
formalised. The discussion with this official highlighted the pressure exerted by HM
Treasury on MAFF credits, should representatives from the Department not follow the
‘minimising line’ fostered by the Fontainebleau rebate scheme. He argued
“It is easier to operate something closer to the ‘principe de Constance’ for 
discretionary changes at the margin ... Given that so much of any extra pound in 
EU spending is in fact paid for by the UK taxpayer, it makes a lot of sense for 
us to argue in our discussions with our Agriculture ministry colleagues that if 
they have increased their share of receipts on a sector, then we can make 
corresponding reductions in other elements of support for the domestic 
programme. Although it does not operate formally, there is more of a 
presumption certainly from our side, that we would seek to reduce our 
domestic programmes to compensate for discretionary increases which the UK 
has argued for, in spending programmes in Brussels if indeed they argued for 
them at all. Actually they are very good normally at following the Treasury’s 
order and at arguing against increases in spending even if they would be a 
benefit to UK farmers because of our wide and overriding interest in containing 
budgetary pressures and ensuring that the guidelines are preserved.”19
Although the Euro-PES mechanism does not apply to Agriculture, this official claims 
that offsets occur for marginal increases in EU programmes which the Department 
supported despite the effect on the British contribution to the EU budget. This 
description of public expenditure negotiations suggests that an equivalent of the 
4principe de Constance’ is used in the United Kingdom and it is possible it serves 
intimidation purposes.
19 Interview, ref. 13.
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Second, with Guidance and ERDF expenditure, which involve the Department’s co­
financing of EU schemes in the UK, EU financing is ignored in the public expenditure 
negotiations with HM Treasury. A senior civil servant from MAFF considered the 
hypothesis of an Objective 5b
“scheme which would cost £10 million, of which the European Community 
would pay £5 million. Before we can launch the scheme we must have the 
funds for it. We would have to bid in the public expenditure negotiations £10 
million, not £5 million, because the European Community receipts do not count 
in the public expenditure negotiations.”20
This procedure is closer to attribution than to the Euro-PES mechanism because the 
reduction in the Department’s credits is not based on the UK contribution to CAP but 
on actual receipts from the EU. However, both arrangements greatly reduce the 
incentive for MAFF to maximise the UK returns on the EU budget. The argument that 
departments should bid for EU funding under Structural Funds in the same way as for 
domestic financing is a consequence of the Fontainebleau agreement. It translates the 
fact that the cost of EU expenditure is nearly the same as that of domestic expenditure 
for HM Treasury. However, decision-making processes imply that EU funding of 
agricultural structural projects is not additional.
Despite the absence of formal budgetary institutions such as Euro-PES, the strategies 
of the players in level 1 negotiations on Agriculture are similar to those in other policy 
sectors where EU budgetary influence is not as great. With MAFF the budget- 
minimisation approach is encouraged by pressures from HM Treasury. Bureaucrats in 
MAFF are also aware of the fact that CAP is the main cost centre for the EU budget 
while the size of the British agricultural sector is small.
20 Interview, ref. 28.
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One characteristic of level 1 negotiations peculiar to the UK is the low degree of 
conflict between MAFF and HM Treasury, which numerous civil servants from 
different national administrations acknowledged. An official from Cabinet Office 
estimated that conflict resolution between HM Treasury and the Department 
represented only 10% of the Desk Officer’s work because since the early 1990s MAFF 
had increasingly agreed with HM Treasury’s line 21
In France
In France the strategies of the players involved in level 1 negotiations are particularly 
affected by the financial returns on the EU budget. Since France is a net contributor to 
the overall EU budget but a net recipient on the CAP, the strategies of actors are 
specific on Agriculture. The French returns on CAP are positive because France takes 
about 24% of the CAP budget while paying 17.8% of gross contributions. The 
MacSharry reform has continuously improved the rate-of-retum on CAP spending in 
France (see Table 5.3.).
Table 5. S. Expenditure under the Guarantee and the Guidance sections in France 
and the French rate-of-retum (1989-1995)
in million ECU
Guarantee section 
Total EU expenditure 
EU spending in France 
Rate-of-retum on Guarantee
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
24,403
4,606
18.9%
24,980
5,026
20.1%
31,528
6,333
20.1%
31,324
6,859
21.9%
34,748
8,185
23.5%
33,605
8,049
23,9%
34,498
8,376
24,3%
Guidance section
EU spending in France 187 362 363 455 583 384 -
Rate-of-retum on Guidance 13.9% 19.8% 19.3% 18.0% 21.4% 13.3% -
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec I ’Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) : 39-42.
21 Interview, ref. 59.
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Table 5.4. Spending in France under Objectives 5a and 5b and the French rate-of-
retum on these Objectives (1989-1999)
1989-1993* 1994-1999**
EU expenditure French rate-of- 
in France return
EU French rate- 
expenditure in of-return 
France
Objective l22 1,082 2.4% 2,225 2.3%
Objective 2 1,495 18.3% 3,803 24.7%
Objective 3 and 4 1,809 20.5% 3,254 21.1%
Objective 5a 1,400 33.7% 1,963 30.3%
Objective 5b 1,170 36.8% 2,274 32.6%
Community Initiatives 453 10.1% 1,649 12.1%
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec VUnion Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale): 41.
Because France is a major net recipient of the Guarantee section and Objectives 5a and 
5b, and gets more than its fair share overall on the Guidance section, the Direction du 
Budget has incentives for maximising not only the French take of EU expenditure but 
also the fimds available for Agriculture in the EU budget. This strategy coincides with 
the resource-maximisation approach of the Ministry of Agriculture that traditionally 
defends farmers’ interests and incomes. The greater financial returns on EU 
agricultural expenditure contributed to a lower degree of conflict in the relationships 
between the Direction du Budget and the Ministry of Agriculture.
EU budgeting influences the strategy of Agriculture ministry actors in opposite ways in 
Britain and France, since French level 1 actors pursue budget maximisation while their 
British counterparts are minimising the financial impact of the European budget within 
national policy. However, in both cases EU-related financial considerations decreased
22 Objective 1 is for les developed regions; Objective 2 is for industrial reconversion regions; 
Objectives 3 and 4 are for measures against unemployment; Objective 5a is for agricultural structures; 
and Objective 5b is for rural development.
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the degree of conflict between the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture 
during level 1 negotiations. Whereas lower conflict reinforced the values of HM 
Treasury within Whitehall, it favoured the position of the French Ministry of 
Agriculture by encouraging a resource-maximisation strategy towards the European 
budget.
5.3.2. Level 2 negotiations
Decision-making in the Ministry of Agriculture offers an illustration of the 
hybridisation of budgetary institutions. Because of the size of EU-financed expenditure 
on agriculture, a large part of the decision-making process over agricultural 
programmes involves negotiations between departmental actors at level 2 
(hybridisation). The ‘collectivisation’ of policy decisions at the EU level has increased 
the importance of level 2 negotiations. Exposing the strategy pursued by departmental 
actors during these negotiations will identify how national administrations have adapted 
to EU pressures.
Negotiations between British and French representatives and their European 
counterparts at the EU level are affected by several factors. First, British and French 
bargaining strategies vary because of differences in the distribution of their agricultural 
priorities. Because of the structure of agricultural production, France is directly 
affected by virtually all CAP commodities and compensation programmes. France is 
also interested in export refund levels since it is a net exporter of agricultural products. 
Therefore, French representatives are actively involved in negotiations on most CAP
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programmes, while other Member States have a predominant interest (e.g.
Mediterranean countries with fruits, wine and vegetables, UK and Ireland with
livestock). This specificity of the French position creates both advantages and
drawbacks. A French official argued
“because of its geographic location at the heart of Europe, France has interests 
in all the programmes, which is an inconvenience since one always has the 
impression of claiming something, but which may be an advantage because 
there is no negotiation on which to have blocked positions ... On all issues 
national interests are at stake.”23
The participation of France in many negotiations presents some drawbacks. A member 
of the DB underlined “France always defends positions in favour of agriculture because 
it is not good at making choices between its types of production and sub-sectors 
because it has interests everywhere. We tend to avoid sacrificing anyone, and therefore 
to defend everything.”24 However, the dispersion of French agricultural interests is 
often considered a strategic advantage within negotiations because it multiplies the 
possibilities of trade-offs between policy preferences. An increasing number of win- 
sets eases compromise-building. Participation in decision-making on many 
programmes implies that French players occupy a central position within CAP 
negotiations, which may be conducive to a leadership role for France. Also, these 
multiple agricultural interests offer French negotiators opportunities to alter policy 
preferences from year to year or even during a negotiation. Sustaining uncertainty 
about French policy positions may disturb constituents’ expectations and modify
23 “Sa situation geographique au coeur de l’Europe fait qu’elle a des interets dans Fensemble des 
dossiers, ce qui est un desavantage parce qu’on a l’impression de toujours reclamer mais ce qui peut 
etre assez avantageux sachant qu’il n’y a aucun dossier sur lequel on ait des positions bloquees ... pour 
toiis les points, nous avons des interets nationaux en jeu.”, Interview, ref. 17.
24 “La France defend toujours des positions pro-agricoles parce qu’elle ne sait pas bien aibitrer au sein 
de ses productions et au sein des filieres parce qu’on a des interets partout. On a toujours tendance a 
ne vouloir sacrifier personne ce qui nous conduit a tout defendre.”, Interview, ref. 2.
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possible country alliances. Therefore, the involvement of France in many CAP 
programmes is often considered a strategic advantage for the defence of French 
agriculture.
The participation of the United Kingdom in the designing of CAP programmes is 
similarly affected since not all CAP programmes involve spending in the UK because of 
the structure of British agriculture. The United Kingdom is an important recipient of 
beef and sheep livestock grants, but is little concerned with wine, tobacco or cereals. 
The UK participates in decision-making on the latter programmes as a secondary 
player only, because it is not considered an expert in those commodities and because 
spending decisions on these programmes have no financial consequences for British 
agriculture or MAFF budgeting. Member States not producing a commodity are 
secondary players because their claim for budget cuts is considered biased. The UK is 
an exception in that respect since British representatives support price reductions for 
all commodities.25
The concentration of British agricultural interests on a few programmes gives 
credibility to the British policy line because its preferences remain consistent over the 
years. An official from the Ministry of Agriculture argued “they [the British positions] 
are quite predictable within budgetary negotiations, whereas we do not adopt as clear- 
cut positions as the British because our interests lie in more sectors.”26 This statement
25 According to Interview, ref. 24.
26 “Ils [les Anglais] sont assez previsibles dans les negotiations budgetaires, alors que comme on a des 
interets dans plus de secteurs, on n’a pas des positions aussi tranchees que peuvent l’avoir les 
Anglais.”, Interview, ref. 17.
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was echoed by an official from the Direction du Budget who argued
“With the English, negotiations are simple because they always have one single 
concern. They are predictable within negotiations whereas we are interested in 
all community issues, thus we are obliged to make compromises and choices. 
We do not have one single concern which necessarily wins. We would 
sometimes put agricultural preoccupations forward, sometimes transport, 
another time the fact that it is too expensive.”27
The predictability of British positions does not necessarily constitute a strategic
advantage because it offers fewer opportunities for new compromise agreements and
country alliances. British involvement in only a few CAP schemes limits the
opportunities for policy trade-offs and reciprocity, which reduces its margin of
manoeuvre within negotiations. It contributes to the isolation of British players within
EU bargaining. However, isolation may be an advantage in a policy context where
unanimous decisions are favoured for political reasons. An official argued
“Because of their low rate-of-retum on Agriculture, the British are not 
interested in it [CAP], But they are obliged to participate because they cannot 
put the whole system into question. Their tactic in Brussels is to have their 
agreement paid for. In every agreement or package there is always a little 
something for the British. They obtained the specific set-aside land, they 
obtained the maintenance of the refunds on whisky and the price of linseed oil. 
There are always specific ‘presents’ for the British to buy them off, otherwise 
one cannot reach a compromise.”28
27 “Avec les Anglais, ce qui est simple pour les negociations est qu’ils ont toujours une seule et meme 
preoccupation. Ils sont assez previsibles dans les negociations alors que nous sommes interesses par 
tous les sujets communautaires et done on est obliges de faire des compromis et de choix. On n’a pas 
toujours une preoccupation qui l’emporte forcement. On mettra parfois en avant nos preoccupations 
agricoles, parfois les transports, et puis une autre fois le fait que cela coute trop cher.”, Interview, ref. 
2 .
28 “Les Anglais, comme ils ont un mauvais taux de retour sur 1’agriculture, cela ne les interesse pas. 
Mais comme ils n’arrivent par a remettre en cause le systeme ils sont bien obliges de suivre. Leur 
tactique a Bruxelles e’est de se faire payer leur accord. Dans tout accord ou dans tout paquet il y a 
toujours un petit quelque chose pour les Anglais. Ils ont obtenu leur jachere specifique, ils ont obtenu 
le maintien des restitutions pour le whisky, le prix du lin oleagineux. II y a toujours des ‘cadeaux’ 
specifiques aux Anglais pour les acheter, car sinon on n’arrive pas a boucler un compromis.”, 
Interview, ref. 2.
173
Second, the strategy of national representatives is affected by voting procedures at
level 2. Decisions by the European Council require a qualified majority if supported by
the Commission. If there is a disagreement between the Commission and the Council,
unanimity is required within the European Council to overcome the Commission’s
opposition. A member of MAFF recalled
“that has only happened on three or four occasions because the Commission 
will make sure that its proposal was along the lines of what the Member States 
wanted or at least it would not have every Member State voting against it ... 
The Commission has a lot of power because it has the power to make the 
proposal in the first place.”29
Voting procedures impact on Member States’ strategies. Member States try to 
influence commissioners to gain their support to ease the adoption of a proposition in 
the Council. Member States seek to gain the Commission’s opposition to proposed 
decisions, should they wish to impede decision-making. The Commission’s opposition 
gives each Member State a veto power unrelated to its weight within EU negotiations. 
However, small countries on their own cannot expect to block decisions supported by 
the Commission.
Because of the size of EU agricultural programmes and because of hybridisation of 
decision-making processes, Britain and France have had to adapt and define a policy 
during negotiations at level 2. France seeks a leadership or at least a central role within 
negotiations to influence them, and it uses the possibility of changing its priorities and 
its alliances to pursue budget-maximisation. At the opposite, Britain adopts a 
consistent budget minimisation policy line and uses isolation as a threat againsst other 
EU members to impose its national priorities. Therefore, the strategy pursued by
29 Interview, ref. 31.
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national civil servants during level 2 negotiations reflects how national bureaucracies 
have adapted to EU membership and use decision-making procedures at EU level to 
impose their national priorities.
5.4. The margin of manoeuvre of national administrations on agricultural 
programmes
5.4.1. The Common Agricultural Policy
This section seeks to quantify the impact of EU membership on policy-making. 
National administrations have no margin of manoeuvre or very little on CAP 
expenditure at the EU level and in their country. First, the CAP budget, the 
Agriculture guideline, is worked out mathematically and follows EU economic growth. 
It is agreed that Member States cannot increase the guideline because of their 
willingness to develop non-agricultural programmes at the EU level, which was 
demonstrated at Edinburgh. Indeed, the guideline was not increased in 1994 and 1995 
when the MacSharry reform and exchange rate fluctuations put heavy pressure on CAP 
expenditure. Member States discuss the Commission’s proposal for a budget and can 
require a revision of the budget, if they can convince the Commission that planned 
expenditure would breach the Agriculture guideline. Therefore, the guideline 
constrains national administrations because it authorises a fixed level of spending on 
CAP. At the same time the guideline offers a guarantee that CAP expenditure is not
175
absolutely open-ended and gives Member States the power to amend CAP plans 
accordingly.30
Second, once the design and the budget of the various CAP schemes are agreed at the 
EU level, national administrations have little flexibility in the implementation of these 
schemes in their countries. An official from HM Treasury argued “there is very little 
discretion at all in any of the CAP spending”.31 His statement was confirmed by a 
member of MAFF who maintained “CAP is obligatory expenditure. There is nothing 
we can do about it or very little.”32 The margin of manoeuvre of MAFF is restricted at 
operational level because most of the money comes from the EU with precise 
conditions attached, and there is no national regime for commodities and market 
support. Therefore, an official from MAFF argued “with CAP as such, directly 
applicable, and most funding is 100% EC funding, we do not have to make any 
decisions for ourselves other than what has been agreed in Brussels. Therefore, it is 
important to get Brussels policy to fit with UK wishes.”33
In contrast to other EU schemes CAP programmes are obligatory not optional, 
therefore national administrations do not have a choice to implement them or not. 
CAP schemes fully harmonise the conditions for agricultural production (support 
prices, aid to farmers) throughout the EU. Harmonisation suppresses any possibility of 
differences between Member States, in contrast to approximation or convergence 
which only reduce differences. The central management of intervention and restitution
30 According to Interview, ref. 31.
31 Interview, ref. 13.
32 Interview, ref. 28.
33 Interview, ref. 31.
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spending is required to suppress the distortions of competition. National governments 
cannot, for instance, impose restrictions on claimants additional to those in the EU 
legislation to reduce CAP expenditure in the country. Finally, CAP regimes for market 
intervention and income support leave little scope for complementary interventions by 
national governments on their own. Therefore, Member States do not have major 
agricultural policies at the national level since the CAP is so exhaustive. Even 
domestically-financed schemes on national policy issues (e.g. environmental rules 
which impact on the beef sector in the UK) need to be cleared with EU institutions.34
Third, national governments have a restricted flexibility at the margin in the 
implementation of CAP schemes. With beef intervention the EU allows some 
differences between Member States about the classes of beef subject to intervention. 
Because it criticises beef intervention the UK has reduced the number of beef classes 
on which to intervene.35 However, beef is the only commodity sector where there is a 
possibility for variations between intervention in EU members. With the suckling cow 
premium scheme the EU allows cross-national variations since it allows Member States 
to offer supplementary headage payments. The UK does not use this facility but 
France and Ireland give complementary payments within the limits set by EU 
institutions. However, these variations are exceptional and concern only the fringe of 
EU programmes. CAP schemes are so precisely targeted and defined that the margin 
of manoeuvre of national administrations is almost nil during implementation.
34 According to Interview, ref. 27.
35 This example also illustrates that the British government does not seek to maximise CAP spending 
in the UK.
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Therefore, there are only two main ways for national governments to influence CAP 
schemes. First, Agriculture ministries are responsible for the administration of CAP 
schemes and anti-fraud controls. Second, Member States influence and participate in 
decision-making about CAP at level 2. Member States retain their sovereignty for 
designing agricultural intervention and income support because only decisions 
supported by a majority of countries are implemented. Member States’ sovereignty is 
not as complete on agricultural policy as on fiscal policy because only unanimous 
voting gives a veto power to individual EU members. However, the efficient 
participation of national governments in level 2 negotiations is the key for them to 
maintain a role in the definition of policy measures applicable in their country.
5.4.2. Structural programmes
The margin of manoeuvre of national governments over decisions on structural 
programmes is significant. Although the two accompanying measures implemented in 
the United Kingdom and France, the agri-environmental and the afforestation of 
agricultural lands schemes, were switched from Guidance to Guarantee during the 
1992 reform, they are discussed in this section because they differ greatly from 
obligatory CAP programmes. Not only are the targets of these measures oriented to 
reforming agricultural structures but the financial design of these schemes is closer to 
that of Guidance programmes. Therefore, accompanying measures are more similar to 
structural programmes under the Guidance section than is CAP for their effects on the 
margin of manoeuvre and the strategy of national governments.
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With structural programmes the margin of manoeuvre of national government is large
for a number of reasons. First, the conditions attached to EU schemes are not as
precise as with CAP. As argued by a member of MAFF on agri-environment schemes,
“we have a wide margin of manoeuvre. The criteria are the same for all Member States
but they are in very general terms.”36 The conditions of eligibility for EU funding are
flexible in the EU regulations while leaving Member States free to impose additional
restrictions to reduce financial claims in the country. With the Processing and
Marketing Grants, an official underlined
“a lot of the administrative matters have been handed out to the Member States. 
Under the present arrangements for regulation 866/90, the actual decisions on 
individual cases are made by the Member States. As a partnership arrangement, 
the Commission sets out the framework because they are paying the largest part 
of the money.”37
Member States also have a large margin of manoeuvre to set spending levels for each 
programme. The British level of livestock compensatory allowances is set at the 
minimum allowed by the EU regulation (ECU 20.3 per unit in 1995), while France and 
Germany tend to set compensation closer to the maximum allowed (ECU 135).38
Second, while Member States must implement the EU programmes, national schemes 
may complement them. The British government found the EU investment aid and 
grant scheme unsatisfactory in comparison with the national scheme it replaced. 
Regulation 2328 required that investment should be part of a plan and was income- 
related. A separate state aid scheme was maintained in the UK to continue traditional 
arrangements for investment and for farmers not eligible under the EU scheme.39
36 Interview, ref. 22.
37 Interview, ref. 19.
38 According to Interview, ref. 20.
39 According to Interview, ref. 21.
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Third, Member States influence the design of the EU programme. The UK had a 
leadership function in the promotion of structural measures at the EU level. The EU 
schemes on agri-environment and the afforestation of agricultural lands were largely 
inspired by schemes the UK had been running since 1986-87. The British schemes 
were considered good practice which other Member States should copy. Therefore, 
few amendments were made to the British arrangements. Similarly many of the 
schemes under Objective 5a, such as support for young farmers and for mountain 
agriculture, were inspired by existing French policies. The influence of individual 
Member States in the designing of EU agricultural policy fosters changes in other 
Member States. French farmers’ organisations used not to be interested in British agri- 
environmental measures because they argued agriculture and environment were 
separate. Since the EU has adopted agri-environmental schemes, the discourse of 
these organisation has altered, and expenditure under these schemes has multiplied 
over tenfold since 1992 in France.
Therefore, the stimulation effect of EU structural programmes depends on whether 
national governments consider co-financing a strong incentive for undertaking 
structural schemes. In the United Kingdom co-financing provides little stimulation for 
developing schemes because of the Fontainebleau agreement. The budgets for 
environmental and afforestation schemes were not increased since the UK has received 
EU funds because HM Treasury considered that the changes in the source of funding 
should have no impact on spending levels. It shows that EU funding is not additional 
to domestic financing. Because of the effect of Euro-PES and the Fontainebleau 
agreement on the British budgetary procedures, negotiations between MAFF and HM
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Treasury concern total, not British, spending on agri-environment. A civil servant from 
MAFF explained “we first determine the overall size of the programme ... Within the 
budget envelope that we nationally have decided for a particular scheme, none of the 
allocations of budgets is driven by the Community.”40 Since the conditions of eligibility 
for EU financing are flexible, the department decides first on the desired level of 
spending on these policies and then determines the criteria for eligibility to the 
schemes. Because schemes similar to the accompanying measures were started from 
the mid-1980s in the UK, MAFF has the administrative structure and the information 
on farming necessary accurately to forecast the budgetary cost for more or less 
stringent criteria. Spending levels under the EU scheme are determined on the basis of 
former levels under the national budget.
In France co-financing is a strong incentive because of the resource-maximisation 
approach. Co-financing is seen as a way of cutting the ministry’s costs and improving 
the profitability of investment plans. In some countries eligible for Cohesion Fund 
credits co-financing is not an efficient financial structure because matching domestic 
funds may not be available. In 1989 the EU offered full financing of the programme 
for rooting up vineyards because mixed financing was slowing down the 
implementation of the policy in Mediterranean countries41
Two main conclusions may be drawn from this section. First, in spite of the CAP 
programmes, which EU members must undertake under precise conditions, other EU 
agricultural schemes leave some margin for national discretion. Therefore, Member
40 Interview, ref. 22.
41 According to Interview, ref. 2.
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States may decide on how much they want to be influenced by EU schemes. Second, 
because of the participation of departmental actors in the design of EU schemes, 
Member States have means to influence EU programmes and policy priorities.
5.5. Conclusion
Chapter 5 argued that the impact of EU membership on budgeting in agriculture 
ministries and the adaptation of the departments’ bureaucratic mechanisms to EU 
spending programmes on agriculture are different in size and nature from what could 
be assumed from the existing literature.
First, chapter 5 demonstrated that the literature commonly over-emphasised the impact 
of EU membership on agriculture ministry budgetary choices because of the great size 
of transfers from the EU to individual Member States. Chapter 5 quantified the degree 
to which budgeting on agriculture is affected by EU membership in finance and in 
policy-making more precisely. In the first place, a financial approach comparing the * 
size of EU and domestic expenditure on agriculture shows that the European budget 
finances nearly all intervention expenditure in member countries. For instance, the 
ratio of EU and domestic financing of British agriculture is roughly 3 to 1. However, 
recently rising EU agricultural spending in Britain was mainly driven by monetary 
fluctuations unrelated to the CAP reform. In France the European Union is directly or 
indirectly responsible for about 90% of the grants to French farmers, leaving the 
government with few financial means for an independent French agricultural policy.
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However, a large part of public spending in the agricultural sector is made by national 
governments: about half of total expenditure in the agricultural sector is financed by the 
French central government and Social Security Funds. Therefore, financially, 
agriculture ministry budgetary choices are not totally EU-determined, and domestic 
financing remains important for social protection and policy.
Chapter 5 demonstrated that the impact of EU membership is limited since national 
governments keep a margin of manoeuvre on policy-making. National governments 
have little margin of manoeuvre on the design of CAP expenditure and little flexibility 
in the implementation of these schemes. With structural programmes national 
governments decide how much they want to be influenced, depending on whether they 
consider co-financing a strong financial incentive. In the UK co-financing provides little 
incentive because of the Fontainebleau agreement, whereas in France co-financing 
favours spending because of the resource-maximisation approach. Therefore, 
budgeting in agriculture ministries is not as fully EU-determined in policy-making as is 
usually maintained.
Second, chapter 5 argued that the main consequence of EU membership is the 
adaptation of the department’s bureaucratic mechanisms to European budgetary 
processes. The design of the European budget requires the participation of 
departmental actors at level 2. Therefore, the strategy of the national actors at level 1 
and at level 2 reveals how national bureaucracies have adapted to EU membership and 
their reaction to EU pressures. In the United Kingdom the sectoral approach confirms 
the strategy of minimisation of EU expenditure and the priority given to national not
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EU policy priorities. The strategy of level 1 actors is affected by the net contribution 
to the EU budget (especially because of CAP). The constraints on MAFF actors are 
similar to those in other departments because the Fontainebleau agreement impacts on 
all EU expenditure in Britain. Level 1 negotiations in the UK present a low degree of 
conflict between MAFF and HM Treasury because MAFF is conscious of the 
particularly low return on CAP. Within level 2 negotiations British representatives 
adopt a consistent budget minimisation policy line and use isolation as a threat against 
their counterparts.
In contrast, French representatives are financially concerned by a large number of 
negotiations and implement a strategy of changing policy priorities and alliances to 
budget-maximise. The strategies of level 1 players are specific to agriculture since 
France is a net contributor to the overall EU budget but a net recipient on the CAP. 
The Direction du Budget has incentives for maximising not only the French take of EU 
expenditure but also the funds available for Agriculture in the EU budget. The greater 
positive financial returns on CAP contributed to a lower degree of conflict in the 
relationships between the Direction du Budget and the Ministry of Agriculture.
British and French bargaining strategies vary because of differences in the structure of 
agricultural production. French agricultural interests are varied, even dispersed, while 
British interests are concentrated. The structure of interests affects national alliance- 
building and negotiation strategies. It affects the potential win-sets and the possibility 
of leadership. Therefore, the British policy line is more consistent and predictable than 
the French, but UK’s position at level 2 is more isolated.
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The contrasted strategies at level 2 indicate the different reactions of national 
administrations to EU pressures. The definition of a coherent policy guiding the 
participation of national actors in level 2 negotiations shows that national 
administrations have adapted to EU budgetary procedures. The participation of 
departmental actors in the design of EU programmes give them also means to influence 
EU policy priorities. Therefore, Member States may influence EU processes on 
national budgeting.
The conventional view about budgeting in the Ministry of Agriculture tends to 
exaggerate the influence of EU institutions on the determination of national budgeting. 
The conventional literature tends to differentiate too widely between the influence of 
the EU on budgeting for Agriculture and for other departments. The conventional 
literature presents the Europeanisation of agricultural budgeting as an exception within 
national budgeting. Likierman argues “its expenditure differs in an important respect 
from that of other departments” 42 By extending the focus to the impact of EU 
membership on budgeting in other departments, the thesis will determine whether 
budgetary Europeanisation is peculiar to agriculture or whether it is a wide-ranging 
adaptation process affecting budgeting in EU members across a number of sectors. 
This study across departments will make it possible to substantiate our hypotheses that 
the adaptation of budgetary processes to EU pressures is proportional to the frequence 
and intensity of interactions between national and European actors during policy­
making processes and to the size of EU expenditure in a sector.
42 Likierman, Andrew (1988), Public expenditure - Who really controls it and how (London: 
Penguin): 31.
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Chapter 6
Europeanisation under national control? The case of 
budgetary decision-making in the Department of Transport
The case of transport lies mid-way between Agriculture and Health since EU 
regulatory activity in the transport sector is long-established while the direct financial 
impact of EU transport programmes on departmental budgeting is recent. The 
competency of the EEC in transport was asserted as far back as the origins of the 
Community (Treaty of Rome, articles 74 to 84) and encompasses various aspects. 
First, the liberalisation of the transport sectors was to be completed in 1997. Access to 
the market for road transport was freed when registration and national authorisation 
for providing transport services were suppressed (e.g. any European transport 
company may provide services between London and Manchester). In rail liberalisation 
has started only recently.
Second, the harmonisation of technical norms (e.g. weight and dimensions of vehicles) 
and the functioning of the transport sector (e.g. community quotas on road transport) 
have been developed. EU transport regulation is now extensive and has a great impact 
on the structure of the market, competition and industry. The regulatory activity of the 
EU has an indirect impact on the department’s budget to the extent that it sets 
technical constraints on transport companies, some of which are publicly owned 
(SNCF, Air France, British Rail ...). However, it is extremely difficult to assess the 
impact of this category of measures on budgeting.
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Third, budgeting in transport is also greatly affected by the overall EU environment and 
regulations which apply to transport as well as to other sectors. Social and work 
regulations affect the treatment of employees of public transport companies (as of 
private ones); tax policy, in particular excise duties on petrol, is defined on the basis of 
the level of taxation in neighbouring countries and technology (trucks can now cross 
France without tanking in France if petrol is comparatively expensive since the capacity 
of petrol containers has now increased); the regulation on re-capitalisation of public 
companies is another example of the European Union’s constraints on transport 
budgeting by non-transport regulation. The impact of this regulation, in particular in 
air transport, is more apparent in France because unlike the UK France has a national 
carrier. The Air France case illustrates that the government no longer can decide to 
finance or cancel part of the debt of a public company without the agreement of the 
European Union. However, as noted by a senior civil servant from the DB, the 
regulation has less impact on financial flows between the central government and Air 
France than on administrative and legal procedures.1 In short, the government will go 
on subsidising public companies using more complicated financial and legal structures. 
For instance, the French government uses the possibility of financing non-profitable air 
companies within the framework of regional planning as a means of continuing to 
subsidise Air Inter indirectly through the Fonds de Perequation des Transports Aeriens.
1 According to Interview, ref. 9.
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Fourth, regulations on the structure of transport companies have a more direct impact 
on budgeting. The Directive 91/440 on rail companies2 implies a split between 
management accounting for infrastructure and operating costs. The Directive is 
inspired by the British system and challenges the negotiations of the lcontrat de plan 
Etat-SNCF  by requiring that the infrastructure budget should be balanced. This 
regulation represents a major cultural change for the SNCF, since it raises the 
possibility of introducing competition for providing rail services by opening up access 
to the national infrastructure network to foreign rail-operating companies. The 
introduction of competition into what France traditionally considers a natural 
monopoly has an enormous impact on SNCF budgeting. It raises the question of how 
to price the service as against the infrastructure cost. The new obligation raises a 
major problem because international competition will mainly occur on those TGV lines 
where the SNCF is making profits through earning rent, which it then uses to finance 
its low-retum conventional rail network. The whole financial equilibrium of the SNCF, 
based on a cross-subsidisation by which the TGV pays for providing services on old 
conventional lines would be challenged.3 Competition and an increasing pressure on 
the SNCF to lower its price on TGV lines services would modify the existing financial 
equilibrium. The effect can be felt already since the former chairman of SNCF, Mr. 
Bergougnoux, planned to close 6,000 kilometres of unprofitable conventional rail 
lines.4
2 Council Directive of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community’s railways (91/440/EEC).
3 Interview, Ref. 57.
4 “La SNCF prete a supprimer 6.000 kilometres de lignes”, La Tribune, 18 Oct. 1995.
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Moreover, the Directive is considered by a few Member States as a first step in the 
direction of privatising rail services. The United Kingdom has split infrastructure and 
operating services into two entities for privatisation of the service-operating company, 
although the Directive requires only a separation of their accounts, and Germany goes 
in that direction. The French government currently rules out this possibility for the 
SNCF, arguing the SNCF must run all the profitable lines (those that could be 
privatised) to pay for the non-profitable ones.
The influence of the EU in norm-setting, tax and accounting is not new but it has 
always been difficult to assess the adaptation of departmental budgetary processes 
because these pressures are indirect. Up to the early 1990s the European Union was 
not competent to decide on investment priorities nor on the design of transport 
infrastructure. The only chanel of intervention of the EU on transport infrastructure 
was research, namely feasibility studies (in 1983 the Community financed part of the 
feasibility studies for the Channel Tunnel). The great change brought by the Treaty of 
Maastricht to the transport sector was to give a responsibility to EU institutions to 
finance transport inffastucture in the EU. This new mandate has had an important 
impact on the determination of spending priorities by the Departments of Transport in 
Britain and France. Transport is a significant case study of the impact of EU 
membership on the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms at departmental level. This 
chapter concentrates on how varied groups of actors at departmental level have 
promoted or reacted to this new financial responsibility and the effect it has had on 
departmental policy-making.
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6.1. Historical background
The main stages leading to the creation of a financial responsibility for the European 
Union in transport are as follows.
In 1968 the European Parliament expressed its intention of having a Common 
Transport Policy (CTP) defined and implemented without delay. In 1970, 1974, 1979 
and 1982 resolutions called the Council to fix a working programme with a precise 
timetable of decisions to be taken.5 In 1982 a resolution of the European Parliament 
brought an action for a declaration by the ECJ that the Council had infringed the EC 
treaty by failing to introduce a Common Transport Policy. Only minimal measures had 
been adopted by the Council, which had reached no decision on a number of 
Commission proposals on which the EP had long ago adopted a favourable opinion. In 
1985 the European Court of Justice called the Council to act by fixing the framework 
for a CTP and introducing the freedom to provide services.6
In December 1989 the idea of a European network for high-speed trains was submitted 
to the European Council of Ministers, which decided to set up a Working Group 
involving national experts to reflect on how the network concept could be used in the 
European Community. The group produced guideline maps for a European high-speed 
train {schema directeur de train europeen a grande vitesse) adopted by the Council in 
December 1990, which launched the idea of a European high-speed train network. The 
group identified ‘missing links’ {maillons clef) that are parts of rail lines where there is 
less traffic mainly because of topographic obstacles (Pyrenees barrier, Alps, TGV-East
5 Resolution 1970/40, and resolutions on 25 September 1974,16 January 1979 and 3 March 1982.
6 Judgement of the European Court of Justice, case 13/83 on 22 May 1985.
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and the line between London and the Channel Tunnel). The low profitability of these 
‘missing links’ partly explains why national financing may not be available. By late 
1990 the group of national experts had gathered a consensus on the identification of 
EU interests with precise projects that Member States would not want to undertake by 
themselves. The decision was legitimated by scientific and technical expertise. This 
group still exists and produced a report in 1995 which slightly modified the original 
scheme.
Independently of, and simultaneously with, the identification of weaknesses in EU high­
speed train network by national experts, intergovernmental negotiations in Councils led 
to a political decision by the Heads of State at the Maastricht summit in December 
1991. The Treaty introduced the notion of Trans-European Networks (TENs) in the 
transport, communication and energy sectors (article 129b) aimed at the 
interconnection and the compatibility of existing and planned transport networks. In 
the transport sector the notion of TENs enlarges the concept of guideline maps 
{schemas directeurs) first defined in 1990, since it includes conventional rail, 
infrastructure for combined transport, ports, airports, road and inland waterways. 
However, the concept of a high-speed network remains as it was defined in the 1990 
guideline maps included in the annexe of the TENs decision. Moreover, article 129c of 
the Treaty of Maastricht creates a EU responsibility for defining infrastructure 
investment priorities, since it gives the European Union the task of identifying projects 
of common interest and needs for technical-norm harmonisation. Last, TENs provides 
for EU financial support for projects of common interest.
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Table 6.1. The budget for Internal Policies and TENs (1994-1999) 
in m. ECU
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Financial perspective
- Internal policies 4,557 5,003 5,337 5,603 5,837 6,060
- incl. TENs 292 358 410 489 574 683
Actual exDenditure
on TENs 179 239 277 346 _
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec TUnion Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale): 27.
Since then European Councils have continuously given a budgetary priority to Trans- 
European networks, e.g. increasing the budget line by over ECU 70 m. in 1996 (that is 
a 20% growth). In September 1995 the Council defined the conditions for obtaining 
EU support and allocated the credits among the different types of networks for 1995- 
1999. Transport networks were given the priority with ECU 1,785 m. out of the 2,345 
available (about 75%), ECU 112 m. for energy and 448 for telecommunication 
networks. In 1995, 240 out of the ECU 280 m. allocated to transport networks were 
spent.
The European Councils enlarged the concepts of guideline maps and missing links 
defined by experts to new sectors and integrated them into the responsibilities of the 
European Union. Negotiations on the selection of projects started in 1992. Guideline 
maps for combined transport, road and inland waterways were agreed upon in October 
1993 but because of the co-decision procedure, EU decisions on all outstanding 
guidelines were delayed until mid-1995. Also, the selection of priority projects by the 
European Council became more difficult as varied groups simultaneously produced 
different lists of priority projects.
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In parallel with the intergovernmental negotiations on TENs, the Commission in 1992 
started to reflect on how to relaunch growth in the European Union (the European 
summit in Edinburgh in December 1992 launched a European economic growth 
initiative). In its White Paper submitted at the June 1993 Copenhagen summit, the 
Commission recommended the European Union should undertake and contribute to 
financing transport infrastructure projects as a way of sustaining employment and 
growth. The implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht gave the European Union 
new legal and financial means to act in this sector. The Delors’ White Paper selected 
26 projects which could constitute the agenda of the EU transport and energy 
infrastructure programme.
Together with the adoption of Delors’ European Initiative for Growth and 
Employment, the Brussels European Council (December 1993) commissioned a group 
of personal representatives of the Heads of State7 to assist the Commission in co­
ordinating and taking forward plans for networks in transport and energy. The setting 
up of the Group originated from a Commission initiative originally separate from the 
TENs project and its ideas. It was a response to the feeling that TENs was too general 
a concept and that there was a need for specific projects. The group, chaired by vice- 
president Christophersen, submitted an interim report to the Corfu European Council 
(June 1994). It short-listed 11 priority transport projects among the 34 infrastructure 
and 5 traffic management projects. By doing so the European Council redirected 
attention to the high-speed train network and on the ‘missing links’. The final report of 
the Group to the Essen European Council (December 1994) selected 14 top priority
7 Professor Christian de Boissieu was appointed as the French representative, and Mr. G. Fitchew, 
Head of the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, as the British.
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projects and about 20 projects of lower priority (see Appendix 6.2.). The 
Christophersen list soon raised a financial duplication problem as the Group mostly 
selected projects which had been already short-listed in the framework of TENs (with 
one exception), and as it was decided there would not be a special financial instrument 
to pay for the Group’s projects. However, the Christophersen list gained political 
support because, in contrast to the Commission, the selection was legitimated by expert 
advice and intergovernmental consensus. In the end the two initiatives were brought 
together as the Commission redefined its list of projects eligible for TENs funding to fit 
in with those of the Christophersen Group.
6.2. Shifts in players’ strategies
This short historical summary provides a background for reflecting on how national 
administrations have adapted to pressures arising from the new role of EU institutions 
on transport infrastructure. Section two of this chapter argues that the definition of a 
new responsibility together with financial means at EU level had a strong impact on the 
strategy of the various national actors involved in the budgetary process at level 1 and 
level 2. Also, it shows that these national actors helped define the role and the means 
of EU institutions in the transport sector. Therefore, section two shows how national 
bureaucracies at the departmental level have used and reacted to EU membership. The 
network approach is relevant for studying the role of the varied players involved, and a 
comparative approach serves to underline specific national interests.
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6.2.1. States ’ subjective interests at the genesis of the European transport initiative
Before discussing sub-governmental interests and strategies, as a background it is 
useful to focus on the two states’ interests. In transport policy, French interests are 
significant. The timing of the different stages leading to the definition of a new 
responsibility for EU institutions in transport infrastructure supports the view that 
France exercised a major leadership function in promoting this new function. Major 
initial steps in the designing of EU transport policy were taken under French 
presidencies (Commission proposal in 1983s and the decision to set up a Working 
Group in 1989). The idea of a European high-speed train network closely followed a 
decision by the French Council of Ministers on national guideline maps for high-speed 
trains {schema directeur national des trains a grande vitesse) in January 1989. A 
senior civil servant argued that “taking into account France’s precedence in the field of 
high-speed trains and the fact that the concept of networks and guideline maps is very 
old, we have imposed it somewhat at the European level during the French presidency. 
We are a little the originators of this matter.”9 The Delors White Paper on growth and 
employment recommended a EU transport programme just when the TENs initiative 
was in need of political support. French civil servants are keen to emphasise that 
Delors had designed his White Paper to justify European transport programmes.
8 Commission of the European Communities (1983), “Progress towards a common transport policy - 
inland transport”, Com. 83 (58), (Brussels, CEC, 9 Feb.).
9 “Compte tenu de l’anteriorite de la France en matiere de grande vitesse et que le concept de reseau et 
de schema directeur est tres ancien, on l’a, a l’occasion de notre presidence, un peu impose au niveau 
europeen. On est un peu a l’origine de tout cela.”, Interview, ref. 42.
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On this subject a former Directeur du Budget acknowledged that
“France has managed wonderfully to use Brussels as an instrument for the 
penetration of the TGV product, which is on the verge of becoming a 
Community product. We succeeded in having Delors give birth to a 
masterpiece, which is the Great Programme on Employment of 1992, on which 
of course nobody has ideas on how to create employment directly, so why not 
build tunnels in which you would put trains ... This is a pure product of the 
French influence inside the Commission.”10
On the same topic, but more reflecting the interests of the Ministry of Transport, an
official insinuated that the Delors White Paper provided a useful justification for giving
a European aspect to French transport projects: “This is the official version, but of
course the Ministry of Transport has taken this opportunity to emphasise the interest of
developing trans-European networks independently of their impact on growth and
employment.”11 Therefore, there are strong presumptions on the part of officials that
French players actively encouraged the creation of a European transport programme to
sustain the building of high-speed train infrastructure in the European Union.
In contrast, the government of the United Kingdom is not often considered a leader in
diffusing ideas that led to the European transport programme. Yet, the increase in EU
expenditure in the transport sector corresponds to the period when the UK realised it
should promote every European policy other than agriculture to reduce the share of
CAP within the European budget. However, British ministers were sceptical about the
EU’s need to expand its role in transport investment because the Commission had no
expertise in that sector at the time.12
10 “La France a formidablement bien su utiliser Bruxelles comme instrument de penetration du produit 
TGV qui est en train de devenir un produit communautaire. On a reussit a faire accoucher par Delors 
un chef d’oeuvre qui est le Grand Programme sur l’Emploi de 1992 sur lequel bien entendu personne 
n’a d’idees sur la fagon directe de creer des emplois, alors pourquoi pas faire des tunnels dans lesquels 
on mettra des trains ... C’est directement un produit de l’influence frangaise a l’interieur de la 
Commission.”, Interview, ref. 1.
11 “C’est la these officielle, mais bien evidemment le Ministere des Transports s’est saisi de cette 
opportunity pour developper l’interet de developper les reseaux trans-europeens independemment de 
leur impact sw la croissance et sw l’emploi.”, Interview, ref. 32.
12 According to Interview, ref. 45.
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6.2.2. HM Treasury and the Direction du Budget: the guardians o f their governments ’ 
interests or Machiavelian actors ?
In a first approach Finance Ministries in the UK and France were keen to emphasise 
they had little financial incentive for using EU financial facilities. As laid down in the 
TENs financial regulation, support is in the form of feasibility studies, interest-rate 
subsidies, loan guarantee premia and, in exceptional cases, co-financing. In contrast to 
other Member States, such as Belgium13, the French and the British governments are 
not interested in interest-rate subsidies nor loan guarantee premia, since they find better 
borrowing conditions in private financial markets thanks to their credit-worthiness. 
Even the SNCF enjoys equivalent borrowing conditions despite its huge deficit, 
because of the implicit financial backing of the French government. However, EU 
financing facilities remain attractive for the ‘label’ they give to a project. As mentioned 
by a British official, “EIB financing is not seen as a source of cheap finance but, if you 
can get it, it is financing that seems to give projects a particular financial status ... In 
relation to the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, the Department hopes that the bidders will be 
able to attract significant contributions from the EIB”,14 particularly as it is easier for a 
project to raise other sources of finance if it is already supported by EU organisations.
The second element in the determination of the Finance Ministries’ strategy stems from 
the mechanisms set up in France and in the UK for administering EU expenditure and 
the national contribution to the EU budget. The position of HM Treasury seems more
13 The Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Beiges contracted a European Investment Bank loan.
14 Interview, ref. 34.
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consistent than that of the Direction du Budget, which has notably shifted its strategy 
and informal discourse in a Machiavelian fashion.
The institutionalist approach proved most useful for pointing out that institutional 
arrangements in the UK set pressures on HM Treasury to be in favour of setting both 
the EU transport budget and the British share of EU transport expenditure as low as 
possible. However, while the new institutional framework explains most of the 
behaviour of HM Treasury, it does not explain why the British government was so 
keen to push the CTRL project as its top priority, and why eventually four out of the 
14 Christophersen priority projects involved the UK as a participant (notably the West 
Coast Main Line was added at the last minute). The maximisation of UK projects 
included in the EU initiative seems paradoxical in the new institutional analysis which 
posits that HM Treasury is not financially interested in EU funding because, as a result 
of the Fontainebleau agreement, EU and domestic financing amount to the same thing 
in budgetary terms. On the CTRL project, one explanation suggests HM Treasury is 
keen to obtain EU finance to reduce the official government contribution to the 
project. It is a government principle and a public policy made explicit with the Private 
Finance Initiative that government should contribute as little as possible to projects that 
could be financed privately. Even if EU financing of the CTRL project may reduce the 
compensation under the Fontainebleau agreement, it also reduces the government’s 
subsidy to the project in accordance with the PFI’s recommendations. However, in 
spite of this notable case HM Treasury is broadly consistent with its formal instructions 
of containing public expenditure, no matter from which body, to levels that are as low 
as possible.
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In France positions inside the Direction du Budget are contradictory depending on the 
bureaux, reflecting conflicting interests at different levels of policy-making. The 
European bureau is in favour of setting the EU transport budget low because France is 
a net contributor for all policies except agriculture. On internal policies the rate-of- 
retum on the French contribution is negative (the French rate-of-retum on TENs is 
10% to 13% depending on the calculations, while France contributes to 17.8% of the 
EU budget).15 Once the EU transport budget is set, the European bureau is in favour 
of a large French stake of European transport expenditure because it accounts to the 
Bureau de la Synthese on the basis of the returns on the French contribution during the 
Perspectives. At this stage the approach does not consist in seeking positive but ‘less 
worse’ rates-of-retum. This rationale denotes a shift to a resource-maximising 
approach. In this respect the European bureau adopts the perspective of the Ministry 
of Transport, which is to maximise EU expenditure to optimise total receipts.
The position of the Transport bureau should in theory be the pure reflection of the 
general line of the Direction du Budget on EU budgeting. However, the TENs led the 
Transport bureau to break away from the ministry’s line, subsequently altering the 
overall policy of the Direction du Budget. The extension of the European Union’s 
responsibilities to transport infrastructure investments corresponds to when the 
Transport bureau was trying to resist the government’s political project of building the 
TGV-East, particularly on the grounds of the low profitability of the project (estimated 
at between 3 to 4%). The low profitability is because the North-East of France is not 
densely inhabited, a large share of the potential users are subsidised by the government
15 According to Interview, ref. 57.
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(e.g. army), and the opportunities for extending the network further East are not great. 
Indeed the traffic towards Vienna or Budapest would be too low to be profitable, and 
the TGV network cannot be extended to Germany where the rail technology is based 
on a different system (magnetic support).
Against that background successive governments took a political commitment to give
the East a TGV as part of French regional planning policy. After years of political and
financial deadlock on the subject the new EU role seemed to offer a solution for both
parties by providing enough additional sources of finance to make the project
worthwhile. As argued by a member of the Direction du Budget,
“the stakes are not the same from the perspective of the European bureau and 
that of the Transport bureau, except for the common ones of controlling budget 
spending, or of having institutions other than the French government finance 
budgetary expenditure so that it does not weigh on the Maastricht criteria. If 
Local Authorities have more debt, it comes down to the same thing. As 
regards the TGV-East, the budgetary stake is such that we are better off getting 
the most we can financed by Europe up to a certain point.”16
In short the Transport bureau took the view that EU financing would reduce the 
government’s subsidy, and that financial arrangements would increase the profitability 
of the project: additional EU financing created the illusion that the profitability of the 
TGV-East project increased (to 8%), because the calculation did not include the cost 
of the EU contribution for French public finance.
16 “L’enjeu n’est pas le meme vu du bureau Europeen et vu du bureau Transports, si ce n’est l’enjeu 
commun de la maitrise de la depense budgetaire ou le financement de la depense budgetaire par 
d’autres que l’Etat pour que cela ne pese pas sur les criteres de Maastricht. Que les collectivites 
locales s’endettent, cela revient au meme. Sur le TGV-Est, l’enjeu budgetaire est tel qu’on a interet a 
faire financer le maximum de choses par 1’Europe jusqu’a un certain point.”, Interview, ref. 9.
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The EU solution seemed to be a miracle. However, it is rather a mirage, causing major 
shifts in the strategy of the Transport bureau and the Direction du Budget as a whole. 
First, the Transport bureau broke away from the European bureau policy to set the EU 
budget low by considering the possibility of altering the European Financial 
Perspectives to increase TENs’ credits and by agreeing at the Essen summit to allocate 
any extra financing to the network budgetary line. This decision, motivated by the 
desire to increase the credits available under TENs, stands in complete contradiction 
with overall DB policy to keep public expenditure low to respect the Maastricht 
criteria. Second, the priority given to TENs funding as an alternative to 100% 
domestic financing stems from a misleading resource-maximising approach breaking 
away from the DB’s traditional rate-of-retum approach. Since the French return on 
TENs is negative, it would be less costly for the government to pay for the investment 
with domestic funds rather than have it financed by the European Union. Third, since 
the internal rate-of-retum on the TGV project is lower them the French share of the EU 
transport budget, it is not profitable to have it financed by the European Union.17
While it is not clear when this solution was found, it is possible to argue that the 
financing of the TGV-East was in the back of the minds of the actors who contributed 
to designing the European transport initiative. We have already underlined French 
leadership in the promotion of the concept of high-speed train networks at the EU level 
and the identification of missing links by the 1989 Working Group. The only missing 
links identified corresponding to projects that were ready to start were the Channel 
Tunnel and the TGV-East, the two projects where France has high economic and
17 According to Interview, ref. 57.
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financial interests. A former Directeur du Budget recognised “the French government 
and the industrial corporations in the sector managed to insert TGV programmes into 
the Community budget thanks to small budgetary lines and research programmes.”18
6.2.3. The Department o f Transport: the defence o f sectoral interests at all costs ?
The most interesting question about the strategy of the Department of Transport and 
the Ministere des Transports is whether access to the new European Union financial 
facilities have altered their positions within the budgetary process regardless of national 
budgetary priorities and how they have adapted their strategy to accommodate EU 
policy-making.
In the United Kingdom the reconciling of departmental and national budgetary interests 
is not an issue. Since the introduction of the Euro-PES mechanism in the department’s 
budgeting in 1988, coupled with the Fontainebleau agreement, the natural interest of 
the department lies in setting EU expenditure, even in the UK, as low as possible.
Table 6.2. Department o f Transport’s baseline reduction under Euro-PES (1992-96) 
in m. pounds
1992-93* 1993-94** 1994-95** 1995-96**
Non-Research & Development 9.180 na na
Research & Development 0.458 0.458 0.434
Total 9.180 9.638 na na
* actual expenditure
** DTp’s baseline reduction as forecast in the 1992 Survey (estimations)
Source: Department of Transport (1992), “A basic guide to EUROPES”, internal document, July.
18 “L’Etat frangais et les industries concemes ont reussit par des petites lignes et des programmes de 
recherche, a instiller dans le budget communautaire des programmes TGV. On va reussir a faire 
passer le TGV-Est, qui est une catastrophe macroeconomique, et le faire financer par Bruxelles.”, 
Interview, ref. 1.
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While the conclusions from the new institutional approach help explain the general 
‘minimalist’ attitude of British DTp civil servants about EU transport expenditure, it 
does not explain why they ultimately voted in favour of the TENs programme and put 
up proposals for EU funding four UK projects. An approach based on groups’ 
interests suggests the DTp cannot afford to reason purely in budgetary terms in a 
European context where the Commission has given a political impetus for EU transport 
investment programmes. Because the UK cannot opt-out from EU transport policy 
without being politically isolated within the negotiation process and unable to influence 
decisions, the Department of Transport has to participate in the decision-making 
process at the EU level. The participation of the Department of Transport in EU 
decision-making against its political interests (because it challenges national methods of 
project prioritisation), against its administrative interests (because it complicates the 
decision-making processes by involving varied actors and introducing additional 
constraints) and against its financial interests (because EU expenditure is not additional 
and not even considered a substitute for domestic finance) illustrates how the European 
Union creates an environment where players are induced into participating in the game 
by the risk of exclusion. This context partly explains the feeling of unease felt by 
members of the DTp about EU policy and institutions. Since they are conscious they 
sacrifice departmental and national budgetary interests, departmental actors seek to 
ensure that at least EU priorities match the British ones so that national priorities are 
not distorted nor contradicted by EU ones. British players adopt an active attitude 
within negotiations, not because they believe in the benefits of EU policy, but to 
minimise its budgetary costs for national government and its policy costs for the 
transport sector.
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The circumstances are different for the French Ministry of Transport, which has strong 
incentives for adopting a budget-maximising approach on EU transport expenditure. 
First, spending ministries have a natural propensity to increase their credits to expand 
the satisfaction of the actors in their sector and their own satisfaction. Second, 
institutional arrangements lead the Transport and the European bureaux in the 
Direction du Budget to encourage the MT to obtain as many EU credits as possible to 
avoid worsening the rate-of-retum. Third, shifts in the strategy of the Direction du 
Budget on the TGV-East project were interpreted by the Ministry of Transport as a 
signal the Direction du Budget was abandoning the rate-of-retum approach. Prospects 
of ‘additional’ EU financing supported the idea there were new means of financing 
infrastructure. As a consequence the Ministry of Transport was particularly active in 
EU negotiations in the hope of pushing French projects to the top of the priority list to 
get maximum funding and including as many transport schemes as possible (6 projects 
were included in the Christophersen Group’s report). The Ministry of Transport took 
the view that the European Union provided an opportunity for promoting its interests 
within global government policy, and the TGV-East negotiations left it with the feeling 
of having the implicit backing of the Direction du Budget and the government for 
pursuing this line.
This shift in strategy affected the department’s policy in several ways. First, the MT 
tried to give a European label to projects which had already gained national political 
backing. With the TGV-East an official recognised that “the European term was added 
somewhat afterwards.”19 Several civil servants pointed out that this shift had
19 “Le terme europeen a ete rajoute un peu apres coup.”, Interview, ref. 9.
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contributed to a loss of credibility by the French representatives within the EU 
negotiations, not only because their European counterparts were not easily deceived by 
the strategy, but mainly because the French projects were pushed although they did not 
fulfil the basic requirements for EU funding: the TGV-East does not satisfy the criteria 
of financial partnership between the public and private sectors set by the 
Christophersen Group, nor does the Lyon-Turin TGV satisfy the maturity criteria. 
French projects were accepted after a difficult bargaining stage, once French 
representatives accepted the possibility that countries eligible for Cohesion Fund 
credits may accumulate several EU financing schemes for a single project.
The second effect of the new EU transport programme on the strategy of the Ministry 
of Transport is project diversification. Pushing the budget-maximising approach 
further than the government wished, the Minister of Transport Bosson included a 
second project (the Lyon-Turin TGV) within Christophersen’s selection list with the 
same degree of priority as the TGV-East. This inclusion marked the return of the 
traditional clash between departmental and the Direction du Budget’s views and 
created the impression the French government was not speaking with one voice. The 
DB continued to hold its old positions, arguing the maturity of the project was not 
satisfactory, that neither the SNCF nor the French government were ready to finance 
the remaining 90% of the project (about FR. 50 bn.), and that the project was 
‘polluting’ the debate on the financing of TGV-East. Reflecting the view of the 
Direction du Budget, a senior civil servant argued “the risk we face is to get a 
‘sprinkling’ between several TGV, while the real priority is the TGV-East because it is
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ready and because it represents the greatest budgetary risk for us since we are 
politically constrained to undertake it.”20
Therefore, EU pressures on transport infrastructure have caused significant changes in 
the strategy of national actors involved in the budgetary process. In Britain, the 
sectoral approach shows that British actors were encouraged to participate in the EU 
budgetary process as bidders of funds, whereas the institutional approach underlined 
their commitment to resource-minimisation. In France, the existence of funds at EU 
level altered the internal process of prioritisation and challenged the overall 
government’s policy on EU budgeting.
6.2.4. Corporate interest groups and professional experts: the secret makers o f public 
policy ?
Corporate interests in the transport sector are so strong that we can argue they 
participated actively in the shaping of EU transport initiatives. First, transport- 
operating companies in all transport modes had strong incentives for introducing the 
concept of guideline maps at the EU level, even before the possibility of EU financing 
was mentioned, mainly as a way of improving the profitability of the existing 
infrastructure by increasing international traffic. This factor explains the French 
government’s support for the so-called ‘PBKAL TGV’, even though it will not bring 
any budgetary income from the European Union: the SNCF is concerned with the 
completion of the Belgian, German, Dutch and British parts of the project to increase
20 “Ce qu’on risque d’avoir c’est un saupoudrage entre plusieurs TGV, alors que la veritable priorite 
c’est le TGV-Est parce qu’il est pret et parce que budgetairement c’est la que le risque est le plus 
important pour nous, parce qu’on y est contraint politiquement.”, Interview, ref. 9.
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traffic on the French part of the line. Second, by accelerating or generating the 
building of infrastructure projects, the EU transport initiative opens up many contract 
opportunities for road, rail and other transport infrastructure companies. These 
potential developments create a strong incentive, notably in France, where the 
government and the SNCF are not likely to undertake more TGV projects, since the 
ones remaining have a low profitability. Third, because the most expensive, the least 
completed and the most ‘European’ transport mode is the TGV, the SNCF, the 
manufacturers of rail equipment and the builders of railways have strong interests in 
shaping EU transport programmes so they contribute to the diffusion of TGV 
technology in Europe. Here again, the French rail corporations have a specific interest, 
since the TGV is the product where their market share is well above the French share 
of other products. But the effectiveness of corporate interest groups and professional 
experts in shaping the European transport initiative varies, depending on the structure 
of the sector for each transport mode.
Rail
The rail pressure group is highly organised and operates through long-established 
international representative organisations. Its position has a large audience since the 
group represents a major economic sector, and unity is ensured by the dominance of 
few railway companies (usually one per country, e.g. British Rail, SNCF and SNCB) at 
the expense of the manufacturers of rail equipment and builders of rail. Its strength 
also originates from the fact that railway companies escape government control to the 
extent that transport administration is under the ‘guardianship’ of railway companies
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operating the network. As argued by a member of the MT, the SNCF controls the 
Direction des Transports Terrestres, not the reverse.21
The rail industries (brought together at the French level in the Federation des Industries 
Ferroviaires - FIF) are organised at the EU level in the Union des Industries 
Ferroviaires Europeennes (UNIFE) in Brussels. The strategy of this organisation has 
substantially shifted following the opening of the single market and of TENs which 
challenged the long-established relations between a national rail industry and a national 
railway company (in France the SNCF ordered only from GEC-Alsthom and German 
railways from Siemens). Therefore the rail industries were disoriented by TENs 
because of the change in the market structure it involved. They were less in favour of 
TENs than railway companies in 1990-91. This example illustrates that TGV is a 
project designed by the SNCF, not primarily by industrial companies. However, 
industrial enterprises have recently taken the lead, namely on the inter-operability of 
high-speed trains. As underlined by a civil servant from the MT, “they became 
conscious that they had ideas, that they constituted a force, that there was a market 
opening up for them.”22
Several propositions can be formulated to explain the role of rail companies and 
experts within the European transport initiative. First, the railway companies, in 
particular the SNCF, have contributed to the identification of a potential EU added 
value for transport at an early stage. Railway companies grouped in the Union 
Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC), whose headquarters are in Paris, agreed on a
21 According to Interview, ref. 38.
22 “Ils ont pris conscience qu’ils avaient des idees, qu’ils constituaient une force, qu’il y avait devant 
euxunmarchequi s’ouvrait”, Interview, ref. 42.
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high-speed project in Europe and identified guideline maps as early as 1989. This
document was used as a basis for the work of the group of experts commissioned by
the European Council that year. Second, the Commission has used the backing of
experts to gain credibility and expertise in the transport sector. The Commission
sponsored the foundation of the Association Europeenne pour lTnteroperabilite
Ferroviaire (AEIF) at the European Union level, which consists of 300 representatives
of railway companies and industries working on the definition of technical norms.
Third, governments have sometimes taken the lead in promoting the interests of the
private sector in participating in shaping public policy. A civil servant argued
“In the Channel Tunnel case, the French or the British governments were led 
into becoming substitutes for the responsibilities of British Rail and the SNCF 
in the discussions with the Commission. On matters that should have involved 
lobbying and dialogue between the rail companies and the Commission, the 
Member States have had to do it instead.”23
Road
The road pressure groups are not as organised or as united as the rail because of the 
structure of the sector: national administrations do not control road companies because 
they are numerous and there are varied administrative levels of financing and decision­
making bodies on road infrastructure (national and local roads, subventions by the 
regions). Also, government is involved only in providing the infrastructure, not in 
offering transport services (while government has both roles in rail). Road pressure 
bodies are numerous and each represent different sub-interests: for instance, the 
International Road Federation (IRF) in Geneva and Washington is largely dominated
23 “Dans l’affaire du Tunnel sous la Manche, les gouvemments frangais ou britannique ont ete amenes 
a se substituer aux responsabilites de British Rail et de la SNCF et a dialoguer avec la Commission. 
Pour des sujets qui auraient du faire l’objet d’un lobbying et d’un dialogue entre les entreprises 
ferroviaires et la Commission, les Etats-Membres sont obliges de le faire a leur place.”, Interview, ref. 
42.
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by petrol and car companies. The International Road Transport Union (IRU) expresses 
the views of the conveyors. It participates in many working groups, seeking 
information more than influence.
Because corporate interests in the road sector are diffuse and organised at the 
international rather than the EU level, professional experts have more opportunities for 
influencing the design of EU policy in an informal fashion. In particular, the European 
Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS) in Rotterdam, which organises seminars under 
the sponsorship of the Commission, diffuses ideas about transport policy among wider 
sector policy-shapers. Also noted by civil servants is the NEA Research bureau based 
in the Netherlands. Informal meetings and ‘independent’ studies by experts seemed an 
efficient way of shaping the EU initiative, and governments and industrial corporations 
have favoured this indirect method of influence. The Round Table of European 
Manufacturers (with the membership of Renault, Volvo and Philips) produced a 
document in 1983 in which they developed the concept of ‘missing links’ and 
expressed their support for the Channel Tunnel project. By intervening early in the 
decision-making process, the group efficiently directed the reflection of the Working 
Groups and of the Commission on its own three main concerns: the development of the 
network approach, the partnership between public and private sectors, and training. 
Using specialised expertise in the road sector seems an efficient mode of interest- 
representation. The British government is particularly known for commissioning 
studies from universities and research bureaux which are listened to attentively by the 
Commission. Road companies use the backing of academic expertise to convey their 
views to the Commission: in 1994 the IRU ordered a study by a German professor on
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the advantages of road in comparison with rail, and gained expertise from it. 
Therefore, EU expenditure on transport infrastructure within the Member States was 
influenced by actors over which EU members have no control at national level or 
through their participation in EU mechanisms.
The description of players’ strategies helps one to understand the shift in national 
transport policy which arise from EU membership and how national actors design 
European policy to fit in with their interests. It helps explain shifts in budgeting to the 
extent that policies and / or policy-making at the national level were altered because of 
EU membership. Section two concludes that the EU transport initiative was supported 
by governmental and non-governmental actors from the transport sector, and that it 
caused substantial shifts in the position defended by the governmental actors involved 
in budgetary negotiations. It shows that national administrations have adapted to EU 
pressures on transport and seek to influence EU influences through their participation 
in the EU decision-making system.
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6.3. EU constraints on national transport policy and the nationalisation of 
European transport policy
Section three quantifies the impact of European Union transport programmes on 
budget allocations between transport projects at the national level. Did EU 
membership change national transport policy choices? Is transport policy different 
from what it would be without EU financing?
With transport policy civil servants both in the United Kingdom and France were keen 
to emphasise that the influence of the European Union is small, because EU transport 
policy did not alter project prioritisation at the national level for several reasons. First, 
the size of the budget for TENs is too small in comparison with government or private 
financing to be considered a major factor in the decision to undertake a project. As 
argued by a senior civil servant, “we do not see any rationale for switching funds as a 
result of the Christophersen route” because the current TENs budget financing 
regulation draft sets the maximum a Member State can obtain at 10% of the cost of a 
project.24 At the aggregate level the TENs budget (ECU 280 m. in 1995, some £205 
m.), to be shared out among projects in the whole EU, is small when one considers that 
the SNCF invests a minimum of 2 to 3 billion Francs (excluding the maintenance of 
existing infrastructure) and the French government subsidises the SNCF for 
infrastructure projects by 11 billion Francs every year. Therefore, EU financing in the 
transport sector is a minor source of finance, because the limited funds available are 
‘sprinkled’ among many competing projects.
24 Interview, ref. 45.
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Second, EU financing is a substitute for domestic funding because the government acts 
as the iast resort financier’, providing complementary financing after other institutions 
(railway company, regions, private bodies) have set their levels of contributions. 
Therefore, any ‘additional’ funding of an infrastructure project reduces - or is a 
substitute for - the government’s contribution.
Third, the interest in having additional EU financing is cancelled out by perverse 
effects: information or even expectations that a project has or could receive support 
from the European Union increases the cost of projects. According to an official from 
the SGCI, much of the subsidy for building transport infrastructure in Corsica and in 
Belgium (construction of the Belgian part of the PBKAL TGV) went in inflation, 
supporting the idea that building infrastructure would be cheaper if there were no 
financial support.25
Fourth, project prioritisation at the national level has not been altered because EU 
transport programmes are constrained by national transport policies rather than the 
reverse. The first reason for this fact is timing: the European initiative for transport 
infrastructure projects is recent and must fit in with previous national plans for 
infrastructure projects. In France the relations between the SNCF and the government 
are defined in a ‘contrat de plan’ set for five years. Up to now actors in the budgetary 
games have turned to the European Union for extra financing once the plan was 
accepted by the national parties involved in the negotiations, but there is no indication 
that the content of the plan is influenced by EU considerations. In the United Kingdom 
the proposal to the Commission on priority transport infrastructure projects in April 
1994 was not consistent with the national priority plan for roads designed by the DTp
25 According to Interview, ref. 57.
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and published a few weeks later. There was no interministerial co-ordination on the 
timing or on the content of both plans, which indicates that European and national 
project prioritisation are two independent processes which do not interact. The 
planning approach underlying TENs did not extend to Member States such as the UK 
that adopted a non-strategic approach to transport infrastructure: the government plan 
considers about 250 improvement schemes, which are bits of roads it is thinking of 
financing over the next ten years. However, the government does not make any 
commitment to undertake any of the road projects included in both the national plan 
(because HM Treasury’s planning horizon is three years only) and the EU plan (there is 
no guarantee the schemes included in the guideline maps would be undertaken by the 
government without EU finance).
Also, project prioritisation is not altered because of agenda-setting rules. The EU 
agenda of priority projects is based on existing national projects that Member States 
considered a priority. National projects were not designed to match specifically with a 
call from the EU but before the EU initiative. The European label was added 
afterwards. As a result the Christophersen list incorporates projects whose maturity 
varies: the 14 top priority projects include projects ready to start (TGV-East) and 
others for which feasibility studies are just starting (Lyon-Turin TGV), while some 
projects with a lower priority are ready to launch (Spata airport) or are currently being 
built (Maurienne motorway). Some of these projects would have been undertaken 
anyway, especially the very mature. These examples indicate that EU policy has been 
‘nationalised’ to a greater extent than national policy was changed under European 
constraints.
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On the other hand there are some indications that national transport policy was altered 
by the EU initiative. First, project co-financing is a strong incentive for orienting 
government spending in France. EU expenditure in the French DOM within the 
framework of the Structural Funds has greatly accelerated French government 
investments on those programmes co-financed by the European Union (by 50 to 60%). 
Second, the European label provides a kind of guarantee which conditions the viability 
of a project. The credibility of the Lyon-Turin TGV project, a project even greater 
than the Channel Tunnel for the technology and the finance involved, is enhanced by 
the European Union backing of the project (it is included in the TENs) although 
feasibility studies have not yet been subsidised by the EU. Third, if EU funding is small 
within total spending, it can be significant for some individual projects. Investment in 
the Reunion Island under the framework of the Structural Funds (POSEI-DOM 
programme) represents about 10% of the island’s GDP (30% of these investments are 
on transport). While Community financing of the Channel Tunnel as a whole was low, 
its contribution was significant for the research budget of the project, namely the 
feasibility studies. Therefore, the EC can be considered an important supporter of the 
launch of a project in its early stages. With the TGV-East the French government 
hopes to receive FR. 2.5 bn. out of the FR. 28 bn. necessary to complete the 
infrastructure, while hoping to obtain FR. 3.5 bn. from Local Authorities and FR. 800 
m. from Luxembourg. In 1995 about ECU 22 m. were spent by the EU budget on 
feasibility studies on the TGV-East, that is 140 out of the 300 million Francs spent on 
studies. In 1996 the French government received ECU 33 m. under the transport 
section of TENs. The EU contribution cannot be considered insignificant.
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Among those who think the European transport initiative in the transport sector has 
modified the policy undertaken, and therefore spending decisions, are the disillusioned 
officials who emphasise that EU influences are particularly efficient in making 
unprofitable projects possible. They argue that projects brought to the EU level are 
those that the private sector, public transport companies, and government, would not 
want to finance because of their low financial return. As underlined by a civil servant 
from the MT, “one must say that the best projects have been completed, and that we 
are undertaking projects which are far less profitable.”26 This reasoning raises the 
question of why a government would agree on financing unprofitable projects at the 
EU level while they refused domestic financing. The answer may lie in the argument of 
a senior official from the Direction du Budget: “We will manage to put through the 
TGV-East, which is a macroeconomic disaster and have it financed by Brussels, in 
exchange for which we will subsidise a bridge in Greece. It is a gigantic ‘bargaining’ of 
public spending.”27 This statement indicates that governments have interests in having 
EU financing of some non-profitable projects they want to undertake for non-financial 
reasons (political, regional planning, strategic), and they negotiate EU financing on 
those projects. However, this explanation cannot apply to all EU projects, because 
some of them are very profitable economically.
The multiplication of non-exclusive sources of funding at the EU level (TENs, 
Structural Funds, Cohesion Funds) and at sub-government levels (European, central, 
regional, local) has many undesirable side-effects. First, because it is difficult to know
26 “il faut dire que les meilleurs projets ont ete realises, et qu’on attaque des projets beaucoup moins 
rentables.”, Interview, ref. 32.
27 “On va reussir a faire passer le TGV-Est qui est une catastrophe macroeconomique et le faire 
financer par Bruxelles, en echange de quoi on ira subventionner un pont en Grece. C’est un 
gigantesque bargaining de la depense publique.”, Interview, ref. 1.
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the various potential sources of financing open to a single project, it is difficult for a
Finance Ministry to assess the extent to which domestic funding is the solution of last
resort. The creation of a new source of revenue is likely to make negotiations between
spending ministries and Finance Ministries more complex. As noted by a member of
the Direction du Budget,
“we consider that often, when they have not obtained something at the national 
level, spending ministries try to get it at another level, that is the European 
level. Therefore, we try to make sure that they have not already been granted 
certain European credits or on the contrary, we ourselves send them towards 
some European credits in certain sectors.”28
Second, because the European Union allocates credits to projects at sub-governmental 
level, namely to Local Authorities, it can distort general government policy. As an 
illustration, the British government was most concerned about the possibility that the 
European Union could allocate subsidies to ports in Objective 1 areas (Liverpool) 
which would distort competition with other ports (Holyhead) and challenge regional 
planning in the UK. Central government finds it particularly difficult to design policy 
while not being able to control policy decisions at the sub-national government level. 
Therefore, it is more difficult to co-ordinate general government policy and to control 
the budgets of Local Authorities. Third, multi-level sources of funding for a single 
project multiplies the number of applications for funding and underlying negotiations. 
It has become more difficult for the Department of Transport in all Member States to 
launch a project because of the need to accommodate the requirements of the varied 
funding bodies and to fit in with their decision-making timetables. Fourth, application
28 “On considere que souvent les ministeres depensiers, lorsqu’ils n’ont pas obtenu quelque chose au 
niveau national, essayent de l’obtenir a un autre niveau, le niveau europeen. Nous faisons done 
attention a ce qu’ils ne puissent pas deja disposer de certains credits europeens ou, au contraire, on les 
renvoit de nous-memes vers des credits europeens dans certains secteurs.”, Interview, ref. 9.
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rules create perverse effects. A senior civil servant described the strategic inclusion of 
a Spanish mountain road in the TENs programme, not because the potential TENs 
funding is significant, but because projects included in the TENs have a competitive 
advantage in obtaining substantial financing from the Cohesion and the Structural 
Funds.29 Multi-level financing can be perverse since some projects can obtain 
disproportionate funding because it is not possible to know which other sources of 
finance the project applied to.
Section three argued that the European transport initiative had little impact on 
decisions over national transport policy choices. There are some exceptions to this 
arguement, especially with low-profit and small projects. The impact on policy seems 
much more restricted that on policy-making, since section two demonstrated earlier in 
the chapter that the EU transport initiative caused substantial shifs in policy-making. 
The greater impact on policy-making than on policy suggests that national actors can 
‘nationalise’ EU pressures through their participation in EU mechanisms.
29 According to Interview, ref. 38.
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6.4. The effect of the European Union on policy-making and inter-groups’ 
relationships
While national transport policy does not seem to be affected much by EU transport 
programmes, it seems that policy-making processes have been altered by the creation 
of the EU. The institutional changes described in chapter 3 show that policy-making in 
the transport sector has become more complex and can no longer be described in a 
national context. EU and national decision-making intersect, creating an hybrid 
process where national civil servants make policy decisions at the national and at the 
EU levels at the same time. This section provides an illustration of the concept of 
hybridisation which was developed earlier in the thesis.
Section two described shifts in the interests and in the strategies of the main actors in 
transport policy decision-making. The approach here characterises relationships 
between these actors in decision-making at the national (level 1) and EU level (level 2) 
as power-dependence and dominance. In contrast to the theoretical framework of 
Rhodes, where policy-making is determined by the interests of a dominating group of 
actors, transport policy-making offers an example of a case of ‘rolling domination’, 
with different groups dominating different stages of the decision-making process 
depending on power-dependence and conflict-resolution.
Preceding arguments support the case that corporate and professional experts have a 
leadership function in the initial stage of policy-making. There is a power-dependence 
relationship between the European Union institutions (Commission and Council) and
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transport corporations and professional experts, by which the latter give the former 
expertise in exchange for interest-representation. The main political constraint on the 
Commission is the need to formulate proposals which can succeed in the Council. 
Proposals must be supported by a political impetus and be able to offer a basis for 
consensus. In transport the political impetus was created by the Delors White Paper 
and the decisions made at successive European summits. What the Commission mainly 
lacked was credibility to formulate valid proposals because of its lack of expertise in 
transport infrastructure. Because the transport sector is highly technical and involves 
varied corporations, the backing of the industrial and scientific community offered the 
Commission’s proposals the expertise required to create a consensus. As 
acknowledged by the Commission, “developments at expert level should allow 
renewed efforts to be made”.30 Corporations and experts were happy to participate in 
the study as a way of diffusing ideas, especially since the creation of groups such as the 
AEIF and ECIS institutionalised their participation in decision-making, which is 
otherwise informal. In contrast, the hybridisation of policy-making challenged the long- 
established relations between government departments and the national railway 
company (BR or SNCF) in the case of rail. As pointed out by a French official, “today, 
you have to justify yourself, even in financial and economic terms. You have to sell 
your projects much more than before”31
The Department of Transport has some informal influence at the initial stage, but acts 
as a secondary player when its interests match the Commission’s and the corporations’
30 Commission of the European Communities (1983), “Progress towards a common transport policy - 
inland transport”, Com. 83 (58), (Brussels, CEC, 9 Feb.), 30.
31 “Maintenant il faut aller se justifier y compris en termes financiers et economiques. II faut vendre 
son projet beaucoup plus qu’avant.”, Interview, ref. 32.
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positions. Although the department is not meant to have direct links with the 
Commission, departments use their administrative expertise to diffuse ideas informally 
at the EU level. A report written under the chairmanship of Fayard, French Head of 
Roads32, which reflected French views on the mixed financing of motorway 
infrastructures, was sent as a background document to the Commission. Some of the 
contents of the report were copied into Working Paper 66 of the Christophersen 
Group. However, the Departments of Transport did not have a major role in the 
generation of proposals. When the interests of companies and experts are symmetrical 
with those of the department at level 1 (i.e. both are in favour of undertaking projects 
to improve infrastructure and services in the transport sector), the department often 
finds it efficient to rely on industrial corporations and experts to convey ideas. In this 
case it is relatively easy to reach an agreement between the two groups as the win-sets 
are large. With the industrial and professional backing of government initiatives the 
Department of Transport does not really need to intervene early in the decision-making 
process, because the Commission considers scientific and industrial expertise a better 
basis for gaining a consensus than administrative expertise.
The Department of Transport mainly leads during the negotiation stage as it reconciles 
level 1 interests and represents them at level 2. However, decision-making and 
leadership vary depending on the degree of conflict between the interests of level 1 
actors and on the degree of asymmetry between actors’ power-dependence. In some 
cases the department shares the leadership function with the SGCI / CO because of the
32 Groupe de Travail Autoroutes (1994) “Le financement des infrastructures routieres en Europe: vers 
un partenariat public-prive, une approche realiste et un partage des risques”, Oct.
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functional split between the institutions defining national interests at level 1 and 
institutions representing them at level 2.
Table 6.3. Leadership and ‘rolling domination *
Symmetry Asymmetry
Low degree 
of conflict
High degree 
of conflict
Representative
dominates
decision-making
Representative 
does not dominate 
decision-making
A B C D
‘A’ represents policy decisions on which involved parties, with symmetrical power- 
dependence relationships, agree. In this case any conflict-resolution is carried out at 
the administrative level under the leadership of the department and requires the 
approval of all groups. The Department of Transport has some margin of manoeuvre 
in negotiations at level 2 for two reasons. First, since the department represents its 
own interests, which are supported by other governmental bodies, the national policy is 
consistent with varied sectoral interests (transport, budget and environment). Second, 
since conflict-resolution is organised under the lead of the department, it is possible for 
the department quickly to react to new issues through interministerial co-ordination. 
Issues under ‘A’ can move to ‘B’, if the win-sets of the participants no longer overlap, 
which in turn increases conflict; to ‘C’ if the department gains authority at the expense 
of others, creating asymmetry; and to ‘D’ if the power-dependence relationship 
becomes asymmetrical at the expense of the Department of Transport.
‘B’ represents decisions involving a number of participants whose interests are 
conflictual and who share equal power in the decision. The Department of Transport is
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only one participant in decision-making and therefore loses the leadership for conflict- 
resolution at level 1 to the benefit of an institution geared to conflict-resolution 
between level 1 actors (CO in the UK, SGCI in France). However, while losing 
leadership of the level 1 negotiations, the department is still very much in the same 
position as in ‘A’. Since ‘A’ depicts an ‘entente cordialey at level 2, the views of the 
department are well represented within negotiations. However, the decision-making 
process is much more complicated and fragmented since the intervention of a 
additional department is institutionalised. Second, the margin of manoeuvre of the 
department at level 2 is reduced since the resolution of conflicts usually takes the shape 
of guidelines defining the government’s line. For any question not discussed 
beforehand at the interministerial level the representative cannot make any commitment 
on behalf of the government before the involved parties reach an agreement.
‘C’ and ‘D’ represent negotiations involving actors with asymmetric power- 
dependence. In this case conflict-resolution at level 1 often reflects the position of the 
dominant player. The impact on leadership for the Department of Transport varies 
depending on whether it dominates the decision-making. When the department is the 
dominant player at level 1 (‘C’), then it is in charge of both conflict-resolution at level 
1 and interest-representation at level 2. Its margin of manoeuvre within negotiations at 
both levels is great.
When the Department of Transport is not the dominant player at level 1 (‘D’), then it 
represents interests other than its own at level 2. This dissociation of interest- 
representation and leadership has several consequences: interest-representation has less
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credibility; the consistency of the national discourse is challenged, namely big 
differences can appear between the official line and the informal positions; and the 
margin of manoeuvre of the department in level 2 negotiations is reduced since it must 
first seek the approval of the dominant player.
Therefore there are grounds to support the argument that national policy-making for 
transport infrastructure had to adapt to EU decision-making through the process of 
hybridisation. The processes for making decisions have become more complex because 
of the greater fragmentation of the decision into successive and/or simultaneous stages 
taking place in various loci of decision-making by a larger number of actors. National 
governments do not dominate the decision-making process as much as they used to 
before hybridisation because new institutional arrangements allocate decision-making 
powers between more players and because new actors (experts, manufacturers) have 
acquired a greater legitimacy because of their expertise. The way for national 
governments to regain control over decision-making is to master either these new 
actors thanks to their long-established relationships with them, or to become influential 
at the EU level.
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6.5. Conclusion
Chapter 6 focused on the impact of the new European transport programmes on the 
determination of national spending priorities. Transport is a significant case study of 
the impact of EU membership on the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms since it is 
possible to isolate recent changes in policy and policy-making as a response to the new 
financial responsibility of EU institutions.
Chapter 6 assessed the degree to which policy and policy-making in Departments of 
Transports were affected by the EU responsibility for transport infrastructure. While 
addressing the quantification issue, chapter 6 concludes that the impact is greater on 
policy-making than on policy. There are several reasons why the EU does not succeed 
in influencing policy: the size of the European budget is small in comparison with 
government and private financing, especially with the multiplication of projects 
submitted for EU funding; the agenda of EU priority projects is based on existing 
projects that Member States identified and were ready to finance. As a result, the 
effect of the EU on project prioritisation and on overall transport policy is low, except 
for a limited number of projects. The European transport initiative offers substitute 
financing but is not able to make much difference to national policy choices. The new 
responsibility of EU institutions for transport infrastructure had a stronger impact on 
policy-making than on policy. Because of hybridisation, the processes for making 
decisions have become more complex from the greater fragmentation of decisions into 
successive and/or simultaneous stages taking place in various loci of decision-making 
by a larger number of actors.
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Chapter 6 focused on how national actors involved in budgetary negotiations (Finance 
Ministries, Department of Transport, private interest groups) had adapted to the 
creation of a European level of decision-making. It argues that shifts in the strategy of 
these actors during budgetary negotiations reflect how national administrations aim to 
use and react to EU membership. EU transport policy has promoted shifts in the 
strategies of the groups of actors involved in decision-making at level 1 and level 2. 
National actors have shaped the EU transport programmes which respond to the 
interests of the two Member States, although they do not always acknowledge that 
they seek to maximise the returns on these programmes.
First, the sub-governmental approach provides an explanation for the British strategy 
of having many projects included in the EU priority lists, although institutional 
arrangements in the UK create pressures in favour of the lowest possible EU transport 
budget and British share of EU transport expenditure. In France the resource- 
maximising line adopted stands in contradiction to the overall policy of keeping public 
expenditure low, especially on projects with a negative rate-of-retum. With some EU 
transport expenditure in France it would be less costly for the government to pay for 
investment with domestic funds rather than having it financed by the European Union. 
Second, shifts in the strategy of the Departments of Transport show they adapted to 
the new EU responsibility for financing transport infrastructure. Hybridisation implies 
that officials from Departments of Transport are engaged in negotiations over the 
allocation of the European budget credits. Therefore, British actors face an obligation 
to participate in the EU budgetary process as bidders for EU credits to avoid isolation, 
whereas the institutional approach demonstrated that these actors were strongly 
encouraged to minimise EU expenditure in the UK. In France the existence of a EU
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budget for infrastructure investment led the government to give a European label to 
national projects and to alter project prioritisation to maximise EU credits.
Third, private interest groups and professional organisations in the transport sector 
participated actively in the shaping of EU transport initiatives because of the power- 
dependence relationship by which experts gave scientific credibility to the 
Commission’s proposals in exchange for influence in the decision-making process.
Chapter 6 provided explanations of how to reconcile a low EU influence on policy and 
a significant influence on policy-making. The chapter suggested that the European 
Union is not skilful in deploying its resources, which are limited: its financial means are 
small in comparison with those of national governments; it has too low an expertise by 
itself to have a strong lead in policy in the EU and needs to use - and become 
dependent upon - external expertise; its administrative resources are small and the EU 
relies on national administrations to generate projects and control the implementation 
of EU programmes; the EU has no overall legal responsibility for transport but its 
mandate is confined to specified programmes in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity.
Also, the chapter argues that Member States were able to influence EU pressures 
through their participation in EU decision mechanisms. National governments have 
adapted quickly to the hybridisation of policy-making to ensure the representation of 
national interests at the EU level. EU policy was more nationalised than national 
decisions were modified to accommodate a European transport programme. This 
argument substantiates the view that a high level of integration and an efficient learning
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process in national administrations allow national governments to use the EU level in 
their own interests.
Finally, chapter 6 showed that not only Ministries of Agriculture have to adapt to 
European Union pressures. Europeanisation is a wide-ranging adaptation mechanism 
affecting budgetary processes in many policy sectors and in proportions which are not 
necessarily linked to the size of EU public expenditure. This proposition is tested in 
the next chapter with a ‘hard case’, since it is widely accepted that budgetary processes 
in the Departments of Health are not affected by EU membership.
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Chapter 7
Health: the embryonic Europeanisation of budgetary 
processes?
There is a major methodological problem in measuring the impact of EU membership 
on health budgeting. First, there is a difficulty in defining health budgeting in the 
United Kingdom, France and the European Union. The frontiers of government health 
expenditure are particularly hard to trace in France because the social security system 
has developed prevention and public health programmes that are undertaken on behalf 
of the government but are excluded from the budget of the Direction Generate de la 
Sante (DGS). In particular, expenditure under the Fonds National de Prevention, 
d’Education et d’Information sur la Sante (FNPEIS) managed by the Caisse Nationale 
d’Assurance Maladie (CNAM) includes programmes against cancer (namely breast 
cancer screening), AIDS and tobacco. Therefore, it may be more accurate to include 
expenditure by the FNPEIS in the definition of the French government health 
expenditure since the Fonds’ budget (about FR. 1.3 bn.) is almost as important as that 
of the DGS (about 2 bn.). In addition, in policy-making the DGS usually tries to 
include on the agenda of the CNAM those programmes which the government refuses 
to finance in the central government budget because of its close relationships with the 
Comite Frangais d’Education pour la Sante which coordinates actions by the DGS and 
the FNPEIS.1 In the UK the Department of Health (DOH) is responsible for the 
management of the National Health Service (NHS).
1 Interview, ref. 5.
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The focus of the thesis is on health budgeting for government spending programmes 
which overlap in the three geographical areas: the UK, France and the European 
Union. NHS expenditure cannot be considered the basis for our definition of health 
expenditure in the UK and France since part of the coverage of the NHS is not 
centrally financed in France (e.g. there are different social security regimes to finance 
the hospitals in France). Nor can the coverage of French central government and social 
security health expenditure be considered a sound basis for a comparative study 
because public health programmes do not match in the UK and France. Moreover, a 
budgetary focus does not incorporate the level, access and quality of health care 
provision and benefits. Differences in the distribution of health expenditure among 
various institutions and in the public health system in the UK and France (tax-based as 
against mixed public and private provision) make it difficult to establish a sound basis 
for a comparative study. Therefore, the chapter bypasses this methodological problem 
by working back from what the European Union undertakes in health, and measures its 
impact in Member States’ budgeting, whether centrally financed or not.
Second, the thesis is interested in the impact of the EU on health policy only to the 
extent that it has clear budgetary consequences. The thesis is not discussing the 
Europeanisation of health policy but of health budgeting. Health is useful in delineating 
the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership 
since the influence of the EU is fairly recent in this sector. Therefore, health budgeting 
constitutes a ‘hard case’ for the proposition that Europeanisation is a wide-ranging 
adaptation process affecting budgeting at the overall level and across departments.
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To determine the impact of EU membership on budgetary processes in Departments of 
Health and to compare how national administrations have adapted to EU pressures, the 
chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 provides an historical background to 
how EU institutions have become responsible for health care and determines their 
impact on the involvement of national departmental officials within policy-making at 
level 2. Section 2 quantifies the impact of EU membership on the determination of 
health policy choices by national administrations. Section 3 measures the impact of 
hybridisation in policy-making and describes how budgetary processes have adapted to 
the creation of a European health policy level. Finally, section 4 argues that EU 
membership has modified the existing equilibrium between the various groups of actors 
involved in policy-making.
7.1. Historical background
The mandate of the European Union to take public health measures is fairly recent. 
The responsibility of the EU for health matters was recognised formally only in 1992. 
Before the Treaty of Maastricht health decisions and programmes were adopted 
through two procedures that presented many drawbacks for the promotion of EU 
health action. The first procedure consisted of adopting health programmes under 
Article 235, but the prospects of extending programmes was challenged by the 
requirement of unanimity, and some Member States indicated they would resist the 
development of more programmes at the EU level. Health decisions and programmes 
were also adopted as part of other policies for which the EU was responsible.
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As emphasised by an official from the French Ministry of Social Affairs,
“It was one of the big claims of the various ministries in charge of health: many 
things were done for policies other than health. One has been able to do many 
things in the name of free circulation of workers since 1975 and of the opening 
up of para-medical professions since 1978. Medicines come under free-trade 
and competition policy. Social security benefits were dealt with by virtue of the 
harmonisation and free circulation of labour provisions ... There was a strong 
demand within the administrations of the different countries concerned, for 
Health ministers to be able to intervene on a number of actions undertaken in 
the name of free-trade, when health matters were involved.”2
Decision-making at the European level on health matters before 1992 incorporated the
participation of Member States’ representatives, but their participation had no solid
legal basis. The participation of the representatives of national health administrations
varied at the different levels of decision-making at the EU level. At the Council level
Health ministers met but their ability to take decisions was hindered by the absence of a
mandate of the Commission to deal with health policy. This official from the Direction
Generate de la Sante stresses
“the fact that Health Ministers meetings were organised in Brussels quite 
quickly after 1978. It is namely because Health Ministers were also Ministers 
of Social Affairs, or Consumer Affairs Ministers in other countries, or of Social 
Security. They could well meet because they wore two hats.”3
2 “C’etait une grande reclamation des differents ministeres charges de la sante: on faisait toute une 
serie de choses au nom d’autre chose que de la sante. On peut faire beaucoup de choses au nom de la 
libre circulation des travailleurs depuis 1975, de l’ouverture des professions paramedicales en 1978. 
En matiere de medicaments, cela releve de la politique de libre-echange et de concurrence. Les 
prestations de securite sociale etaient traitees au nom de toutes les dispositions d’harmonisation et de 
libre circulation des travailleurs ... II y avait une forte revendication au sein des administrations des 
different pays concemes qui etait de dire qu’il fallait que sur un certain nombre d’actions prises au 
nom du libre-echange, quand cela touche a des questions qui concement la sante, les ministres de la 
sante puisse mettre leur grain de sel.”, Interview, ref. 46.
3 “le fait qu’il y ait eu assez rapidement vers 1978 a Bruxelles des reunions des ministres de la sante. 
C’est notamment parce que les ministres de la sante etaient aussi ministres des affaires sociales, ou 
ministres de la consommation ce qui est le cas dans d’autres pays, ou de la securite sociale. Ils 
pouvaient tout a fait se reunir parce qu’ils avaient une double casquette.”, Interview, ref. 46.
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At the Working Group level national health administrations were consulted during the
making of decisions but the absence of any formal recognition of a EU health
responsibility prevented them having any real power within decision-making processes.
As noted by a British official about AIDS,
“We were going along to meetings in Luxembourg with the Commission but 
every time the Advisory Committee started getting difficult, they said to us: you 
are existing on an ad hoc basis; in actual fact you have got no legal rights, you 
do not exist as a Committee; we are only consulting you as a courtesy. So if 
you are going to be difficult, we are going to ignore you anyway.”4
Article 129b of the Maastricht Treaty introduced a new provision that legalised a EU
responsibility for health promotion and the prevention of diseases. The Treaty of
Maastricht confirmed EU health programmes undertaken in the past and allowed for
the definition of a EU mandate in public health. The Commission is responsible for
encouraging the co-ordination of individual Member States’ actions between
themselves to develop synergies by creating economies of scale and avoiding
duplication. Also, in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission
complements individual Member States’ policies where action at the EU level creates
an added value.5 The approach of targeted EU action programmes in health promotion
and the prevention of specific diseases was preferred to a regulatory approach based on
norm harmonisation. In June 1994 eight priority areas were determined, four of which
were adopted at the Cannes Summit: cancer, AIDS and other communicable diseases,
drug dependence and health promotion. Second, the Treaty of Maastricht posits that
other policies (e.g. consumer protection, environment) and departments within national
4 Interview, ref. 51.
5 For example, the EU is financing a centre in Paris for the collection of data on epidemics, which will 
centralise information from all individual Member States. The EU added value is obvious in this case, 
since none of the Member States would have agreed to finance it individually.
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governments should, in pursuing their policies, also take public health policy priorities 
into account.
By providing a legal basis for health programmes the Treaty of Maastricht modified the 
power distribution among actors for decision-making at the EU level by changing the 
procedures for making decisions. Decisions in the Health Group no longer need to be 
taken unanimously because qualified majority voting applies to health decisions. The 
recommendations by the Working Groups have become more constraining, although 
not binding. The Commission may reject projects vetoed by a member of the Advisory 
Committee if he or she proves such projects are not valid. However, a strong 
recommendation by the Advisory Committee to fund a project is an advantage in 
gaining the Commission’s final approval.
There are limitations on the European Union’s responsibility for public health. First,
EU institutions have no power over Member States’ health systems which differ widely
in their funding mechanisms, organisation and structure. As noted by a member of the
DOH, the purpose of a EU health policy is to assist Member States to co-ordinate their
policy, gather information and spread best practice.
“On the health care side and our relations with Europe, the Treaty as it was 
amended after Maastricht, does not say that the Community has any 
responsibility for doing things for the health care ... There is a role for the 
Commission to help the exchange of information but we do not want that to be 
taken again as a sort of recognition that the Community is responsible for 
deciding what is the best way of spending money on health care.”6
6 Interview, ref. 47.
234
According to a French official the absence of an EU general responsibility for health is
a major difference from other policies.
“Despite Article 129 of the Maastricht Treaty, health is not really a Community 
responsibility. There is a Community responsibility for setting up health 
programmes but not for organising public authorities according to different 
objectives, nor for setting general health guidelines. The Common Agricultural 
Policy sets, in some ways, a number of general objectives covering the entire 
agricultural policy. It is also true in other fields like transport. But the idea of 
having a Community health policy with general objectives is out of the question 
since countries themselves do not have any general health objectives.”7
Second, there are some paradoxical effects when health negotiations are put into an
institutional framework. EU actions are now strictly restricted to action programmes
and recommendations in support of existing actions of the Member States, whereas,
before the Treaty of Maastricht, any type of decision could be taken under Article 235.
Article 129b may be used to oppose EU expenditure on the grounds that a programme
contradicts the principle of subsidiarity or that the EU added value is not proved.
Legal limitations introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht may create obstacles for the
adoption of health programmes of great magnitude such as the cancer programme.
The limitations introduced by Article 129b would become particularly constraining if it
were decided that the inclusion of a health article precludes Member States from taking
health decisions under Article 100a or under Article 235. The prohibition of directives
for the harmonisation of health systems does not allow for the alignment of standards
to the best practice. Finally, the introduction of qualified majority voting could be
interpreted as a limitation on Member States’ sovereignty for small countries which
7 “Meme avec l’article 129 du Traite de Maastricht, la sante n’est pas vraiment une competence 
communautaire. II y a une competence communautaire pour elaborer des programmes en matiere de 
sante, mais pas du tout pour organiser les pouvoirs publics en fonction d’objectifs quelconques, pas du 
tout pour avoir des objectifs generaux de sante. La Politique Agricole Commune a, d’une fagon ou 
d’une autre, un certain nombre d’objectifs generaux qui coiffent l’ensemble de la politique agricole. 
C’est vrai dans d’autres domaines, les transports notamment. Mais il n’est pas question qu’il y ait une 
politique communautaire de sante avec des objectifs generaux parce que les pays eux-memes n’ont pas 
d’objectifs generaux en matiere de sante.”, Interview, ref. 46.
235
would not be able to veto a decision. However, unanimity has remained the practice 
because the desire for consensus tends to dominate negotiations.
Third, the financial impact of the Europe Union on health in Member States’ budgeting 
is restricted by the limited EU health budget, reflecting that the development of EU 
health policy is not a high priority for most Member States. These amounts remain 
symbolic if one compares the estimated EU health spending in the UK (about £5 to 6 
m. per annum) to the government’s health budget (about £30 billion).8
Table 7.1. EU health budget (1995-1999)
EU health Average EU Average EU
Action Drocrammes budget lines budget budget per year budget per year
(1995-1999) in £ in FR.
AIDS and other communicable 49.6 m. ECU £7.8 m. FR. 65 m.
diseases
Europe against cancer 64 m. ECU £10 m. FR. 84 m.
Drug dependence 28 m. ECU £4.3 m. FR 37 m.
Health promotion and education 35 m. ECU £5.5 m. FR. 45 m.
Total spending under health 177 m. ECU £28 m. FR 230 m.
Source: Interview, ref. 5.
Fourth, the Treaty implies some constraints since it explicitly excludes any
responsibility of the Working Groups for health care and formalises the decision­
making processes in the Advisory Committee. As noted by a British official, “it makes 
the actual processes of going through to get a decision adopted a lot more complicated 
because you have got the Parliament, the Economic and Social Affairs Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions who need to be consulted.”9 However, the UK still argues 
that the role of the Committee should be extended further than advising on project 
prioritisation.
8 According to Interview, ref. 11.
9 Interview, ref. 51.
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According to his French opposite number the role of the Committee is deliberately
weakened by the Commission:
“I wonder if it is not after having seen how the programme Europe against 
cancer was developing, that Commission people thought that the least possible 
power should be given to this type of Committee in order to make it more 
efficient and be able to undertake arbitration between countries.”10
Since the EU responsibility for health care is recent, health is a significant case to study
whether new EU pressures have caused an adaptation of the department’s bureaucratic
mechanisms.
7.2. The effect of EU membership on national health programmes
The assessment of whether EU membership affects health programmes at the national 
level encompasses several underlying issues. Are EU health programmes additional to 
national actions or substitutes? Has the allocation of a budgetary line to health 
programmes oriented policy choices and project prioritisation at the national level? 
This section seeks to quantify the impact of EU pressures on health policy choices at 
sub-governmental level.
There are several problems in assessing the effect of the European Union on spending 
decisions in the DOH and the DGS. With policy it is difficult to measure whether EU 
programmes duplicate or complement national ones because of the lack of transparency
10 “Je me demande si ce n’est pas apres avoir vu comment se developpe le programme Europe contre 
le cancer que le gens de la Commission on pense qu’il fallait donner le moins de pouvoir possible a ce 
genre de Comite pour le rendre plus efficace, pour pouvoir faire ses arbitrages entre pays.”, Interview, 
ref. 53.
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about the contents of EU programmes. A civil servant in the Direction du Budget
confessed that the DGS and the DB often had difficulty in deciding whether the level of
funding and the contents of EU programmes were appropriate because central
government has little information on the policy contents of EU programmes.11 In the
UK an official from the DOH argued
“the Community has not been very transparent about the way they spend the 
money so far. They have not been very transparent about the criteria by which 
they choose which bids they fiind. They give us reports saying where the 
money was spent but it has been very difficult to work out whether that money 
was well spent or what was the product of doing it.”12
This opacity results from institutional arrangements for designing EU programmes and 
for allocating EU funds among competing bids, which hardly involve central 
government on the policy side. Also, it is difficult to assess all the EU measures for a 
particular policy area (e.g. education to AIDS) because projects could be eligible for 
funding by two separate EU programmes (e.g. Europe against AIDS and health 
education). The combination of vertical programmes geared towards the prevention of 
a specific disease and horizontal public health programmes (such as health education) 
creates a risk of duplication of financing at the EU level. This risk has increased since 
horizontal programmes were favoured after Maastricht, while the EU previously 
preferred vertical ones (cancer and AIDS).
The lack of transparency on the policy side has a financial impact in France because its 
rate-of-retum rationale can operate only with perfect information on the returns on the 
French contribution. Because most EU health funds go to private institutions and
11 Interview, ref. 5.
12 Interview, ref. 47.
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because there is no clear information from the EU on the recipient country shares, and 
on the types of activity funds were allocated for, it is impossible to establish a policy or 
a budgetary offset for matching EU and national programmes, which creates waste. 
Therefore, EU health programmes tend to be additional to national ones in France, 
although the French government is currently unable to assess whether these additional 
funds complement or duplicate existing undertakings. There are further practical 
problems for the assessment of the impact of EU health programmes on national 
budgeting: EU vertical programmes such as the cancer programme cannot be matched 
with particular credits in the DGS budget because there is not always an identified 
budgetary line allocated to cancer programmes and, even if there were, it might 
disappear in the next budget. Spending patterns vary from year to year and cannot 
always adjust in a flexible way because they often cover rigid infrastructure costs. 
Also, because health is a small and recent cost centre within EU budgeting, national 
governments have not yet traced redundant policy measures on AIDS, cancer, drug 
dependence and health education. The Direction du Budget introduced the notion of 
offsetting in the health budgetary conferences only in 1995 (1994 for all other 
ministries) because the EU health budgetary line was considered too small until then. 
However, the offset consists of exchanging information between the bureaux of the 
Direction du Budget rather than a formal financial offset for matching credits. The 
Direction du Budget has no authority to reduce departmental credits on the grounds 
that EU credits exist for similar projects.13
13 Interview, ref. 5.
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In the UK the introduction of the Euro-PES mechanism circumvents the difficulty in 
assessing the financial impact of EU budgeting since the Euro-PES is not based on the 
returns but on the British contribution to the EU health budget. As for other ministries 
EU spending programmes are not additional to national ones, which supports the 
argument that the potential influence of European health programmes on national 
health budgeting is successfully resisted by existing institutional arrangements.
The vagueness about the contents and the effect of EU health programmes, the fact
that these programmes are very recent and the small EU health budgetary line, sustain a
widely shared view among the civil servants interviewed that the impact of EU health
budgeting is small and unsuccessful. That is the feeling of a civil servant about AIDS:
“For my experience of the work that has been done under the first programme, 
not a lot of terribly productive results have come out of it ... It is a kind of 
scatter-gun approach with people firing off small amounts of money all over the 
place without any cohesion at all. On that basis I would not personally want to 
lobby for any more money for the next programme ... I do not think that the 
fact that there has been a European programme had any impact on what has 
happened in this country.”14
EU programmes have tended to multiply and be enlarged without being integrated in a
coherent framework. Health departments criticise the lack of overall strategy at the
EU level, while the amounts are too small to have an obvious impact. Also, EU policy
decisions on health do not have a great impact in France because French legislation is
often stricter than the agreement reached at the EU level. Civil servants in the DGS
are therefore reluctant to promote action by the EU because they have been
disappointed by the decisions taken to date, and because they are not familiar with the
EU decision-making processes.15
14 Interview, ref. 51.
15 According to Interview, ref. 11.
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EU health programmes have an impact on some health policy decisions at the national 
level. First, although the EU health budget is small in comparison with the overall 
health spending incurred by central governments, the influence of EU programmes is 
significant for some individual programmes. For instance, if about 12% of the EU 
health budget is allocated to French projects (estimate by the Direction du Budget), EU 
spending on AIDS policy in France would represent 4.8% of the French credits on 
prevention measures.16 In the United Kingdom the PES baseline reduction subsequent 
to Euro-PES (£5 to 6 m.) may appear small in comparison with the total health budget 
(about £30 bn.). However, since EU health programmes may not be directed to the 
provision of health care, the PES reduction is not weighted against the entire health 
budget but only against the budget for Centrally Financed Services (about £300 m.). 
These services match with areas for which the European Union is responsible, e.g. 
health education, support to the voluntary sector, research and development. 
According to an official from the DOH the reduction by 1.8% of the CFS budget 
because of Euro-PES “is not a very large amount, but every one or two percent is not 
easy to find because of the very stringent reviews of public expenditure in the UK over 
the last two or three years.”17 Therefore, EU health budgeting has an effect on some 
aspects of national health budgeting because of the additional financial burden on 
departments and the additional credits obtained.
16 Considering that the average EU AIDS budget amounts to FR. 65 m. per year and that the estimated 
return on the French contribution to the EU budget for internal policies is 12%, the estimated EU 
spending on French AIDS projects is about FR. 7.8 m. This amount represents 2.5% of total AIDS 
budget (FR. 307 m.) and 4.8% of the credits allocated to AIDS prevention measures (FR. 160 m.) in 
the planned budget for 1995. EU AIDS spending should be compared with the former since they are 
allocated to prevention projects.
17 Interview, ref. 48.
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Second, financial and policy effects are becoming increasingly important as they have 
gradually increased over the years. For instance, the budget of the programme ‘Europe 
against AIDS’ was multiplied by 8.3 between 1991 and 1993 (from 1.43 to 8.3 m. 
ECU). As argued by a British official, “it is not a direct effect but it will be cumulative 
over the years, of both having programmes and being able to use Article 129 to tell 
other Community policy areas that there is a health impact that we are interested in.”18
Third, EU expenditure creates a leverage effect at the national level because of several 
mechanisms. Co-financing creates a financial incentive for governments to undertake 
certain actions by sharing out the programme costs between the EU and national 
budgets. This financial incentive exists even though it is an illusory financial 
supplement for Member States with a negative rate-of-retum on health such as France: 
it would be less costly for the government to secure domestic financing for health 
programmes since the government puts more into the EU health budget than it receives 
back from it. Leverage also arises from institutional factors. For instance, 
management mechanisms set up for the EU breast cancer programme have obliged 
Member States to organise their activities to obtain EU funds at the national level in 
the light of these mechanisms. Then these EU-linked programmes were enlarged and 
contributed to shaping the overall national cancer programme. Therefore the impact of 
the European Union on decision-making at the national level is much stronger than its 
financial impact suggests.19
18 Interview, ref. 47.
19 Interview, ref. 54.
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Policy decisions on the allocation of credits between health projects at the national 
level seem little influenced by EU health priorities. Financially it is difficult to quantify 
the real impact of EU health programmes on national health policy. Existing 
institutions suggest that EU health programmes are more likely to be additional in 
France and non-additional in the UK, but vagueness about the contents and the 
achievements of EU programmes does not allow us to determine whether EU 
programmes duplicate or complement national ones. The argument that EU 
membership is not important to health departments because the funds are small is not 
convincing, because increasing credits would not necessarily contribute to making 
national governments more aware of the contents of EU programmes in deciding on 
national priorities. The main obstacle to a greater impact of the EU on health 
budgeting lies in the lack of transparency in EU policy and in the budgetary choices at 
national government level.
7.3. Changes in budgetary decision-making processes
The conclusion of the last part suggests that the blurred view on the impact of the EU 
on health policy outcomes may be a reflection of a disjointed decision-making process 
about spending. Information does not seem adequately to circulate between groups 
and levels of decision-makers, and spending priorities are not co-ordinated. These 
problems could indicate inefficiencies and loopholes in the adaptation of national 
spending decision-making to EU procedures (Europeanisation) and in the extent to 
which national actors control the EU decision-making processes.
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The Europeanisation of national spending decision-making remains limited, first, 
because the EU level is not yet considered as a credible locus of decision-making. By 
comparison with major international organisations, such as the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) or the United Nations, the European Union’s responsibility for 
health matters is recent and lacks the backing of scientific expertise since the EU is not 
yet a recognised medical forum. Also, EU financial resources remain small. Therefore, 
central government actors are not willing to create or to recognise an additional level 
of decision-making, while the trend is for the internationalisation of standards and 
policies rather than for the differentiation of the European Union among the 
international scientific community.
Second, actors in the DOH and in the DGS are not familiar with interministerial co­
ordination on EU matters nor with EU decision-making processes. Therefore, they do 
not always efficiently use or control the negotiations with their national and EU 
counterparts. The SGCI plays a major role in accelerating the learning process started 
at departmental level in France by making the department aware of opportunities and 
helping prepare texts submitted at the EU level. Interministerial co-ordination with the 
SGCI is particularly emphasised since health matters usually involve the participation 
of other departments (Department of Employment, Ministry of Environment) and many 
agencies (Agence des Greffes, Agence du Medicament, Agence Fran^aise du Sang). 
Therefore, co-ordination by the SGCI is paradoxically more vital in those policy areas 
such as health where the role of the EU is minor and recent than in those where the 
relationships with the EU are so vital that actors have developed an adequate EU role 
and direct relationships with EU actors, such as in agriculture.
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The major problem about the co-ordination of national and EU health decision-making 
processes lies in that central government actors do not control EU decision-making 
procedures. First, EU procedures have evolved over time, and the constraints on 
multi-level co-ordination vary depending on the programme: the first EU programme 
on health, Europe against cancer, sought to ensure co-ordination of national and EU 
measures by involving central government in the selection of projects to be funded by 
the EU. National projects were centralised and filtered by a National Committee, then 
submitted to the EU for approval. This centralised approach generated many problems 
for the management of project prioritisation since national bureaucracies within 
Member States did not set similar priorities, thus creating an incoherent EU cancer 
policy. Also, a French official emphasised about AIDS that “it generates rivalries 
between schools, between strong personalities, because the project involves specialised 
researchers, and that creates conflicts”.20 Political conflicts and strong pressures on 
national bureaucracies for the definition of national priorities seemed an unnecessary 
burden on health departments since the definition and the responsibility for the actions 
undertaken ultimately lay in the hands of the EU. It was then suggested the EU should 
be in charge of selecting the projects it wanted to fimd.
The procedure for selecting projects in the AIDS programmes answers these problems 
since it relies on a bottom-up approach, establishing a direct link between EU 
institutions and private organisations submitting a bid. By calling Member States to 
apply for funding the Commission invites not central governments but mainly 
organisations within the Member States. Furthermore central government is no longer
20 “Cela cristallise des rivalites entre ecoles, entre personnalites fortes, car le projet implique des 
chercheurs specialistes, ce qui suscite des conflits”, Interview, ref. 53.
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in charge of centralising or pre-selecting projects at the national level. National 
centralisation of projects was rejected for practical reasons linked to the nature of 
AIDS. The number of bids is limited by the small number of organisations dealing with 
the disease, which makes the centralisation of projects at EU level possible. There are 
problems in selecting AIDS experts about EU action on the prevention of the disease, 
since EU AIDS programmes do not correspond to a medical or scientific specialisation.
Bids are directly submitted to the EU level, and the role of the AIDS bureau of health 
departments is two-fold: during the application stage, to contact and inform private 
associations informally on how to submit an application for EU funding; and during the 
selection stage national representatives from health departments advise the Commission 
on the quality of all applications submitted (160 projects in 1993) within the framework 
of the Advisory Committee. The recommendations from the Committee have some 
influence on the Commission’s final choice. However, the Committee’s rating of the 
projects is not binding, and the final decision on project funding is taken by the 
Commission according to its own criteria (72 projects funded in 1993). According to a 
French official,
“Once we, as members of the Advisory Committee, have given our opinion, it 
goes back to the Commission and then, there is a sort of ‘black box’, we do not 
know what happens: balancing, negotiations, compromises occur so that each 
European country gets its part and there is not only one group of countries 
eating up the whole budget of the programme. These arbitrations also depend 
on the epidemiological situation of the disease. There is a re-balancing in 
favour of the most affected countries.”21
21 “Une fois que nous, en tant que membres du Comite Consultatif, nous avons donne notre avis, cela 
repart a la Commission et la c’est la ‘boite noire’; on ne sait pas tres bien ce qui se passe, les 
equilibrages, les negociations, les compromis se font pour que chaque pays europeen ‘retrouve ses 
bilies’, et qu’il n’y ait pas un groupe de pays qui mange tout le budget du programme. Ces arbitrages 
se font aussi en fonction de la situation epidemiologique de la maladie. II y a un reequilibrage en 
faveur des pays les plus touches.”, Interview, ref. 53.
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The EU decision-making procedure creates a number of obstacles for the co-ordination
of national and EU policies and policy-making. First, the lack of transparency about
the criteria for the selection of EU funded projects makes it difficult for governments to
orient national projects to obtain maximum EU finance. Central government actors are
little involved in the definition of EU health policy priorities and do not have the means
to shape national measures about EU policy. Also, the DOH and the DGS do not have
adequate information to assess the content of EU policy and the rate of financial return.
Second, since the EU decision-making process ignores the criteria and the procedures
by which central government defines health priorities, national governments criticise
EU-funded projects on the grounds that they are bad projects, which should,
otherwise, have obtained central government financing. In France the allocation of
funds to medical research projects is decided on the basis of independent
recommendations by the INSERM or the CNRS. Health projects submitted to the EU
are those for which financing was refused by central government on advice from
INSERM.22 This position is echoed in the UK:
“What happened initially was that organisations in different Member States, 
who wanted to do something in their own Member State, asked the government 
to give them money, then the government said ‘no’, then they went to the 
Community and got the money. So, when we said ‘no’ because it is rubbish, 
the Community said ‘yes’ because they want to spend money.”23
Third, the choice of a bottom-up approach, favouring direct relationships with the 
private sector, has the corollary effect of exacerbating an incoherent EU policy. As 
argued about AIDS by a British official, “it tended to be piecemeal funding of projects 
without any coherence, without anybody at the Commission who seemed to take a
22 According to ref. 1, Interview.
23 Interview, ref. 47.
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wider overview ... Areas were so scattered that it was difficult to know what the 
impact has been, whether it has made any difference.”24 The lack of an overall 
framework for EU health programmes contributes to a greater opacity of their 
objectives and achievements, and makes EU policy more questionable because it 
encourages waste of money and policy distortions.
Fourth, EU programmes are not sufficiently assessed according to national civil
servants. According to a British official,
“the assessments have been done but the Commission has decided to carry on. 
They have not done it in any way that would pass any academic standard and 
there has not been a wish to do it so ... There is a fear among Commission 
officials that they must not set themselves too difficult targets in case they fail 
to meet them, in which case they would be told they are no good. They are 
nervous about targets.”25
Assessment is all the more difficult in the prevention of diseases or health education 
where numerical targets cannot be used, since the achievements of the programme are 
‘negatively’ measured (e.g. the number of AIDS cases that were avoided because of 
the scheme). Such an assessment cannot be accurate since it is impossible to measure 
precisely how the disease or poverty would have increased if the EU programme did 
not exist. The lack of evidence to assess whether a programme proved effective in 
alleviating the problems it was created to resolve is the basis of the British criticism of 
the Commission’s project to treble the third Anti-Poverty programme in comparison 
with the second. The United Kingdom required a clearer spelling out of the third 
programme’s targets than had occurred previously.
24 Interview, ref. 51.
25 Interview, ref. 47.
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Fifth, existing EU programmes tend to be renewed even though previous programmes
did not achieve the set targets, which indicates an inertia effect in the decision to
undertake EU actions. For instance, the criticisms in the report on the first AIDS
programme published in 1993 did not prevent an increase in the credits allocated to the
second programme. An official noted “once you get one programme, it is difficult not
to have another one”, because it is hard to stop a programme on on-going diseases in
case it is making a difference.26 The renewal and the extension of policy and budgets
of expired programmes despite their poor performance reveals the power of
administrative inertia. According to a French official, these growing responsibilities are
because the structure set up at the time of the first Europe against cancer programme
(DG V) has grown and multiplied its actions to justify its existence.27 For a DOH civil
servant the renewal of programmes despite their achievements emphasises that the
Commission undertakes health programmes not to achieve particular targets but to be
in the lead in high-profile policies. “The Commission tries to get something running
which could appear to be a Commission programme ... It is very much something on
which they want to have the blue flag with the twelve stars flying.”28 According to
him, individual Member States support the Commission in its approach:
“The thing I find missing from most Member States when they are talking in the 
Health Council is any concern for the objective of the action or the initiative, 
they are just interested in the political presentation really more than in the 
reasons of the actions which appear to be Community actions ... Other 
countries say that [assessment] does not matter, that it is all political 
presentation, that we do not need to say whether projects are good or bad 
because they want to carry on.”29
26 Interview, ref. 51.
27 Interview, ref. 54.
28 Interview, ref. 47.
29 Interview, ref. 47.
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The position of Member States in this respect may be explained by the fact that a 
European label proved useful for implementing policies that national governments 
would have found politically difficult to undertake on their own because of powerful 
national pressure groups. For instance, AIDS programmes were better accepted in 
Southern Europe because of the EU label.
These various obstacles contribute to a lack of co-ordination of national and EU 
decision-making and policies, which suggests the two levels of decision-making do not 
overlap sufficiently. Actors and processes at each level are distinct and not many of 
them are in charge of reconciling policy decisions. This case contrasts with the 
preceding ones since decision-making at both levels is not entangled nor blurred. The 
persistence of clear frontiers between national and EU decision-making without a 
systematic verification that policy decisions are not contradictory creates risks of 
incoherent and inefficient policy outcomes. Therefore, the recent decision in the UK 
and France to create a EU unit in each ministry is a major step towards a better 
Europeanisation of national decision-making because it makes departments more aware 
of the increasing weight of the EU in health matters and accelerates the department’s 
learning process on how EU procedures work. Also, it is a contribution to a better 
representation of national interests in EU decision-making since the EU unit is involved 
in the definition of national health policy with ministries and national organisations and 
in defending it at the EU level. In addition to creating EU units in ministries, the 
French Prime Minister’s Office has required that one official in each department should 
be in charge of relations with the European Parliament on relevant policies. With 
health the work of this official proved important in learning about the EP’s health
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agenda, defining the French policy on amendments proposed and preparing background 
information for the Minister of European Affairs and the Minister of Health.
The lack of co-ordination of national and EU decision-making creates a major
budgetary problem within the existing institutional arrangements where spending
power lies in both national and EU hands. A former Directeur du Budget, pointed out
“There is a perverse aspect in budgetary institutions because the plurality of 
levels creates waste since responsibilities are not totally shared-out. If we said 
health is in the field of Member States or Brussels, but that one may not 
intervene in the field that is not his, we would be in an ordered system in which 
an adjudication could be made.”30
The simultaneous financial responsibility of government bodies with non-coordinated
policies raises major policy and budgetary issues. First, the two organisations may be
supporting conflicting policies. Second, the two levels may be financing the same
measures, generating waste and over-financing of some projects. For this reason the
British government has required that funds under EU regional policy should not be
used to finance health care infrastructure projects in UK’s Objective 1 areas
(Merseyside, Northern Ireland, Highlands and Islands of Scotland). As a member of
the DOH emphasised,
“if there were Community funds suddenly available for these three parts of the 
UK on top of the money that we have already made available for health care, 
those three parts of the country would be distorting our national priorities on 
where money should be distributed.”31
30 “II y a un aspect de perversion des institutions budgetaires parce que la pluralite des niveaux sans 
une repartition absolue des competences debouche automatiquement sur du gachis. Si Ton disait que 
la sante est du domaine des Etats Membres ou de Bruxelles, mais que l’autre n’ait pas le droit 
d’intervenir dans le champ qui n’est pas le sien, nous serions dans un systeme ordonne dans lequel des 
arbitrages peuvent se rendre.”, Interview, ref. 1.
31 Interview, ref. 47.
251
These examples support the argument by the former Directeur du Budget that financial 
responsibilities should be better defined at each level and that co-ordination would 
allow for a better implementation of the principle of subsidiarity on health matters.
Section three concludes that Health Departments in Britain and France have not yet 
adapted their budgetary mechanisms to the new responsibility of EU institutions for 
health care. Budgetary processes at level 1 and level 2 are disjointed, which reveals 
that institutional hybridisation did not take place. National governments do not yet 
recognise the EU as a new locus of decision-making and do not seek to influence 
decisions at level 2 through channels they are not familiar with. Also, national 
representatives may not always influence EU budgetary decisions through their 
participation in EU mechanisms which sometimes bypass central government. The lack 
of adaptation of departments’ budgetary mechanisms to EU processes and the low 
involvement of Member States representatives in EU decision-making create 
distortions, duplication and waste of public expenditure on health care in EU countries.
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7.4. The effect of EU membership on power-dependence relationships between 
groups
7.4.1. EU decision-makers and experts: a symbiosis o f interests?
Section four shows that because hybridisation is incomplete, national governments are 
less able to influence EU policies on health matters than on transport through their 
participation in EU mechanisms. Therefore, national governments are less able to 
nationalise EU pressures than non-governmental interests involved in the EU decision­
making process. Medical experts play an active role in defining European health 
budget choices. Therefore, public expenditure occurs on programmes within the 
Member States over which these states have little control.
Policy-making institutions reinforce the power-dependence relationships between EU 
decision-makers and non-government health specialists (e.g. committees, charities, 
independent sector, non-governmental organisations and medical experts). EU 
institutions, because they lack scientific expertise in comparison with international 
organisations focused on public health (such as WHO), are strongly dependent upon 
specialists to become credible actors in health policy-making. For instance, the 
Commission commissioned Professor Abel-Smith from the LSE to provide advice on 
health issues where it would be useful to exchange information. Committees such as 
the Comite des Experts Cancerologues give a scientific label to EU programmes since 
their participation in EU decision-making emphasises that EU programmes are not 
purely administrative products but are designed by scientists for scientists. Although 
the comings and goings between the Committee’s advisers make decision-making more
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tedious, the decisions made are better accepted by the health community.32 New 
decision-making procedures set up on AIDS programmes institutionalise the bottom- 
up nature of the promotion of EU health decisions. As a consequence EU policy 
choices reflect the concerns of these specialists. This power-dependence relationship 
encourages a strong synergy between EU administrators’ and professionals’ interests 
since both are willing to extend EU programmes and financial resources.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ensure that EU health programmes are selected 
and defined by independent scientific experts in the new AIDS or drug dependence 
programmes. First, the expertise of the EU is contested since the medical community 
does not entrust leading doctors with the power to represent them over AIDS, since 
the new programmes do not match a single medical specialisation. Second, since most 
AIDS or drug specialists have acquired expertise because of their work within the 
voluntary sector (which may apply for EU funding), the expertise brought to the EU 
may be considered biased. A civil servant from the DB argued EU programmes 
respond to individual concerns from specialists and lobbyists who are influential since 
there is no overall framework on public health in the EU.33 The role of experts in the 
promotion of EU actions that match with their own scientific speciality would explain 
why small programmes tended to multiply34 and why the types of projects eligible for 
EU funding within a single programme are so varied.35 A French official stressed that 
existing relationships between experts and EU administrators were becoming
32 According to Interview, ref. 50.
33 Interview, ref. 11.
34 e.g. ECU 336 m. for the Biomedicine and Health programmes for 1994-98, ECU 20 m. for the 
protection of consumers in the internal market.
35 The first Europe against AIDS programme included such diverse headings as working with young 
people, prevention and education, anti-discrimination, social rights, civilian exchange of information 
and working with particularly disadvantaged groups.
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“clientelistic”.36 Third the independence of experts, who recommend what action 
should be undertaken at the EU level, may be called into question when experts 
commissioned to produce a report are selected by the Commission. In these cases it is 
possible to argue that the Commission is biased because it selects experts who agree 
with it on the definition of its role. However, EU institutions prefer to be influenced by 
non-governmental rather than by national health administrations.
7.4.2. New power-dependence relationships between national administrations and 
experts
Merging EU and experts’ interests affects the power-dependence relationships between 
national health administrators and the voluntary sector. Because the selection of health 
projects funded by the EU bypasses national government, national health 
administrations have a renewed incentive to work closely with the voluntary sector to 
ensure the projects submitted to the EU for funding match national priorities. Also, 
national governments increasingly need to rely on scientific experts and health 
associations to represent and defend national views at the EU level, since the 
Commission seems to prefer scientific to administrative expertise. As stated by a 
French DGS official, “the voice of the associations is loud, louder than the voice of 
politicians”.37 Experts have sometimes become a means for national government to 
explain its health-of-the-nation strategy when the Commission requires the advice of 
experts nominated by the Health Department. For instance, the British government
36 Interview, ref. 54.
37 “La parole des associations est tres forte, elle est plus forte que la parole des politiques”, Interview, 
ref 53.
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nominated one DOH official and a leading doctor from the private sector to provide 
expertise on the communicable diseases programme to the European Commission. The 
Department was careful to select experts who would represent the British 
government’s view on the subject. However, experts’ recommendations are not 
binding and the Commission has the exclusive right to propose policy measures.
The development of close relationships between health administrators and the private 
sector is more or less an easy task in each Member State. In the UK the private sector 
has traditionally been active and well organised. That is why British interests seem well 
represented at the EU level, and explains why the policies implemented are close to 
what the UK was undertaking before the EU programmes were finalised. British 
associations seem successful in submitting bids for EU funding and the UK obtains 
more than its fair share of the EU health budget.
In France private associations have not been traditionally involved in the definition and 
promotion of public health. Associations remain dispersed and unorganised, which 
makes lobbying inefficient. Also because the benefits of public health policy are 
dispersed, there is no structured and powerful public health lobby raising questions 
during the EU decision-making processes. The DGS sees the structure of the French 
voluntary sector as a problem for the representation of French interests at the EU level 
and a major difference with agricultural or industrial policy-making. A French official 
observed “that there is no pressure group means that there is no link between national 
and Community administrations.”38 Existing decision-making procedures give the
38 “Le fait qu’il n’y ait pas de groupe de pression fait qu’on n’a pas de relais entre les administrations 
nationales et radministration communautaire”, Interview, ref. 50.
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private sector a major coordinating function which the EU considers a guarantee 
against a ‘Europe of bureaucracies’. The lack of organised private networks linking 
national and EU bureaucracies with the real world is a major obstacle to 
Europeanisation because it makes difficult the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms 
to the consequence of EU membership. The DGS is conscious of the need for greater 
coordination. As already emphasised with transport, the ministry has an unofficial 
active role in encouraging associations to form structured networks and to defend their 
views at the EU level. The AIDS independent sector is starting to become more active 
because new EU institutional arrangements offer them the opportunity to obtain funds 
directly from the EU. National government is more eager to control public health 
programmes which traditionally involved private associations because of scandals such 
as over blood transfusions. New para-public agencies were created (Agence du 
Medicament, Agence du Sang, Etablissement des Greffes) to allow for the increased 
control and accountability of national government, thus greatly modifying the existing 
networks of organisations.
Experts and associations have become more central for the definition of EU health 
programmes and, indirectly, they affect the balance of power between actors at the 
national level. Present arrangements represent a challenge for the formulation of public 
policy because of the strong representation of interest groups in non-coordinated EU 
and national decision-making.
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A former Directeur du Budget argues
“because of the interference of government levels, we are dealing with a 
multipolar decision-making system, in which the real decision-maker is the 
lobbyist, who is at the centre of the system and who is trying to maximise his 
own income by playing on at least the four levels of subsidy he can get, that is 
Brussels, national government, his Region and, depending on the nature of what 
he wants to do, his Department or Local Authorities. One must be really dumb 
not to manage, with time, to have something financed.”39
Some experts appear to have had a strong influence on the definition of health
priorities at the EU level. For instance, it is tempting to link the assertion of a British
civil servant who argued “a lot of what has happened in other European countries has
been influenced by the programme this government set in place in the mid to late
1980s”40, with the positions held by the expert Merkel, who was in charge of European
Affairs working on AIDS policy from 1986 to 1990 when the British AIDS programme
was set up. He was then seconded to the Commission to run the EU programme
against AIDS during its implementation and to contribute to drafting the second AIDS
programme.41
This section argues that health offers a complex case of adaptation of bureaucratic 
mechanisms to EU health budgeting. Analysis of the policies undertaken by the 
Departments of Health in Britain and France shows that the impact of EU membership 
is small in policy and difficult to quantify financially. Also, departmental budgetary
39 “En raison de l’interference des niveaux d’administrations territoriales, nous sommes dans un 
systeme multipolaire en matiere de decision, dans lequel le veritable decideur c’est le lobbyiste, qui se 
situe au centre du systeme et qui va essayer d’optimiser son propre revenu en jouant sur les quatre 
niveaux au minimum de subventions qu’il peut obtenir, c’est a dire maintenant Bruxelles, l’Etat, la 
Region et, selon la nature de ce qu’il veut faire, le Departement ou la Collectivite Locale. II faut 
vraiment etre cloche pour ne pas arriver, en se donnant du temps, a faire financer quelque chose.”, 
Interview, ref. 1.
40 Interview, ref. 51.
41 Similarly, the programme Europe against poverty was drafted by a Frenchman who heavily 
influenced the definition of social exclusion by lending the French approach to it, according to 
Interview, ref. 51.
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processes have not adapted efficiently to EU budgeting. Departments’ officials are not 
often able to influence EU health policy because the participation of non-governmental 
organisations and experts in EU decision-making is preferred to that of representatives 
of the Department of Health. These two arguments support the view that 
Europeanisation and hybridisation trends are limited since EU membership did not 
cause any substantial adaptation of departmental budgeting in Britain and France.
However, at the same time, EU membership has reinforced the links between national 
bureaucracies and experts in policy and policy-making, especially in France where these 
links were not as strong as in Britain. National civil servants seek to ensure that the 
policy priorities of the government and the private sector match, and also that experts 
may be used to present the views of the ministry within decision-making at level 2. 
Therefore, the section concludes that Departments of Health have adapted to a greater 
extent and more efficiently to EU health programmes than in sections two and three 
since they reinforced and used their relationships with the private sector just when EU 
institutions favoured the participation of these experts in the definition of EU health 
budget allocations.
7.4.3. Health department 4re-positioned ’ within central government?
EU membership impacts on decision-making processes at level 1 by ‘re-positioning’ the 
Department of Health within national government. Article 129b paragraph 4 of the 
Treaty of Maastricht altered the balance of power in the relationships between the 
DOH and the DGS, and other government departments, since it requires that health
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protection provisions should form a constituent part of other policies. Health 
Departments are now entitled to participate in the decision-making process of policies 
in which other departments have taken the lead when they feel health matters are 
involved. The greater participation of health representatives in EU policy-making 
reinforces the power of the DOH and the DGS at the national level because of their 
greater involvement and weight within interministerial co-ordination. The EU treaty 
enables health bureaucracies to amend decisions and programmes directly or indirectly 
affecting health matters even though these changes may contradict other policies’ 
strategies. For instance, the DGS pressure on medical technology regulation conflicted 
with the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s policy for the free circulation of goods.42
The ‘re-positioning’ of health departments within national government and the 
increased involvement of health officials in decision-making on social affairs create an 
emulation effect. International Relations Unit officials (DOH), who used to be 
involved in Working Groups on the setting up of new programmes, have started to join 
officials from technical units (AIDS, cancer) on Advisory Committees to discuss the 
management of existing programmes. This organisational change stimulates the 
exchange of information and learning processes. For instance, AIDS officials were 
interested in learning how the cancer programme functioned. Policy emulation also 
arises because health concerns in some Member States oblige others to discuss points 
which national health officials did not consider a priority. In particular, German 
concern about the health implications of BSE (mad cow disease) and drinking water 
regulations has made the DOH stronger in introducing policies at the national level.
42 Interview, ref. 50.
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However, there are some conflicts of interest which put Health Departments into 
opposition to the rest of national government. First, new opportunities at the EU level 
encouraged national health officials to undertake action at this level, while the 
government was opposed to more EU health measures. This disagreement was 
revealed when the DGS tried to use the French presidency of the European 
Commission to reinforce French leadership on health programmes while neither the 
French government nor the European Union had chosen health as a policy priority. 
Second, the Direction du Budget is seeking to introduce the rationale it adopted for 
relations between EU and national budgeting (‘principe de constance\ assessment of 
the rates-of-retum) into departmental budgeting. The Direction du Budget stressed 
that “the ministry has adopted a rationale today by which credits add up without 
cancelling each other out.”43 Becoming familiar with the government’s budgetary 
rationale requires a learning process. It is more difficult for the Direction du Budget 
and for HM Treasury to make the DGS and DOH familiar with the notion of offset 
since the cost of health within EU budgeting remains small. Third, a SGCI official 
argued that the introduction of health measures within intergovernmental bargaining 
led health decisions to be used as side-payments to poorer countries in exchange for 
their agreement on other policies, because health remains a small player within 
negotiations.
43 “Le ministere est dans une logique aujourd’hui ou les credits se cumulent mais ne s’annulent pas”, 
Interview, ref. 5.
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7.5. Conclusion
Chapter 7 quantified the impact of EU membership on the determination of policy 
choices and demonstrated that this impact is small in policy and in finance. First, the 
Europeanisation of national health budgeting remains limited over policy because the 
Departments of Health in the UK and France are mainly concerned with health care, for 
which the EU is not responsible. EU health policy is not yet considered to be critical. 
Second, EU funding has little financial influence on the budget of health departments 
because the European health budget is small and most of EU funding is allocated to the 
private sector. Also, it is difficult to assess whether EU health programmes duplicate 
or complement national ones because of the lack of transparency about the level of 
funding and the contents of programmes. In France opacity makes it difficult for 
departments to establish financial offsetting for similar EU and national programmes, 
because French returns on EU health budget are not known in detail. Poor information 
hinders the application of the ‘principe de Constance’ and the assessment of existing 
programmes. Therefore, EU programmes tend to be additional to national ones in 
France, and non-additional in Britain, but there is no systematic assessment of whether 
EU funds complement or duplicate existing national undertakings.
Third, EU health programmes sometimes influence policy decisions at the national 
level, in particular when EU expenditure is great in comparison with matching national 
funds and co-financing. The impact of EU health programmes is not always a function 
of the size of the funds available at EU level because EU funding creates a leverage 
effect.
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Chapter 7 measured the impact of EU membership on policy-making and demonstrated 
that Europeanisation and hybridisation trends remain much smaller in Departments of 
Health than in Ministries of Agriculture and Departments of Transport. Budgetary 
mechanisms at the department level did not adapt much to pressures caused by EU 
membership, and hybridisation is limited by the restricted participation of national 
representatives to the decision-making processes at level 2. Europeanisation is limited 
since there is no clear health policy at the EU level to which Member States’ health 
department could adapt and integrate with at the national level. The hybridisation of 
level 1 and 2 budgetary processes is limited because decision-making procedures at 
level 1 and level 2 remain largely non-coordinated, and information does not easily 
circulate across both levels. National governments are not much involved in the 
definition and the running of EU programmes and are not often able to ensure EU 
expenditure closely matches national government’s priorities. Central government 
actors do not control EU decision-making because EU selection procedures largely by­
pass the central government level as these processes favour discussions with lower 
government levels or with non-administrative actors (private charities and experts). 
National and EU spending decision-making processes are disjointed, with the 
consequence that EU policies when implemented create distortions to national policies 
(duplication, contradiction, waste). The two levels of decision-making do not overlap, 
actors and processes are distinct, and not many actors are in charge of reconciling 
policy decisions. The fact that multiple levels of government may spend on similar 
programmes without co-ordination of decision-making is inefficient. In the absence of 
a co-ordination mechanism, it would be desirable for responsibilities to be shared more 
clearly.
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national governments are not able to influence EU expenditure on health within the 
Member States because of low hybridisation. First, it showed that the EU encourages 
the creation and organisation of policy communities by opening its bids to private 
organisations. Simultaneously, it is widely influenced by individual experts and lobbies 
which provide the Commission with expertise. These groups may express 
governmental views but the government has little control over the interests represented 
at EU level. The bottom-up approach favouring direct relationships with the private 
sector fosters an incoherent EU policy, which contributes to the opacity of its 
objectives and achievements.
Second, the influence of specialists, lobbies and experts in the designing of EU 
programmes without a coherent EU public health framework creates a problem 
because of administrative inertia in the renewal of programmes. Therefore, because the 
DGS itself has an incentive to maximise the returns on the French contribution to the 
EU budget, the absence of budgetary and policy offsetting in France is more acute 
since there is little opposition to the extension of programmes.
Health constitutes a ‘hard case’ since chapter 7 shows that the process of adaptation of 
the department’s budgeting to EU budgeting remains limited. The reason for a 
restricted Europeanisation lies in the low involvement of national civil servants in EU 
decision-making, to the benefit of experts. However, this case does not dismiss the 
central argument of the thesis. First, the health case shows that EU factors are 
necessary for understanding health budgeting in Britain and France. Only EU factors 
may explain that EU decision-making, because it bypasses national government, has 
encouraged closer relationships between the DGS and the DOH with the private 
sector; and that EU health policy is incoherent and distorts national priorities, because
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there is no process to coordinate EU and national budgets. Many policy problems are 
caused by the lack of adaptation of national bureaucratic mechanisms to EU budgeting. 
Therefore, a low degree of budgetary Europeanisation is a significant factor in 
explaining budgeting in a department. Second, the health case substantiates the second 
and the third hypotheses, because the low adaptation of budgetary processes is linked 
both to the lack of interactions between national and European actors during policy­
making processes, and to the ‘sprinkling’ of EU credits between small health 
programmes.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion: Europeanisation limited?
The impact of EU membership on methods and processes of budgeting has been 
inadequately discussed in the conventional literature. The starting point of the thesis 
was this gap in existing work on budgeting and European integration, and the need for 
a study of the adaptation of national budgetary mechanisms to EU-related pressures. 
The thesis tests the proposition that the impact of EU membership on national 
budgetary processes is greater and different in nature from what could be presumed 
from an examination of the existing literature. The thesis analyses, quantifies, assesses 
and characterises budgetary Europeanisation, defined as the process of adaptation of 
bureaucratic budgetary mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership. It 
demonstrates that membership of the EU is an important variable for the determination 
of national policy-making. At the same time, it argues that through their participation 
in EU decision-making processes, national governments succeed largely in 
‘nationalising’ European Union pressures on national budgeting. This proposition is 
tested in an overall way in chapters 2 to 4, and then in three policy areas representing 
different degrees of exposure to EU influences (chapters 5 to 7).
To explain differences in the extent of Europeanisation in various policy settings, the 
thesis tests two more hypotheses: hypothesis two is that actors are more constrained by 
the EU and also better able to influence international actors, when they interact
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frequently with actors at the international level; hypothesis three argues there is a link 
between the degree of adaptation to EU processes and the amount of EU finance in the 
budget of a department. The thesis argues that empirical evidence of the adaptation of 
national budgetary processes to EU pressures at the overall level and at sub- 
government level supports the three hypotheses tested throughout the thesis. It 
concludes that, while both hypotheses two and three are valid, the role of interactions 
between actors at the national and the EU levels is greater than that of finance in 
explaining the scope and nature of budgetary Europeanisation. To bring together the 
discoveries enunciated in the preceding chapters, chapter 8 is articulated around these 
issues which have guided the thesis.
Section 1 addresses the quantification issue and measures the degree to which EU 
factors are an important variable for determining national budgeting. It evaluates how 
much national budgeting is affected by EU influences. Section two focuses on the 
characteristics of budgetary Europeanisation and assesses the impact of EU 
membership according to different aspects of budgeting. Section three gives an 
appreciation of the adaptation of budgeting to EU pressures from a qualitative 
perspective and assesses the improvements and the problems this adaptation process 
involves. Section four focuses on how national budgetary processes are constrained 
and identifies various sources of pressure on national budgeting. Finally, section five 
provides an insight into future pressures on national budgeting in the framework of 
EMU.
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8.1. The Europeanisation of national budgeting: the quantitative approach
The thesis demonstrates that the impact of EU membership on national budgeting is 
greater than what could be presumed from an examination of the existing literature by 
providing evidence of a process of adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms at the 
overall level and at sub-government level in Britain and France. However, the thesis 
recognises that there is still a considerable margin for national discretion in policy and 
policy-making.
8.1.1. A wide-ranging adaptation process
First, at the overall level, the thesis argues budgetary Europeanisation is a wider 
process with greater long-term implications for national budgeting than is supposed in 
the existing literature because the latter has a narrow view of the adaptation process of 
bureaucratic mechanisms to EU pressures. The existing literature focuses on two main 
EU-related constraints on national budgeting: EU regulation, which sets tax 
harmonisation rules, and compliance with formal budgetary rules. The thesis shows 
that the process of adaptation arising from these two pressures is smaller than asserted 
in the literature. Only a few changes in British and French budgeting emerge from 
direct EU constraints. Member States retain a large part of their sovereignty on fiscal 
matters and compliance may be achieved through cosmetic techniques.
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The thesis shows that the adaptation of bureaucratic mechanisms is a wide process 
because it does not restrict EU influence to negatively-oriented fiscal norms and 
procedures and to police-like legislative rules which establish limits that Member States 
cannot surpass. By emphasising EU influences on decision-making and on leadership 
the thesis demonstrates that processes and methods of budgeting at the national level 
had to adapt to EU procedures and to European budgeting. The thesis argues that the 
implications are greater on decision-making than on policy. Therefore, the 
Europeanisation of national budgeting implies institutional change at the overall level 
and at sub-government level. As a consequence, budgetary institutions can no longer 
be studied in a national perspective because of the strong links between policy 
decisions at the EU and the national levels, and between the European and the national 
budgets.
Second, at sub-government level, the thesis demonstrates that the adaptation of 
departments’ mechanisms to the consequences of EU membership is wide-ranging, 
affecting budgetary processes in many policy sectors and in proportions which are not 
necessarily related to the size of EU public expenditure. It is commonly assumed that 
Europeanisation is determined by the size of EU finance in a particular policy domain. 
Because Agriculture is the main cost centre of the European budget and because CAP 
expenditure in Britain and France is greater than domestic spending, the conventional 
literature limits the potential influence of the EU on budgeting at department level to 
Agriculture. Likierman argues that “United Kingdom membership of the European 
Community is central to the department’s role, and means that its expenditure differs in
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an important respect from that of other departments.”1 Because the literature 
traditionally distinguishes between EU influences on Agriculture and on other 
departments on the basis of the size of EU finance, it overstates Europeanisation trends 
in Agriculture and neglects those in Health. The approach to budgetary 
Europeanisation is scattered and the emphasis on finance is made at the expense of the 
adaptation of methods and strategies.
The thesis is opposed to this segmentation within public budgeting and reveals that 
Europeanisation is a general adaptation process involving national budgeting as a 
whole and not just its parts. The institutional approach and the sectoral chapters 
demonstrate that budgetary Europeanisation is a general trend which takes place across 
departments. The thesis finds evidence of budgetary Europeanisation in the three 
spending departments studied in Britain and France. Moreover, there are similar 
patterns of Europeanisation which may be found in the three cases, e.g. the increasing 
contribution of national civil servants to the making of EU policy, the role of expertise 
and the role of accounting methods.
The thesis argues it is not appropriate to measure the role of EU pressures in a policy 
sector only as a function of the size of EU finance within domestic expenditure. On the 
one hand, big EU spending programmes do not always have much impact on national 
budgetary plans. With the TENs project the multiplication of projects funded 
produced a ‘sprinkling’ of EU aid, an argument also invoked about the programme 
Europe against AIDS. With health programmes the opacity of the criteria for EU
1 Likierman, Andrew (1988), Public expenditure - Who really controls it and how (London: Penguin): 
31.
270
funding makes it difficult for governments to orient national projects to obtain 
maximum EU finance.
On the other hand, small EU budgetary lines may have a great impact on domestic 
expenditure. First, although some EU credits seem small within the whole budget, they 
can be significant for some individual projects. Structural Funds’ investments are vital 
for transport projects in the Reunion Island. With agriculture the EU is the origin of 
agri-environment measures being adopted in France. Second, French spending 
ministries often stress the advantage of undertaking EU-funded projects, even if the 
size of EU finance is small in comparison with domestic expenditure, because EU 
grants are considered additional or ‘free’. With the TGV-East project the Department 
of Transport considered that EU financing provided a new way to finance the 
infrastructure and increased the profitability of the project since its calculations did not 
include the cost of the EU contribution for French public finance. Similarly, 
departments often take the view that co-financing schemes are half free and boost the 
profitability of projects. In a context of budgetary stringency any additional financing 
means are vital to departments. Third, EU financing is important for the label it gives 
to a project because it shows that Member States’ governments support that project. 
Fourth, EU expenditure creates a leverage effect and obliges Member States to 
organise their actions at the national level in accordance with EU mechanisms to obtain 
funds (e.g. breast cancer programme). Therefore, the impact of EU programmes on 
decision-making at the national level is in some cases stronger than its financial impact 
suggests.
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8.1.2. Country differences in the degree of adaptation to EU pressures
The thesis reveals country differences in the degree of adaptation to EU pressures. It 
demonstrates the role of the British and the French Finance Ministries in creating a 
context favourable or not to the adaptation of national budgetary priorities to EU 
budgeting. The way the European budget is financed and the methods of accounting 
for EU credits received impact on the strategies of ministries towards EU programmes 
and explain differences in the degree of exposure of these ministries to EU influences.
Several factors impact on the strategy of national actors at level 1 and contribute to the 
reduction of EU influence on public budgeting. In the UK departments are constrained 
by the Euro-PES mechanism and the Fontainebleau agreement which put pressures to 
keep small both the EU budget and the British share of the EU budget. Financial 
mechanisms in the UK set incentives for departmental actors to encompass a small field 
and to obtain a small share of EU spending within a set EU budget. These mechanisms 
clarify part of the strategy of British representatives of minimising the budgetary impact 
of European policies. They help explaining differences in degrees of adaptation to EU 
pressures in equivalent departments in Britain and France.
In France, the lack of a systematic budgetary enforcement of the ‘principe de 
constance’ and the rate-of-retum approach encourage departmental actors to adopt a 
resource-maximisation strategy. French actors have incentives for maximising their 
share of the EU budget once it is set. In France the rate-of-retum approach explains 
also differences in strategies in various policy domains. Because France has high 
financial returns on EU agriculture spending and is a net recipient of CAP, the
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Ministere de 1’Agriculture has interests in maximising the CAP budget. In contrast 
with internal policies the relevant departments are requested to set the EU budget as 
low as possible. Therefore, financial mechanisms explain differences in the strategy of 
departmental actors and clarify the reasons why the adaptation of bureaucratic 
mechanisms has greater implications in France than in Britain.
National governments sometimes encourage a greater impact of EU influences on 
public budgeting. Some EU programmes leave much margin of manoeuvre to national 
governments, e.g. the agri-environmental and the afforestation of agricultural lands 
schemes. National governments decide whether the EU schemes should be undertaken 
in their country and decide how much they want to be influenced depending on 
whether they consider co-financing a strong financial incentive. In Britain co-financing 
provides little incentive because of the Fontainebleau agreement, whereas in France co­
financing is a strong incentive because of the resource-maximisation approach. This 
margin of manoeuvre explains why EU programmes may have different budgetary 
implications from one country to the other.
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8.2. The Europeanisation of national budgeting: characteristics and limits
Section two focuses on the characteristics of budgetary Europeanisation and assesses 
the impact of EU membership according to the different aspects of budgeting. By 
determining which aspects of budgeting are more influenced by EU factors, the thesis 
indicates the limits of Europeanisation. Based on earlier developments, the thesis 
determines three major characteristics of budgetary Europeanisation.
8.2.1. Spending and taxing
The thesis shows that EU membership sets constraints on spending more than on 
taxing. The discovery of a ‘spending bias’ contradicts the approach of the existing 
literature which traditionally focused on EU influences on taxation (e.g. VAT 
harmonisation) and budgetary macroeconomic aggregates (e.g. public deficit and public 
debt). The thesis argues that the traditional approach over-emphasises the potential for 
a strong EU influence on taxation and on macroeconomic aggregates, while 
overlooking effects on spending.
The thesis shows that national governments retain a large margin of manoeuvre on tax 
matters because tax decisions require unanimous voting at the EU level. The voting 
procedure at the European Council gives each Member State the power to veto any 
unwelcome decision on taxation. Unanimous voting implies that Member States accept 
only those EU ‘constraints’ that match with national priorities. EU institutions have 
little power of constraint since obligations imposed at the EU level are in fact 
‘nationalised’. Member States may agree to a EU tax directive either because it serves
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national purposes (e.g. abolition of the higher excise duty rate in France) or because it 
has no effect on their tax systems (e.g. the 15% lower limit on the standard VAT rate is 
below existing rates in Britain and France). The failure of EU institutions to impose 
tax patterns is illustrated by the exemptions granted to the UK on zero-rating. The 
European Union has no overall mandate for the harmonisation of national tax systems 
and tax pressures, and is not entrusted with the authority to impose tax norms and 
systems. While there are clear measures for the approximation of some taxes, which 
are accepted by each individual Member State, national governments are sovereign to 
determine the tax burden and to raise other sources of revenue than the ‘harmonised’ 
taxes. Therefore, as long as there is no European Union tax under the control of the 
EU and as long as unanimous voting remains, the existing institutions protect national 
governments’ sovereignty. The only European Union constraint on taxation which 
Member States do not control is the pressure from competition. However, this 
pressure remains weak under the destination system and should be attributed to 
globalisation rather than to European factors exclusively.
The thesis acknowledges that the Treaty of Maastricht sets constraints on national 
budgetary macroeconomic aggregates. However, it emphasises that the target figures 
became unrealistic in the current economic context since they reflect the strongly 
voluntarist and optimistic views of the Treaty of Maastricht where targets were used as 
a political signal. Also, the thesis maintains that the setting of target aggregates has 
little constraining power on Member States because of the lack of credible sanctions 
against free-riding and because national governments have little margin of manoeuvre 
within budgetary management. Finally, with macroeconomic budgetary aggregates 
such as the tax burden, the size of the public sector, the budgetary deficit and the
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public debt, it is difficult to provide evidence of the influence of EU treaty articles for 
methodological reasons. The methodological annexe emphasises it is difficult to 
establish causal links between changes in budgetary figures and European influences. 
On a large number of aggregates there is no ‘European’ standard with which to 
compare national figures. Therefore, macroeconomic budgetary figures are not useful 
tools in a study of budgetary Europeanisation because few convergence effects can be 
observed.
While it acknowledges some influence of the EU on national taxation and budgetary 
aggregates, the thesis shows that the traditional approach over-emphasises this 
potential and neglects influences on public spending. The thesis distinguishes between 
three reasons why European budgeting affects public spending by national 
governments. First, since the European budget depends on national budgets for the 
levy of resources and has little impact on macroeconomic regulation since it is 
institutionally committed to budgetary balance, spending is the main function of the 
European budget. Therefore, EU membership modifies the distribution and the level of 
public spending in individual Member States, since expenditure by EU institutions is 
additional to that of national governments’. The role of EU expenditure in EU 
Member States should be stressed since public spending is financed by two non­
exclusive spending authorities (EU institutions and national governments) whereas 
there is no independent European tax system.
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Second, public spending at the national level is often determined by the boundaries of 
EU spending even though the plurality of spending levels did not lead to a formal 
division of responsibilities between EU institutions and national governments. The 
financing of a project at one level does not systematically preclude the financing of the 
same project at another level. To avoid duplication and waste, public spending 
projections at the national level take the European budget into account: in some policy 
domains, public spending is nil because all interventions are implemented at the EU 
level (e.g. CAP); in others, national spending programmes are designed to complement 
or correct EU programmes (e.g. the French suckling cow premium); and with co­
financing schemes, national financing induces EU spending, and vice versa. Therefore, 
EU spending patterns affect the allocation of public funds by national governments 
since public expenditure at the national level is often modelled on EU spending.
Third, EU budgetary processes affect decision-making on national expenditure because 
departmental actors are simultaneously engaged in budgetary negotiations at both EU 
and national levels. In a context of budgetary stringency EU credits represent an 
additional or another source of finance which most departments seek to optimise. 
Departments are encouraged to participate actively in EU policy-making as well as in 
bargaining with the Finance Ministry for domestic funds. In addition, part of decision­
making on national spending involves negotiating at the EU level. Therefore, 
processes for making decisions on public expenditure are duplicated.
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8.2.2. Policy and policy-making
The thesis shows that budgetary decision-making processes and methods have adapted 
to pressures originating from EU institutions. However, changes in budgetary 
processes do not imply that budgetary outcomes and policies are different from what 
they were before. First, the thesis demonstrates that budgetary Europeanisation 
involves a significant change in budgetary decision-making processes and it uses the 
concept of hybridisation to describe it. Hybridisation refers to the entanglement of 
national and EU policy-making. It means that the making of the budget is no longer a 
process internal to national governments because part of decision-making on domestic 
spending programmes is made at the EU level, and because the national budget is 
closely linked to the EU budget in finance and policy. Hybridisation results from two 
symmetrical entanglements. On the one hand, policy-making on national budgeting 
involves the EU level because national decision-making procedures request the advice, 
the authorisation or the financing of EU institutions simultaneously. On the other 
hand, the making of decisions at the EU level involves the participation and the 
agreement of national actors in the European Council and other institutions.
Second, the thesis argues that the hybridisation of budgetary processes did not 
necessarily imply changes in the substance of national policies. The sectoral approach 
shows that Europeanisation involves changes in the making of policies more than in 
policies. For instance, the implementation of the TENs programme did not lead to 
great modifications of the French and the British programmes for new transport 
infrastructure, whereas the making of decisions on transport infrastructure has become 
much more complex.
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The thesis suggests several reasons why EU-related changes in budgetary processes are 
not echoed by changes in the substance of policies. First, the thesis suggests that the 
European Union it not very skilful in deploying its resources, which are limited. Since 
its financial and administrative means are weak and it needs to rely on external 
expertise, the EU may not give a strong lead in sectoral policy. Second, national 
governments influence EU budgetary and policy choices through their participation in 
EU processes and ensure the representation of national interests at the EU level. 
National administrations have used policy-making at the EU level to promote policy 
decisions fitting their own national interests. In this sense, national governments have 
‘nationalised’ European policy decisions so that national policy is not constrained by 
distorting EU policy priorities. Therefore, budgetary Europeanisation is characterised 
by the adaptation of national budgetary processes and methods to EU budgeting rather 
than by changes in policies.
8.2.3. Practices and rules
The thesis demonstrates that budgetary Europeanisation is characterised by the 
adaptation of practices rather than by changes in formal rules. First, the thesis argues 
that restricting EU pressures to formal rules conveys a superficial view of the nature of 
the adaptation process. There are few EU obligations on national budgetary 
institutions because treaty articles stipulated objectives that need to be achieved and 
not the means through which they should be achieved. There is no normative model 
formed in the EU of how public budgetary institutions should behave and the 
constraints on Member States depend on how close they are to fulfilling the EU 
budgetary criteria.
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Second, the EU strategy of imposing norms on budgetary aggregates is not fully 
effective since there is no strict enforcement mechanism. Although legally binding, the 
Treaty of Maastricht has limitations which render sanctions less credible: the procedure 
is not automatic; the final decisions on excessive deficit and debt require discretion; the 
criteria are more benchmarks than rules; and they are not exempt from ambiguity and 
vagueness. EU obligations for budgetary management have little constraining power in 
the UK since the British government is exempt from the obligation to reduce its 
budgetary deficit and public debt, and from European Council sanctions.
Third, the compliance of national budgetary institutions to imposed EU requirements is 
limited by formal compliance (cosmetic and creative budgeting). Therefore, while 
acknowledging the influence of compliance, the thesis shows that the impact of EU 
rules on national budgetary institutions remains limited. The rule-based approach 
conveys a ‘negative’ view of Europeanisation, based on enforcement and sanctions. It 
neglects the possibilities for positive leadership and long-term budgetary guidance.
The thesis shows that the adaptation of budgetary practices has been neglected in the 
conventional literature. Budgetary hybridisation has redefined the function of 
departmental actors within budgetary processes. Departmental actors are 
simultaneously involved in designing the EU budget and the national budget and are in 
charge of reconciling policies at both levels. Traditional budgetary practices and the 
control by central agencies, in particular HM Treasury and the Direction du Budget, 
are also challenged by the hybridisation of budgetary institutions. Central agencies 
have integrated specific tools (Euro-PES and the ‘principe de Constance’) into national 
budgetary processes to regain control of the financial relationships between central
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government and EU institutions. Therefore, budgetary Europeanisation is 
characterised by the adaptation of practices and methods to EU budgeting more than 
by the adoption of formal rules, because Europeanisation often is an informal and 
bottom-up process. The lack of formalism of the Europeanisation process has 
contributed to the understatement of EU influences on national budgeting.
8.3. The Europeanisation of national budgeting: the qualitative approach
Section three analyses the adaptation of budgeting to EU pressures from a qualitative 
perspective and assesses the improvements and the problems this adaptation process 
produces. The thesis demonstrates that Europeanisation involves a change in the 
quality of budgetary processes at level 1 (in particular, increased complexity and 
fragmentation) and at level 2 (consistency, predictability).
8.3.I. Hybridisation: the greater complexity o f decision-making processes at level 1
At level 1, hybridisation implies a greater complexity of budgetary decision-making 
processes. Departmental actors are simultanously engaged in decision-making 
processes at the EU level in addition to conventional budgetary bargains nationally. 
The reciprocal involvement of national institutions in EU budgeting and vice versa 
creates a complex institutional system where budgetary decisions at both levels are so 
closely entangled that they cannot be isolated from one another. Departmental actors 
operating across boundaries are in charge of the reconciliation of decisions 
simultaneously made at the national and the EU levels because hybridisation creates a
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strong need for vertical coordination. At the same time, the need for horizontal 
coordination is reinforced by the need to define a general national policy and to ensure 
its enforcement throughout departments. Coordination departments (e.g. SGCI) and 
units (e.g. European bureaus) play an increased role within decision-making. Hybrid 
institutions involve a considerable increase in negotiations, policy fragmentation and 
bureaucratic control. Also, traditional methods of decision-making are disturbed by the 
introduction of new levels of decisions, especially since not all budgetary processes 
have become hybrid. Hybridisation is not uniform but varies depending on policy 
areas, creating a two-track budgetary process characterised by the juxtaposition of 
conventional budgeting and of hybrid institutions
8.3.2. The nature o f the representation o f national budgetary priorities at level 2
Hybridisation implies that Member States are able to influence EU pressures through 
their participation in EU policy-making. A high level of adaption to EU mechanisms 
allows for the ‘nationalisation’ of EU decisions, which means that national 
governments use the EU level in their own interests. However, the thesis shows that 
the nature of the representation of national budgetary priorities at level 2 depends on 
strategic factors. For instance, the thesis shows that the consistency of British budget 
minimisation positions throughout negotiations at level 2 reinforces the credibility of 
the British policy at the EU level and within Whitehall. The involvement of French 
representatives in a large number of CAP schemes gives France a leadership function 
which allows for great French influence on the design of agriculture schemes.
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Table 8.1. Conditions for a role o f national representatives at level 2
Conditions Characteristics Strategic
advantage
Strategic
drawback
Example
Recipient: 
Only recipient
- made-to- 
measure scheme
- expertise - considered 
biased
DOM with
POSEI-DOM
scheme
Leader:
Recipient of most 
programmes
- dispersion of 
interests
- unpredictable
- large win-sets 
-many
possibilities of 
alliances
- lack of 
consistency
France with CAP
Actor:
Recipient of few 
programmes
- concentration 
of interests
- consistency - predictability
- narrow win-sets
- few possibilities 
of alliances
France and UK 
with TENs
Outsider: 
Not recipient
- isolation - veto power with 
unanimous 
voting
- side-payments
- lack of 
expertise 
-risk of 
exclusion
UK with CAP 
negotiations on 
wine and 
tobacco, UK and 
France with 
Cohesion Fund
The nature of the representation of national budgetary priorities at level 2 depends on 
strategic factors. The thesis isolates four main country positions within level 2 
negotiations which explain how national governments use strategic factors to influence 
EU mechanisms. First, with EU schemes designed to answer needs in one particular 
country (e.g. POSEI-DOM), the representative of the recipient country is necessarily 
considered biased in its claims for financial support by the other Member States, 
damaging its credibility. However, its strategic advantage within level 2 negotiations is 
expertise since only this country can claim full awareness of the problem to be solved. 
Second, often one country (or a coalition of a few important countries) takes the lead 
during level 2 negotiations because it is the main recipient of a large number of 
programmes. This leadership function is typical of France during CAP negotiations 
since France is directly concerned with virtually all commodities and compensation 
programmes. The drawbacks of having dispersed interests is the lack of consistency 
within French agriculture priorities but such a strategic position is largely coveted. It
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multiplies the possibilities of trade-offs between policy preferences and eases 
compromise and alliance-building. It sustains uncertainty about the leader’s policy 
positions and new alliances. Participation in decision-making on many programmes 
offers a central position to the country representatives.
Third, the most common case is the participation of country representatives as simple 
actors within level 2 negotiations because they are recipients of a limited number of EU 
schemes. With UK agriculture the commodities where British interests lie are well- 
known and predictable. The UK is traditionally an important recipient of beef and 
sheep livestock intervention, but is little concerned with wine and cereals. The UK 
participates in decision-making on the latter programmes as a secondary player only, 
because it is not considered an expert on these commodities and because spending 
decisions on these programmes have no consequential effect on British agriculture or 
MAFF budgeting. This position offers fewer opportunities for changing a compromise 
agreement and country alliances. It limits the possibilities of trade-offs and reciprocity 
and therefore reduces the country’s margin of manoeuvre within negotiations.
Isolation characterises the fourth strategic position, when a country is against all others 
within level 2 negotiations. This position is usually considered dangerous since an 
isolated Member State faces the risk of exclusion, and may not greatly influence the 
design of EU programmes as an outsider. However, when unanimity is required within 
the European Council to overcome the Commission’s opposition or to demonstrate a 
political consensus at level 2, the outsider’s voice has a veto power. The outsider may 
block the decision process or bargain its agreement for side-payments.
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8.4. The sources of pressure on national budgeting
Section four focuses on how national budgetary processes are constrained and 
identifies various sources of pressure on national budgeting. The intention here is not 
to provide a causal statement of why Europeanisation trends develop, but to describe 
how some pressures have obliged national bureaucratic mechanisms to adapt. The list 
in Table 8.2 is not exhaustive and the examples provided refer to the cases presented 
with more details in the core of the thesis.
Table 8.2. The pressures on national budgeting
Pressures Description Example Limits to EU pressure
Competition
approximation of tax 
treatments to homogenise 
the cost of production factors
VAT and excise duty 
harmonisation
- more a consequence 
of globalisation
- constraint depends on 
the mobility of tax base
- financial: public resources contribution to the EU
Substitution
- financial: public spending
budget, European VAT 
CAP voting procedure (e.g. 
unanimity on taxation),
- policy: transfer of decision­
making on spending from 
the national to the EU level
CAP consensus-building
strategies
- binding subsidies to public 
companies, 
relationships with the 
central bank
formal compliance
Regulation - setting up an environment VAT harmonisation, 
Maastricht criteria
derogations (e.g. zero- 
rating, excessive deficit 
ratios)
- recommendations corporate taxation non-binding
Lobbying
- early identification of EU 
added value
- recommendations on the 
design of EU scheme
TENs
AIDS
non-binding
- policy stand: Member 
States want to be seen
programmes on AIDS interest in EU policy is 
not genuine, loose
participating in EU policy implementation
Demand by 
Member States
- emulation: Member States 
copy one another
agri-environment
programmes
rather an impact of 
globalisation
-alibi financing the TGV- 
East
EU pressures as a 
pretext for undertaking 
national policies
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8.4.1. Competition
Economic competition contributes to the convergence of Member States’ taxation 
because different tax treatments affect the cost of production factors. Increased 
competition in the Single Market sets economic pressures for the equalisation of tax 
treatments across competing countries. Therefore, competition in the EU has the 
consequence of a greater convergence of tax levels in the Member States, usually 
towards the lowest standards among competing countries. The stronger the pressure 
of competition, the greater the approximation of tax treatments. The thesis shows that 
the pressure of competition on the approximation of taxes depends on the mobility of 
tax bases. Because competition is more intense on mobile production factors and 
consumption goods, the degree of tax approximation in the EU depends on each tax 
(e.g. it is higher on capital rather than on labour, on internationally rather than on 
regionally-consumed products, and on transportable rather than on heavy or short-lived 
products). The pressure of competition is not identical within EU members since 
peripheral countries are less affected by EU trade flows.
Therefore, competition sets up pressures on public budgeting since it contributes to the 
approximation of taxation in the EU. However, the thesis shows that a limited number 
of taxes are concerned (mainly VAT, excise duties and the taxation of capital flows). 
Also, although competition is stronger in the EU because of the Single Market, the 
pressure of competition should be attributed to globalisation rather than to European 
factors specifically.
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8.4.2. Substitution
Substitution refers to the transfer of responsibilities (e.g. spending, revenue collection 
and decision-making) from one level to another. Substitution is an important cause of 
transfer of national governments’ sovereignty on budgeting to the EU level from both a 
financial and an institutional perspective. While public resources are collected 
nationally, part of these resources (VAT, national contribution to the EU budget) are 
transferred to EU institutions. Therefore, EU institutions are a substitute for central 
government as they become responsible for spending public funds. This substitution is 
important for financial and policy reasons: central governments lose not only resources 
but also control over how public funds are allocated and the responsibility for the 
policies undertaken. Ultimately, they surrender the authority to formulate norms and 
accountability for part of public policy. Substitution raises the question of the 
democratic control of EU policies since the European Parliament remains lacking in 
powers and is unable to replace the traditional control by national Parliaments.
This transfer of responsibility for the financing of public policies is supplemented by an 
institutional substitution mechanism. Decision-making processes on public spending 
have been increasingly transferred from the national to the EU level. With the 
recapitalisation of public companies and various public aid schemes EU institutions 
have the power of controlling the national budget or authorising the use of domestic 
funds. Decisions on public spending involve increasingly the EU level as a substitute 
for, or as an additional level to, the national level. This trend contributes to the greater 
complexity of budgetary decision-making processes.
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8.4.3. Regulation
Regulation refers to the imposition of more or less binding rules by a competent 
authority on a lower institution compelled to comply with them. Regulation is a 
significant cause of Europeanisation since EU institutions may impose norms, targets, 
procedures and sanctions to promote desired ‘European’ outcomes, behaviours and 
institutions. For instance, Member States are bound to integrate a number of rules and 
requirements formulated at the EU level, such as the Maastricht criteria, and to 
integrate new procedures involving EU bodies into national budgetary processes. The 
adoption of the Loi Quinquennale in France explicitly emanates from the Maastricht 
obligations. Compliance is in theory an efficient factor of convergence: the British and 
the French budgetary institutions should become more alike since both must adapt to 
the same EU obligations.
However, the degree of compliance varies, since all EU regulations do not have the 
same obligatory power. Some rules are fully binding as they codify precisely 
institutional arrangements or the use of budgetary techniques. For instance, EU 
institutions prohibit overdraft facilities and privileged access of government authorities 
to financial institutions. This EU law put an end to the symbiotic relationship between 
the Banque de France and the government, with important budgetary implications for 
the financing of budgetary deficits. The conditions for granting central government 
subsidies to public companies are strictly defined and controlled at the EU level.2 With 
fully binding regulations compliance is high and failure to comply is usually punished.
2 For more details on the effect of the EU state subsidies regulation on national budgeting, see 3.1.3..
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Regulation is an important cause of Europeanisation. However, imposed rules 
sometimes result in formal compliance achieved by the use of cosmetic techniques. 
With Air France the EU regulation on the re-capitalisation of public companies does 
not prevent the government from granting subsidies, but obliges the use of more 
complicated administrative and legal structures.3*
Other EU regulations are binding and include sanctions, but they leave much margin of 
manoeuvre to national governments since they set up only a framework. For instance, 
the Maastricht Treaty requirement that national budgetary procedures should comply 
with the set guidelines leaves Member States responsible for defining which 
amendments are required since the Treaty stipulates objectives and not the means 
through which they should be achieved. The margin of manoeuvre in the interpretation 
of treaty articles explains why institutional changes may vary from country to country. 
Another limit to EU constraints lies in the frequent derogations granted to those 
Member States where EU regulations would have a great impact (e.g. zero-rating in 
the UK). Exemptions prevent EU regulation from producing wide-scale EU-related 
changes.
Finally, EU institutions produce a number of non-binding recommendations which are 
constraining for Member States only to the extent that national governments are willing 
to implement them. For instance the Commission recommended the abolition of zero- 
rating and the application of only two VAT rates.4 These rules are not obligatory but
3 For more details, see the introduction to chapter 7.
4 Commission of the European Communities (1987), "Completion of the internal market: 
approximation of indirect tax rates and harmonisation of indirect tax structure", Com. 87 (320-322), 
(Brussels, CEC, 5 July).
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they indicate the opinion of a key EU institution, sustain a cross-national debate and 
may be used as a pretext by national governments for undertaking policies with the 
political backing of the EU.
8.4.4. Lobbying
Experts and the private sector set up pressures on national budgeting. The thesis 
identifies three ways in which experts have influenced EU spending programmes in the 
Member States and have caused the adaptation of national bureaucratic mechanisms. 
First, national administrations and EU institutions have used concepts and conclusions 
of research studies by experts to initiate, legitimate or influence European spending 
programmes. The design of EU programmes, and ultimately EU policies, are largely 
dependent on experts. For instance, the thesis shows that the involvement of French 
transport experts within TENs favoured high-speed train networks, a sector in which 
French interests are strong.
Second, because the Commission emphasises independent expertise, national 
bureaucracies have modified the ways of representing national priorities. Both cases 
on transport and health reveal that national governments use private groups to 
represent and defend national priorities at the EU level. Private involvement is 
considered a more efficient method to influence decisions at the EU level.
Third, because the determination of EU health priorities largely involves independent 
private experts, the Departments of Health in Britain and France have reinforced their 
links with non-governmental organisations, to influence their views. Therefore, public 
health policy is increasingly influenced by the private sector, which itself may be 
strongly influenced by their national governments.
290
Table 8.3. Conditions favourable to the role o f experts in EU decision-making
Conditions Description Example Problems
Institutional:
disjointed decision­
making process
Institutional link 
between EU 
institutions and the 
private sector, 
excluding central 
government 
institutions
Health: AIDS Lack of co-ordination 
between EU and 
national programmes
Scientific: 
lack of expertise
EU projects require the 
scientific backing of 
independent experts
Health: Comite des 
Experts Cancerologues
Greater complexity of
decision-making
processes
Strategic:
power-dependence
relationship
Experts need interest 
representation and EU 
institutions need 
scientific backing
Health: AIDS Clientelism
Organisational:
leverage effect
Early identification of 
potential EU added 
value on which 
enlarged scheme is 
based
Transport: TENs Biased project 
definition
Internal:
structure of the 
network
Structure of the 
network of experts, 
leadership
Transport: rail, road Biased interest- 
representation
The thesis isolates several conditions favourable to the role of experts and identifies 
some problems. First, experts are sometimes called to participate in decision-making 
processes through institutional arrangements. The procedure for selecting projects in 
the AIDS programmes establishes a direct link between EU institutions and the private 
sector. Institutional arrangements for making the decision on how to allocate the EU 
budget rely strongly on experts. Therefore, EU policies are determined by the 
individual concerns of medical experts and may distort policies undertaken by national 
governments because of the lack of coordination between the two levels.
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Second, the basic reason for the role of experts lies in the independent technical and 
professional expertise they provide for the selection of projects. Scientific criteria seem 
a better basis of choice than bureaucratic or political. Thus, EU institutions need to 
rely on outsiders from the private sector because they lack scientific expertise and 
credibility. The responsibility of EU institutions for health is recent in comparison with 
major international organisations, such as WHO, and with long-established leading 
public companies in transport infrastructure. Although the coming and going between 
the Commission’s advisers add complications to the decision-making process, decisions 
are better accepted by the private sector when they have been involved in the making 
of the decisions.
Third, the role of experts is promoted by strategic factors, in particular the strong 
power-dependence relationship between them and EU institutions. EU institutions, 
because they lack scientific expertise, are strongly dependent upon specialists to 
become credible actors in new policy domains. Committees such as the Comite des 
Experts Cancerologues (Committee of Cancer Experts) give a scientific authority to 
EU programmes. Thanks to their participation in EU decision-making EU schemes are 
not pure administrative products but are designed by private-sector actors. In 
exchange for contributing their expertise the experts ask to be represented, as an 
interest, on EU institutions. EU programmes become a channel for the promotion of 
decisions supported by individuals and groups, as against by central governments. EU 
programmes can therefore be criticised as biased towards sectional interests and as 
failing to reflect a general public interest in health across the EU.
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Fourth, the contribution of experts in the design of EU programmes is often because of 
organisational factors. Experts intervene early in the decision-making process by 
identifying potential EU added-value in some policy domains. With TENs the 
preparatory work of experts in 1990 defined and shaped a potential EU initiative on 
networks. While the project was revised many times afterwards and involved many 
more parties, the final project is largely inspired by this preparatory work and the 
suggestions of these experts in the early days.
Fifth, the role of experts and the private sector depends on internal factors, in particular 
the structure of their network. With health the role of British experts is greater than 
that of their French counterparts because of the structures of the private sector in the 
two countries. In the UK the private sector has traditionally been active and well 
organised and British associations are proportionally more successful in submitting bids 
for EU funding. EU policies have been largely influenced by British policies for AIDS. 
In France the private sector has not been traditionally involved in public health 
decision-making. Associations are dispersed and not organised into networks capable 
of effective lobbying. The DGS recognises that the structure of the French voluntary 
sector is a problem for French representation at the EU level, especially as EU 
institutions pay more attention to experts’ advice. Therefore, the structure of private 
networks is a significant factor explaining the role of experts in different policy 
domains.
The thesis demonstrates that the increasing participation of experts in the determination 
of EU decision-making represents an obstacle to the good representation of national 
priorities at the EU level and to the coordination of budgetary decisions at national and
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EU levels. The Health case shows the problems (duplication of public expenditure, 
distortions of policy, waste of money) caused by the lack of coordination of budgetary 
processes when private experts are preferred to departmental actors for the expression 
of national priorities at the EU level. The role of experts also suggests that national 
governments have little control over public expenditure in their own country.
8.4.5. Demand by Member States
EU policies are also promoted by Member States themselves, for motives that are not 
necessarily ‘European’. First, Member States sometimes want to be seen participating 
in or initiating EU policy not mainly because of a genuine interest in that policy domain 
but rather for the effect on national and international actors. For instance, the DGS 
wanted the government to use the French presidency to launch a major EU health 
programmes because it would have been perceived as a political signal that the EU was 
responsible for health. Also, experts are often said to have played an important 
function in the promotion of vertical health programmes because they wanted the 
Commission to take the lead in high profile policies.5
Second, emulation is a cause of further Europeanisation because membership of the EU 
develops links between national actors. EU institutions become a forum for the 
exchange of ideas and the comparison of national practices. For instance, meetings of 
national representatives with their EU counterparts contributed to the selling of needles 
as a means to reduce the spread of AIDS in France. However, emulation is not a 
pressure specific to the European Union.
5 This argument is based on various statements of senior civil servants quoted in 7.1.
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Third, individual Member States sometimes use EU membership as a pretext for 
undertaking national policies that might be opposed by powerful national interests. For 
instance the abolition of the higher VAT rate in France, allegedly because of EU 
membership, was a decision of the French government since there was no EU 
obligation to do so. As a corollary Member States try to get national projects to fit 
into later EU programmes so as to qualify for EU financing. A large number of ‘EU 
projects’ are national projects which happened to meet the selection criteria for EU 
projects but were not designed as EU projects specifically. EU financing is a substitute 
for domestic financing since national governments were committed to undertake these 
projects on their own. In France the TGV-East project was given a European label to 
be selected among the TENs projects, although the French government was already 
committed to undertake it as a national project and had started work on it.
8.5. The future of budgetary Europeanisation within EMU
At the end of this concluding chapter, it is necessary to make some reflections on 
national budgeting in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union. There is a 
great contrast between the current understatement of a European influence on public 
budgeting since 1970 and the strong expectations that national budgetary management 
is going to be greatly affected by EMU. National public spending is likely to be 
affected by European monetary integration as a result of two contradictory forces. On 
the one hand, because the government will lose traditional instruments of policy 
regulation, budgetary management will become a strategic tool for national 
governments to direct economic policy. On the other hand, since the EU is
increasingly dependent on the budgetary performance of national states, the EU is 
expected to put pressures on governments to reach a degree of convergence or at least 
to produce budgetary outcomes considered compatible with EMU.
8.5.1. The instruments o f economic regulation
Economic and Monetary Union has direct consequences for the use of regulatory 
instruments by central governments. First, budgetary management becomes a special 
instrument of policy regulation within EMU since central government will lose the 
domestic management of monetary policy and exchange rate adjustments for national 
economic stabilisation and demand management. Emphasis on budgetary and fiscal 
instruments could appear paradoxical in a period well-known for rejecting Keynesian 
principles and fine-tuning. In contrast, the focus is directed towards the structural 
impact of budgets on economic performance rather than on short-term stabilisation. 
Because monetary and exchange rate policies will be conducted by the EU, national 
economic performance will be determined to a greater degree by budgetary policy.
Second, the loss of monetary policy at the domestic level has several implications for 
budgetary management. Because money creation is determined by an independent 
central bank, budgetary deficits cannot be monetised any longer. However, the loss of 
seigniorage revenues6 for the UK and France is almost nil since both these countries 
have emphasised the reduction of inflation as one of their main priorities for many 
years. The financing of a budgetary deficit will imply higher taxes and public
6 Seignorage revenues are reductions in the public debt because inflation erodes the value of money.
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borrowing or lower public spending, which raises the costs of financing deficits in a 
monetary union where fiscal competition between Member States is important. 
However, a single rate of monetary expansion in Europe will offer a stable context for 
forecasting and controlling public expenditure.
Third, the loss of exchange rate adjustments at the national level affects economic 
regulation and the financing of budgetary deficits. Member States will not be able to 
compensate for the higher interest rates required for financing budgetary deficits with 
exchange rate adjustments and changes in relative prices because EMU requires a 
single nominal interest rate in the EU. Because modifications in relative prices cannot 
be absorbed by differences in real interest rates, budgetary deficits imply changes in 
absolute prices and in quantities (the adaptation of which would be much more harmful 
to the economy if prices are rigid) and higher real interest rates for the whole Union.7 
Since budgetary policy does not provide the same functions as exchange rate 
adjustments (that is, immediate modification of relative prices, perfect flexibility of the 
price of financial assets), it is widely agreed that more budgetary co-ordination is 
required to encourage discipline in Member States, since the cost of budgetary deficits 
on interest rates is shared between all the Member States of the Union. This idea is 
basic to the Delors Report.
Fourth, the choice of national regulatory instruments is influenced by the decisions on 
subsidiarity. This principle, discussed in the Werner Plan in 1970, in the MacDougall 
Report (1977) and in the Padoa-Schioppa Report (1987), recognises the preference
7 Wyplosz, Charles (1990), "Les implications budgetaires de l'union monetaire", Observations et 
Diagnostics Economiques, Revue de I'OFCE, 33 (Oct.): 155-172.
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given to the most decentralised level of decision-making compatible with externalities. 
The principle of subsidiarity has two main implications for budgeting. First, taxing and 
spending matters remain largely for national states, which also have corresponding 
responsibility for the soundness of their public finances.8 Second, an incidental result 
of subsidiarity is the separation of powers between the controllers of the money in 
circulation (the central banks) and the spenders (politicians).9
8.5.2. The impact o f national budgetary policies
With EMU European economies will be increasingly connected financially and 
monetarily. This interdependence affects the impact of national budgetary policies. 
First, national budgetary and fiscal policies will be less effective in affecting domestic 
demand or supply because of the openness of the European economies. National fiscal 
policies are likely to lose much of their control over national output and employment. 
“Greater openness implies greater spill-overs of aggregate demand between the 
economies and, hence, reduces government spending multipliers.”10 Public choice 
theory suggests that policy-makers will seek to regain their leverage and restore the 
effectiveness of their policy instruments by co-ordinating their policy and centralising 
fiscal policy at EU level.
8 Hagen, Jurgen von and Harden, Ian (1994), National budget process and fiscal performance, 
working paper.
9 Cowie, Hariy (ed.) (1992), Federal Trust conference report - Towards fiscal federalism? Delors II 
budgetary proposals 1993-1997 (London: Federal Trust for Education & Research).
10 Welfens, Paul (ed.) (1991), European monetary integration - EMS developments and international 
post-Maastricht perspectives (Berlin: Springer-Verlag): 292.
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Second, as a corollary of the preceding point budgetary policies implemented in one 
country will have direct repercussions on others. Fiscal externalities may produce 
distorting effects if Member States undertake divergent budgetary policies 
simultaneously. Such distortions were caused by the failure of the French expansionary 
budgetary policy in 1982 when the rest of the EC had adopted stringent policies. The 
French case illustrates how national budgetary policy can be ineffective in an open 
European environment without co-ordinated budgetary policies from other Member 
States.
Third, because the openness of the economies makes it difficult to assess national
performance, financial markets may misprice the level of risk tied to national
government debts, creating periods of unconstrained fiscal laxity.11 Therefore, binding
rules are justified if capital markets in the EU cannot adequately price individual risk
differentials to offset the incentive for higher deficits by larger premia. The Delors
report (art.30) argues that
“to some extent the market forces can exert a disciplinary influence ... [but] 
market perceptions do not necessarily provide strong and compelling signals 
and that access to large capital market may for some time even facilitate the 
financing of economic imbalances ... The constraints imposed by market forces 
might either be too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive.”
Fourth, national budgetary and fiscal policies will in aggregate almost entirely 
determine the total European budgetary and fiscal position. The combination of a 
small European budget with fairly independent national budgets makes global fiscal
11 Driffil, John and Beber, Massimo (eds) (1991), A currency for Europe, the currency as an element 
o f division or Union ofEurope (London: Lothian Foundation Press).
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policy in EMU the incidental outcome of national decisions.12 This fact reinforces the 
need for co-ordinated fiscal policy since it is still unclear, first, whether the single 
market will increase wage and price flexibility; second, whether shocks in the EU will 
be symmetric or not, transitory or permanent, and what is the time lag for the 
adjustment to transitional shocks;13 last, whether the EU budget is large and efficient 
enough to act as an automatic stabiliser and to absorb asymmetric regional shocks in a 
roughly budget-neutral fashion for the whole union. Fiscal externalities and the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks require some policy co-ordination or centralisation to 
organise fiscal redistribution in Europe; but there is no consensus on the way to set it 
up.
The first possibility entails the centralisation of public spending at the European level. 
The MacDougall report supports this approach and argues that EMU is infeasible until 
the European budget reaches 5 to 7% of European GDP. Since the EU budget is 
financed by all Member States as a proportion of their wealth but not spent according 
to the share of their contribution, inter-regional income redistribution is achieved by the 
European budget procedure (namely, spending on areas of weak economic 
performance).14 The efficiency of a centralised spending system involving automatic 
inter-regional transfers has been obvious to American observers such as Eichengreen, 
Sachs and Sala-I-Martin.15 To some extent the Commission is moving in this direction
12Wolfson in Fair, Donald and Boissieu, Christian de (eds) (1992), Fiscal policy, taxation and the 
financial system in an increasingly integrated Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic).
13 Cohen in Wyplosz, Charles (1990), "Les implications budgetaires de l'union monetaire", 
Observations et Diagnostics Economiques, Revue de I'OFCE, 33 (Oct.): 155-172.
14 Welfens, Paul (ed.) (1991), European monetary integration - EMS developments and international 
post-Maastricht perspectives (Berlin: Springer-Verlag).
15 Eichengreen, Barry (1992), “Should the Maastricht Treaty be saved?”, Princeton Studies in 
International Finance, 74 (Dec.) (Princeton: Princeton University).
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with its call for a specific financial support scheme and the Delors II package. 
However, the European budget has none of the instruments of economic regulation. It 
is a marginal source of spending in the EU (1.2% of the European GDP in 1994-95); it 
has no borrowing rights and is therefore not entitled to run a deficit; and its decision 
mechanism prevents it from acting rapidly on aggregate demand. The EU budget is 
currently mostly allocative and increasingly redistributive but does not perform any 
stabilisation functions.16 More importantly, centralisation of spending would require a 
higher degree of political unification than Member States are currently prepared to 
commit to. This statement is the conclusion of Lamfalussy (1989) who admits the 
advantages of budgetary federalism but considers this option not to be feasible 
politically. He recommends close policy co-ordination as an acceptable compromise 
solution. Therefore, the lack of political commitment to fiscal federalism explains the 
conservative approach adopted by the EU to budgeting and the extensive formal 
freedom left to Member States on national public spending.
Alternatively, fiscal redistribution to stabilise transitory regional shocks may be set up 
on the revenue side of budgeting with no public spending centralisation. Tax-based 
income redistribution would occur through automatic transfers among regions. These 
transfers would be subject to political discretion and would leave the spending and 
taxing power to national administrations. The theory of fiscal federalism suggests that 
national governments would better recognise the national priorities and that fiscal
16 Gretschmann, Klaus (ed.) (1992), Economic and Monetary Union - Implications for national 
policy-makers (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhofi).
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income redistribution favours competition among tax authorities.17 Fiscal regulation 
lies in the logic of the Delors Report (§30) where it is noted that “the centrally 
managed community budget is likely to remain a very small part of total public sector 
spending.”18 It is supported by the US case of a monetary union working without 
significant mechanisms to balance regional shocks.19
Inter-regional income redistribution could also be left to the market which provides 
several mechanisms for economic regulation. First, inter-regional labour migration 
could regulate the economy by reallocating factors and modifying the structure of 
demand. However, the efficiency of this type of regulation depends on the flexibility of 
the labour market which is currently low because of language and cultural barriers. 
Second, domestic wage and price adjustment is not particularly credible because of the 
low flexibility of real wages in the EU, especially their lack of elasticity towards a 
decrease. Wages are not usually quickly responsive to monetary and exchange rate 
policies since changes in the value of money are thereafter offset by equivalent 
increases, leaving real wages unchanged.20 Third, inter-regional flows of private and 
public capital are a countervailing force against lack of fiscal discipline. Public debt 
holders will ask for a premium in response to any undisciplined budgetary policy, 
therefore increasing the cost of issuing debt. According to the Padoa-Schioppa Report 
(1988), the high mobility of capital, enhanced by the liberalisation of financial markets,
17 Welfens, Paul (ed.) (1991), European monetary integration - EMS developments and international 
post-Maastricht perspectives (Berlin: Springer-Verlag).
18 Driffil, John and Beber, Massimo (eds) (1991), A currency for Europe, the currency as an element 
o f division or Union o f Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press).
19 Hagen in Fair, Donald and Boissieu, Christian de (eds) (1992), Fiscal policy, taxation and the 
financial system in an increasingly integrated Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic).
20 Eichengreen, Barry (1992), “Should the Maastricht Treaty be saved?”, Princeton Studies in 
International Finance, 74 (Dec.) (Princeton: Princeton University).
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puts a sufficient constraint on central governments to establish budgetary discipline 
without any further need for fiscal redistribution.21 However, the efficiency of financial 
markets depends on their ability to assess and price risk correctly. Furthermore, 
market mechanisms may not be conducive to fiscal discipline since the cost of financing 
public debt is supported by all members of a monetary union. Therefore, the 
Community has called for more formal restraints with the explicit contention contained 
in the Delors report that capital markets are not efficient in this respect.
8.6. Conclusion
The thesis, by exploring budgeting comparatively and by uncovering material not 
previously presented (interviews and official documents), has revealed a variety of 
ways in which membership of the European Union influences budgeting in Member 
States and has demonstrated that national budgeting is involved in Europeanisation, 
defined as the process of adaptation of national bureaucratic mechanisms to the 
consequences of EU membership. While assessing budgetary Europeanisation, the 
thesis describes the extent to which national budgetary mechanisms are exposed to the 
process of adaptation to the EU at central and department’ levels.
First, the thesis quantifies the impact of EU membership on national budgetary 
processes and demonstrates that membership of the EU is an important variable for the 
determination of national policy-making. It shows that budgetary Europeanisation
21 Fourgans, Andre (1991), "L'union monetaire de 1'Europe: fondements theoriques, problemes et 
propositions", Revue d’Economie Politique, 1 (Jan.-Feb.).
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processes are greater and different in nature from what could be presumed from an 
examination of the existing literature. Budgetary Europeanisation is a wide-ranging 
adaptation process affecting budgetary processes at the overall and at department 
levels in proportions that are not always related to the amount of finance involved. 
The thesis develops a new concept to explain the adaptation of national budgetary 
processes to EU budgeting. Hybridisation describes the growing interlocking between 
national and EU processes and represents a major contribution to the study of 
budgeting. Hybridisation argues that national and EU budgetary processes are 
entangled because budgetary decision-making is simultaneously made at the national 
and the EU levels with actors and institutions operating across boundaries. Therefore, 
hybridisation substantiates the hypothesis that the national level is an inappropriate 
context in which to study budgeting since EU factors must be introduced to explain 
budgetary decisions in a nation-state.
However, the thesis shows the limits of Europeanisation. Finance Ministries in Britain 
and France have tools to encourage or to reduce the impact of EU budgeting on 
departments’ budgetary choices. At the same time, the thesis argues that through their 
participation in EU decision-making processes, national governments retain a large 
margin for national discretion in policy and policy-making because they succeed largely 
in ‘nationalising’ decisions at European Union level. ‘Nationalising’ here means that, 
since EU policy is determined by taking national policy priorities into account, EU 
policy is dependent on national governments and becomes an instrument for the 
achievement of national policy goals.
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Second, the thesis determines three major characteristics of budgetary Europeanisation. 
First, budgetary Europeanisation shapes spending more than taxing. The thesis argues 
that the traditional approach over-emphasises the potential for a strong EU influence 
on taxation and on macroeconomic aggregates, while overlooking effects on spending. 
The thesis demonstrates that national governments remain largely sovereign on 
taxation and that formal constraints on macroeconomic aggregates are often 
ineffective. The thesis reveals the ways EU budgeting affects public spending at the 
macroeconomic and at departments’ levels.
Second, budgetary Europeanisation affects the institutions more than figures, and the 
process of policy-making more than the substance of policies. The thesis highlights a 
paradox: the impact of EU membership on the adaptation of budgetary processes and 
methods did not often cause a change in policies. This argument suggests that national 
governments succeed in ‘nationalising’ EU policy through their participation in the EU 
decision-making. Therefore, budgetary Europeanisation involves a change in the locus 
of decision-making rather than in the actors in the process.
Finally, the Europeanisation of public budgeting affects practices and methods more 
than rules, which shows that Europeanisation processes are often informal and bottom- 
up. The thesis dismisses the compliance approach because the focus on formal rules is 
too narrow to capture the whole of Europeanisation. However, with hybridisation it 
underlines the role of actors in charge of reconciling budgeting at the national and at 
EU level. Therefore, the thesis substantiates the second hypothesis since it shows the 
adaptation of budgetary processes to EU membership depends on the frequency and 
intensity of interactions between national and European actors during policy-making.
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Third, the thesis gives an appreciation of the adaptation of budgeting to EU pressures 
from a qualitative perspective and assesses the improvements and the problems this 
adaptation process involves. The thesis shows the impact of Europeanisation on 
complexity, but at the same time emphasises that coordination contributed to better 
known and more consistent policies at both levels. The thesis underlines the impact of 
accounting methods (Euro-PES) on the greater consistency of budgetary policies in 
Britain than in France.
Fourth, the thesis identifies five sources of pressure on national budgeting: 
competition, substitution, regulation, lobbying and demand by Member States. It 
demonstrates that EU pressures emanate from different -  sometimes competing -  
sources and may be formal or informal. In particular, lobbying is sometimes a source 
of distortions between budgeting at the national and the EU level. The thesis 
demonstrates that budgeting at the European Union level does not necessarily imply a 
‘hollowing’ and a loss of power of the nation-state. Through their participation in EU 
decision-making, national governments succeed largely in influencing European Union 
pressures on national budgeting to protect national budgetary priorities.
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Appendix 1.1. 
Methodological annexe
The thesis is based on three main sources: data analysis, an assessment of the literature 
on administrative systems, and elite interviewing.
A. The problems of data analysis
With macroeconomic budgetary aggregates such as the tax pressure (ratio of taxes to 
GDP), the size of the public sector, the budgetary deficit and the public debt, it is 
difficult to show the influence of EU membership for two reasons. First, there is a 
problem of determining the variables of Europeanisation. With the budgetary deficit 
and the public debt it is possible to argue that a Europeanisation effect is revealed in 
the convergence of budgetary outcomes towards the standards defined at the EU level. 
In this case, the Europeanisation of budgeting is shown by the convergence of some 
macroeconomic budgetary aggregates. Analysis of British and French deficits and debt 
data does not illustrate such a convergence trend and supports the view that there is 
little influence of the EU on public budgeting.
With the other macroeconomic budgetary aggregates there is a problem in determining 
the variables which could indicate Europeanisation trends. On a large number of 
aggregates (e.g. the size of the public sector, tax pressure, government consumption, 
the size of transfers and the main sources of revenue) there is no ‘EU standard’ with 
which to compare national figures. For instance, there is no indication of what a
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‘European’ tax pressure is or should be. Therefore, it is possible to compare the 
British with the French budgetary aggregates, but there is a lack of variables to indicate 
whether the British and the French budgets are becoming Europeanised.
Second, it is difficult, for methodological reasons, to establish a link of causality 
between changes in budgetary figures and European influences. Proving the 
convergence of macroeconomic budgetary aggregates is not sufficient to prove that 
these aggregates converge because of EU membership, because of the possible 
influence of globalisation for instance. Also, the Europeanisation of budgeting does 
not necessarily require that budgetary aggregates converge. It is arguable that 
Europeanisation trends may induce different tax and spending behaviours in different 
Member States. Therefore, budgetary Europeanisation is distinct from the 
convergence of budgetary outcomes. For these reasons methodological problems 
inhibit the use of much data analysis in the thesis.
B. An assessment of the literature
There is a dual gap in the literature on budgetary Europeanisation. First, there is little 
material on the subject at all. The bibliography shows that budgetary Europeanisation 
has never been the subject of a book; most studies have been chapters. Most of the 
budgetary literature reviews EU variables in a few pages and consequently presents 
two biases: a normative bias, with authors focusing on what should be changed in 
public budgeting because of EU membership; and a compliance bias, with scholars 
emphasising EU obligations for public budgeting. The thesis identifies this gap in the
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literature and aims to fill it. This lack within the literature increased the need to rely on 
official sources and primary sources such as interviews.
Second, existing works on budgetary Europeanisation are not exempt from criticisms. 
Recent investigations have relied on a traditional approach of public budgeting (Heclo 
and Wildavsky, 1974) which is outdated since it predates EU integration. This 
literature is characterised by its ‘nationalist’ focus since budgeting is described as a 
process internal to national governments. The traditional description of public 
budgeting excludes non-national variables and does not explain how budgetary 
methods and processes are affected by EU integration. In addition, contemporary 
literature on EU integration processes plays down or ignores the effect of the EU on 
public budgeting. Public budgeting is not often taken as a case for the study of 
administrative convergence in the EU. When discussed, the impact of EU membership 
on budgeting is approached with a narrow focus, e.g. the cost of financing the EU 
budget, the scope for independent fiscal policy1 and the sanctions from the EU.2 Two 
authors3 have introduced EU integration criteria for assessing national budgetary 
institutions in EU member states but their normative approach lacks empirical support 
and omits changes in methods and practices.
1 CEPII-OFCE (1990), "Vers une fiscalite europeenne?", Observations et Diagnostics Economiques, 
Revue de VOFCE, 31 (Apr.), 121-189; Cahiers Frangais (1993), “Le budget de l’Etat”, Cahiers 
Frangais, 261 (May-June) (Paris: La Documentation Frangaise); Berlin, Dominique (1989), 
"L'elimination des frontieres fiscales dans la CEE", Droit et Pratique du Commerce International, 15: 
35-74.
2 Fair, Donald and Boissieu, Christian de (eds) (1992), Fiscal policy, taxation and the financial 
system in an increasingly integrated Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic).
3 Hagen, Jurgen von (1992), "Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the European 
Communities", in Commission of the European Communities, Economic Papers, 96 (Oct.); 
Wildavsky, Aaron and Zapico-Goni, Eduardo (eds) (1993), National budgeting for Economic and 
Monetary Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff).
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C. Elite interviewing: definition of the sample and problems encountered
Elite interviewing was conducted from November 1994 to April 1995. It was based on 
open-questions to allow civil servants to use their own terms and not to orient their 
answers or their vision of Europeanisation. Interviews lasted for at least one hour. 
They were recorded, then transcribed thoroughly so that any information or argument 
may be quoted or noted accurately.
3.1. The representation o f departments and countries: institutional classification
Chapters 5 to 7 focus on intermediate level decisions, on departmental programmes 
and on power-dependence relationships between actors, since they study budgetary 
Europeanisation from the departmental perspective. They investigate the influence of 
EU membership on budgeting in three spending ministries (Agriculture, Transport and 
Health). These three departments were selected because they offer representative 
cases of Europeanisation. The EU has influenced policy in their jurisdictions to varying 
extents and with varying time lags. We hypothesise budgetary Europeanisation is 
proportional to the degree of policy integration in a sector. The more integrated a 
sector, the more constrained are national budget actors and the more budgetary 
decisions are influenced by the EU. This hypothesis implies that Agriculture should be 
the department in which the influence of the EU is the greatest and Health the 
department where EU influence is the most marginal, with Transport lying in-between 
the two.
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Table A. The representation o f institutions: classification per country, department 
and bureau
Treasury Agriculture Transport Health CO/SGCI*
UK dom. 3 9 8 3 -
UK Europe 2 2 2 1 2
Fr dom. 8 1 2 2 -
Fr Europe 3 3 2 2 4
Total 16 15 14 8 6
* the Cabinet Office and its French counterpart, the Secretariat General du Comite Interministeriel.
* Classification per department
A total of 59 British and French civil servants were interviewed. The Ministries of 
Agriculture and the Departments of Transport are equally represented within the 
sample (154 and 14 interviews respectively). The lower number of interviews at the 
Departments of Health (8) reflects the fact that they are smaller departments within 
national administrations and that European bureaux within the Departments are recent.
In addition to these three departments, 16 interviews were conducted within the British 
and the French Finance Ministries (HM Treasury, Customs and Excise, Board of Inland 
Revenue, Direction du Budget and Direction Generate des Impots). Interviews with 
Finance Ministry officials had two aims. First, meetings with heads of sectors (e.g. 
Head of Agriculture) complemented the discussions with departmental actors. Second, 
interviews with senior civil servants such as former Directeurs du Budget provided an 
overview on budgetary Europeanisation at the highest administrative level. The last 
type of department was the Cabinet Office (2 interviews) and its French counterpart 
the SGCI (4).
4 including one interview at the Intervention Board.
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* Classification per bureau
Inside government departments two types of civil servants were interviewed. Of the 59 
civil servants interviewed, 31 came from a bureau in charge of European affairs, and 22 
represented domestic financial and policy interests (6 non-allocated). It was important 
to gather information from representatives of both bureaux since they reflected 
complementary and sometimes contradictory rationales and strategies.
* Country representation
Finally, with a comparative study it was important to allow for an equal representation 
of British and French civil servants. Of 59 interviews, 32 took place with British civil 
servants and 27 with French ones.
3.2. The representation o f the three sectors within the sample
The classification per department is not perfectly appropriate to account for the 
representation of country representatives of each sector (Agriculture, Transport and 
Health). For instance, Table A gives the impression that French opinions were under­
represented on Agriculture (4 interviews as against 11 in Britain) and Transport (4 as 
against 10 in Britain). Table B corrects this impression by classifying interviewees not 
by department but by sector.
Table B. Classi fication per sector
Agriculture Transport Health
United Kingdom* 14 10 5
France* 12 6 6
Total* 26 16 11
* Six civil servants (3 British and 3 French) out of the 59 civil servants met are not counted in Table 
B since their position is not linked to one particular sector (e.g. taxation and budgetary procedure).
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Table B shows that the country representation for each sector is much more even than 
suggested in Table A, e.g. 14 interviews with officials dealing on Agriculture in Britain 
as against 12 in France (10 and 6 respectively on Transport). The reason for such a 
great difference within the results of both tables lies in the apparent over-representation 
of French Finance Ministry officials. Most of these civil servants are in fact in charge 
of sectors. The approach by sector is more valid than the classification per department 
because it cancels country differences of administrative organisation.
3.3. Functional classification and the representation o f various groups within the 
budgetary process
Table C. Elite interviewing functional classification
Domestic Domestic Relations with
Finance Sector Europe
United Kingdom* 6 15 8
- Agriculture 3 7 4
- Transport 2 6 2
- Health 1 2 2
France* 5 4 13
- Agriculture 3 1 8
- Transport 1 2 3
- Health 1 2 3
Total* 11 20 22
* Six civil servants (3 British and 3 French) out of the 59 civil servants met are not counted in Table 
C since their position is not linked to one particular sector (e.g. taxation and budgetary procedure).
The functional classification aims at sharpening what was said about the classification 
by bureaux. The sample of civil servants may be classified into three groups depending 
on their function in the budgetary process. Of the 53 officials fitting in the functional 
classification, 22 are responsible for relations with the EU for their sector. They form a 
substantial part of the sample because their function is important within budgetary
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Europeanisation. These officials are in charge of representing national priorities at the 
EU level, informing national actors of the opportunities and problems because of EU 
negotiations, and reconciling domestic and EU positions. The same proportion of 
officials interviewed were in charge of domestic sectoral policy. They represent 
national policy interests and are involved in budgetary negotiations. It was important 
to know how Europeanisation trends affected this policy-making. Finally, 11 civil 
servants were finance specialists for a sector and their contact was useful to understand 
the financial challenges implied by budgetary Europeanisation.
3.4. The problems encountered
Two main methodological problems were encountered with elite interviewing. First, 
there is the problem of meeting the counterpart of each civil servant interviewed in a 
country. The need to find ‘matching positions’ was a constant priority when selecting 
the sample. However, there are ‘hard cases’, e.g. it was impossible to meet a former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to balance the interviews with two former Directeurs du 
Budget. Also, the British and the French bureaucracies are organised in different 
patterns and with different definitions of roles. It is sometimes impossible to find the 
opposite numbers of French officials because they simply do not exist in the UK, and 
vice versa. For instance, the functions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer are not that 
of a Directeur du Budget. Similarly, institutions are not always similar although they 
might look so. For instance, the Cabinet Office does not have the same functions as 
the SGCI and the DGS as the DOH.
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Second, the reliance on elite interviewing creates a problem of data protection which is 
greater in a thesis where sources need to be quoted. The recording of about 90% of 
the interviews allowed accurate quotations in English and French (any mistakes in the 
translation of the French quotations are my own).5 The list of all civil servants 
interviewed is in Appendix 1.2.
5 About 10% of the civil servants interviewed did not want the conversation to be recorded.
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Appendix 1.2.
List of interviews
Name Position
Jean-Marc
Andrieu
Rene Barlet
European and International Affairs Division 
Ministere de 1’Agriculture
Head of European Community Division 
Ministere de FEquipement, des Transports 
et du Tourisme
Marc Berthiaume Head of Social Sector
Secretariat General du Comite 
Interministeriel pour les Questions de 
Cooperation Economique Europeenne
Mariane Berthod- Director
Wurmser Mission Interministerielle de Recherche 
Experimentation
Ministere des Affaires Sociales, de la Sante 
et de la Ville
Robert Bishop
Daniel Bouton
Michael Brown
J. M. Brownlee
Christine Buhl
Head of International Shipping Policy 
Division A
Department of Transport
Former Directeur du Budget
Former Head of European Community
Bureau
Direction du Budget
Head of International Relations Unit 
Department of Health
Head of Finance Division 
Department of Health
Head of European Affairs (Bureau 7-B) 
Septieme Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
Date
6 March 1995
30 January 1995
27 April 1995 
3 February 1995
27 March 1995
31 January 1995
10 January 1995 
8 February 1995 
8 March 1995
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A. Burchell
Marie-France
Cazalere
Philip Chorley
Jean Choussat
David Cooke
Neil Cumberlidge
Trevor Denham
Mike Diwer
Julien Dubertret
Mike Dudding
Andrew Eldridge
Andre Ernst
Simon Evans
Head of Railway Economics Division 
Railways 1 Directorate 
Department of Transport
Head of Agriculture 
Secretariat General du Comite 
Interministeriel pour les Questions de 
Cooperation Economique Europeenne
Desk Officer in charge of Education, 
Culture and Health 
European Secretariat 
Cabinet Office
Former Directeur du Budget 
Direction du Budget
Head of Division HI 
International Aviation Directorate 
Department of Transport
Head of Farm Woodlands Branch 
Land Use and Tenure Division 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Market Task Force Division
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Sheep and Livestock Subsidies 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Budgetary Synthesis (Bureau 1-A) 
Premiere Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
Chief Scientist’s Unit 
Department of Transport
Head of Branch A 
Countryside Division
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Head of European Affairs 
Bureau de la Communication et des 
Relations Europeennes et Internationales 
Direction Generate de la Sante
Highways Policy and Programmes 
Department of Transport
17 March 1995 
27 April 1995
17 February 1995
8 March 1995 
23 March 1995
15 February 1995
9 February 1995 
14 February 1995
18 April 1995
8 December 1994 
13 January 1995
23 November 1994 
17 March 1995
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Alain Fayard
Laurent Garnier
Marie-CIaire
Grima
Jerome Grivet
Jean-Pierre
Guillon
Lindsay Harris
Michael Harrison
Ivan Hockley
Nicholas Dett
Graham Jenkins
Franpoise Lalanne
Patrice de 
Laurens de 
Lacenne
Head of European Affairs 
Direction des Routes
Ministere de l’Equipement, des Transports 
et du Tourisme
Head of Health (Bureau 6-B)
Sixieme Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
Head of Transport and Regional Policy 
Sector
Secretariat General du Comite 
Interministeriel pour les Questions de 
Cooperation Economique Europeenne
Head of European Economics and Finance 
Secretariat General du Comite 
Interministeriel pour les Questions de 
Cooperation Economique Europeenne
Head of Agriculture (Bureau 7-A)
Septieme Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
Head of Agri-Environment Protection 
Branch
Environmental Protection Division 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Environment Task Force Division 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Local Transport Policy Division 
Department of Transport
Head of European Community Division II 
HM Treasury
Finance Director 
Intervention Board
Head of European Affairs 
Ministere de 1’Agriculture
Head of European and International Affairs 
Ministere de l’Agriculture
19 April 1995
8 March 1995 
21 April 1995
10 March 1995
1 February 1995 
15 February 1995
15 February 1995 
8 December 1994
11 January 1995 
14 March 1995 
6 March 1995
6 March 1995
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Andrew Lebrecht Head of European Community Division I 9 January 1995
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Anne Lebrun 
Roger Lejuez
George Lloyd 
Louise Maderson 
Bernard Merkel
Franck Mordacq
Francois Moutot 
Peter Nash 
David North
Jean-Claude
Paille
Stephen Reeves 
Jean-Louis Rohou
International Relations Division 
Ministere des Affaires Sociales, de la Sante 
et de la Ville
Director, Mission Europe Equipement 
Direction des Affaires Economiques et 
Internationales
Ministere de l’Equipement, des Transports 
et du Tourisme
Private Secretary 
Board of Inland Revenue
AIDS Unit 
Department of Health
Department of Health
Formerly seconded to the Commission of
the European Communities on AIDS
Head of Transports (Bureau 4-B) 
Quatrieme Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
Head of Bureau 2B1 
Direction Generate des Impots
Head of Finance Division
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Desk Officer in charge of Agriculture 
European Secretariat 
Cabinet Office
Financing of the Agriculture 
Ministere de 1’Agriculture
Head of Finance Transport Programme 
Department of Transport
Deputy Sous-Directeur 
Sous-Direction des Chemins de Fer 
Ministere de 1’Equipement, des Transports 
et du Tourisme
24 April 1995 
9 March 1995
27 March 1995 
13 February 1995 
29 November 1994
8 March 1995
18 April 1995
19 December 1994
6 February 1995
7 March 1995
8 December 1994
9 March 1995
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David Rossington 
E. Routledge
Philippe Sauvage
Alan Sharpies
Pierre Soccoja
Claire Spink
Handley M. G. 
Stevens
Tim Sutton
Claude Trupin
Jean-Eric Vimont 
Ian Walton
C.M. Woodman
Head of Beef Division
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Head of Branch C
European Community Division I
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
European Affairs (Bureau 7-B)
Septieme Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
Assistant Secretary 
Fiscal Policy Division 
HM Treasury
AIDS Division
Direction Generate de la Sante
European Division II 
Department of Transport
Former Director
Public Transport London Directorate 
Department of Transport
Head of Agriculture 
HM Treasury
Chargee de Mission aupres du Sous- 
Directeur
Conseiller Referendaire a la Cour des 
Comptes
Premiere Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
European Affairs (Bureau 7-B)
Septieme Sous-Direction 
Direction du Budget
Head of International Policy and Liaison 
Branch
Strategy and International Division 
Customs Directorate, Customs and Excise
Head of Division 
Highways Policy Division 
Department of Transport
14 February 1995 
9 January 1995
29 December 1994
7 February 1995
7 March 1995
8 December 1994 
17 November 1994
1 March 1995 
1 February 1995
29 December 1994 
28 February 1995
17 March 1995
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Appendix 2.1
A comparison of British and French tax structures 
The evidence from data
The aim of this section is to offer empirical evidence to support the propositions in 
chapter 2. Appendix 2.1. presents and analyses selected British and French budgetary 
data from 1970 to 1992. All figures are based on Eurostat data unless otherwise 
specified.
Figure A. Tax burden in the United Kingdom and France (the ratio of total taxes 
and social security contributions to GDP)
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Tax burden is defined as the ratio o f taxes (direct and indirect) and social security 
contributions to Gross Domestic Product. It reflects the amount of resources drawn 
from national wealth and transferred from private agents to the government for 
reallocation. Tax burden indicates the state’s ‘weight’ on the private economy, since 
public administration activities add little to national output.
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In comparison with other Member States, the tax burden in the United Kingdom is one 
of the lowest (constantly under 37%) while France maintains its tradition of 
interventionism with the second highest tax burden (exceeding 40% since 1981). 
However, the main feature of British and French tax burdens is continuous stabilisation 
since the mid-1980s despite recurrent economic crises. Stabilisation since 1985 in 
France represents a major reversal within the context of continuous increasing tax 
levels which prevailed since 1971.
Figure B. Main sources of revenue of British and French budgets (1990) 
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m Direct taxes on income
Social Security
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□
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□
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K
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The respective proceeds from direct taxes on income and social security contributions 
differ greatly in the United Kingdom and France. The share of these sources of income 
is approximately inverted in France (respectively 14% and 44%) and the United 
Kingdom (40% and 18%). The share of personal income tax is particularly small in 
France (5.7% GDP) when the EU average is 11.2% and OECD is 12%. In addition, 
the share of social security contributions increased more rapidly in France than in the 
United Kingdom. Therefore, differences in the share of receipts financed by social 
security contributions tend to increase.1 By comparison with the United Kingdom 
France relies less on income taxation and more on social transfers and taxes on labour. 
The UK favours taxes on profits, wealth and incomes. The contrast between direct 
taxes and social security contributions mainly reflects differences in the financing of the 
social security system.
Figure C. Budget receipts derived from direct taxes
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1 17 points in 1963, 20 points in 1970, 24 points in 1980 and 26 points in 1990.
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Figure D. Budget receipts derived from consumption taxes
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Until 1976 the relative share of receipts derived from consumption taxes declined in the 
United Kingdom and France. A breakdown occurred following the shift from direct to 
indirect taxation in the 1978-79 Budget in the UK, which stands in contrast to the 
world-wide trend of reducing consumption taxes. As a result the share of indirect 
taxes decreased by 15 points in France from 45% (1963) to 30% (1990). In the 
meantime the UK, during the second period, nearly offset the decrease obtained 
between 1963 and 1976, and was therefore very close in 1988 to the level of 1963.
The structure of indirect taxation evolved substantially during this period as a result of 
the broadening of the VAT base, the rationalisation of the VAT structure and changes 
in the mix of consumption taxes. In the UK consumption switched increasingly from 
taxes on commodities (excise duties), which distort consumption patterns, to broad- 
based consumption taxes.
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Figure E. Budget receipts derived from social security contributions
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Figure F. Budget receipts derived from capital taxes
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Figure G. Income tax progressiveness: average net taxes per decile (1987)
United Kingdom □  France
20  - -
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Source: OECD (1990) "The personal income tax base" in OECD Studies in Taxation (Paris)
Because of its narrow tax base, its tax rate structure and various allowances such as the 
family quotient, France is the OECD country where the average income tax is the 
lowest and where progressiveness is far less than in other European countries. The UK 
income tax system seems much more developed but the average tax rate occupies a 
middle position among OECD countries. While the average tax rate for the first two 
deciles is similar in the UK and France, the attribution of the tax burden among social 
classes is very different: French tax rules favour low and middle-income taxpayers, 
while the upper and middle classes contribute to a very large extent to the financing of 
the UK budget. For instance, the average tax rate for the fourth decile is 10.62% in the 
UK as opposed to 1.65% in France. Only for very high incomes subject to the 56.8% 
tax rate (i.e. the 1% highest income earners) is the French personal income tax system 
progressive.
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The following conclusions can be made:
(a) The French tax system is far less progressive than the English. Income tax, is 
comparatively less developed than in the UK, because of the narrowness of the tax base 
and the low average tax rate. Second, the French indirect taxation system is slightly 
regressive, while the British system is slightly progressive because of the extensive use 
of zero-rating and VAT exemption in the UK. Third, the French tax system relies 
heavily on social security contributions, which are proportional to income and 
regressive for very high incomes. Regressiveness o f the British social security 
contributions has less impact on the progressiveness of the whole system of taxation 
since their share in the financing of the budget is small.
Figure H. The progressiveness of the British and the French tax systems (1990) 
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(b) The French tax system is characterised by a redistribution of income to the middle 
class to the detriment of low income (because of the impact of social security 
contributions and VAT) and very high income earners (because of the maximum tax 
rate). The English tax system favours income redistribution from the middle class to the 
poorest two deciles of the population. The income tax and the VAT system seem to 
ensure a high degree of equity for modest income earners.
(c) It is difficult to estimate the overall efficiency of the British and French tax systems. 
If we define efficiency from the perspective of the tax collector, i.e. as the ability of 
taxes to raise revenue, we can argue first that British income tax is much more efficient 
than the French, which is extremely complicated, with numerous deductions, 
exemptions and tax brackets. The complexity of the French IRPP is not at all a 
guarantee of its equity, and simpler methods could create similar results. Second, the 
French VAT system is a good revenue raiser and the system is well perceived. Third, 
the social security contributions used to be good income raisers in France but are 
increasingly criticised.
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Appendix 2.2
VAT rates applicable in EC members as at 1st April 1987
Member States Reduced rates Standard rates Increased rates
Belgium (1) 1 -5 17-19 25 - 25+8
Denmark (1) - 22 -
France (2) 2.1 - 4 -5 .5  -7 18.6 33.3
Germany 7 14 -
Greece 6 18 36
Ireland (l) (3) 2.4 - 10 25 -
Italy (1) 2 - 9 18 38
Luxembourg 3 - 6 12 -
Netherlands 6 20 -
Portugal (1) 8 16 30
Spain 6 12 33
UK(1) - 15 -
(1) Countries applying a zero rate on some operations
(2) For cars: 28%
(3) Standard rates from 1st March 1990: 23%
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1987)
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Appendix 2.3
VAT rates applicable in EC members as at 1st October 1992
Member States Reduced rates Standard rates Increased rates
Belgium (1) 1 -6 17-19 25 -33
Denmark (1) - 22 25
France (2) 2.1 - 5.5 18.6 22
Germany (3) 7 14 -
Greece 4 - 8 18 36
Ireland (1) 2 .3-10-12.5 16-21 -
Italy (1) 4 - 9 19 38
Luxembourg
VOi 15 -
Netherlands 6 17.5 -
Portugal (1) 5 16 30
Spain 6 15 28
UK (1) - 17.5 -
(1) Countries applying a zero rate on some operations
(2) Standard rate from August 1995: 20.6%
(3) Standard rate from January 1993: 15%
Source: Dessaux, Pierre-Antoine (1993) “Les implications fiscales de l’Europe Communautaire”, 
Cahiers Frangais, 261 (May-June) (Paris: La Documentation Frangaise): 65.
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Appendix 2.4
Excise duty rates applicable in EC Member States
as of 2nd January 1991
Member States Cigarettes (i) Spirits (2) Petrol (3)
Belgium 4.67 4,504.94 293.88
Denmark 77.06 1,816.16 285.76
France 2.63 1,123.36 401.60
Germany 30.24 1,247.72 293.58
Greece 1.25 187.53 208.24
Ireland 51.53 2,614.16 361.70
Italy 2.4 401.83 556.22
Luxembourg 2.06 900.59 212.35
Netherlands 26.26 1,378.34 341.98
Portugal 2.73 274.64 523.52
Spain 1.15 556.80 333.62
United Kingdom 49.43 2,456.75 275.98
EC average (4) 21.00 1,205.20 340.79
CEC min rate (5) 15.00 1,118.50 287.00
CEC target rate (6) 21.50 1,398.10 445.00
Ecofin (7) 57% sale price 1,118.50 287.00
(1) Specific part only; per 100
(2) Per hi.
(3) Unleaded; per hi.
(4) Unweighted EC average
(5) Commission’s proposal of February 1991, minimum rate
(6) Commission’s proposal of Februaiy 1991, target rate
(7) Ecofin proposal of June 1991; minimum rates
Source: European Commission (1993), “The economics of Community public finance”, European 
Economy Report and Studies, 5: 556.
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Appendix 2.5
Minimum excise duty rates in the 1992 Council Directives
Alcohol and 
alcoholic 
beverages (i)
Member States to apply minimum rates of excise duties by 
1.1.93
- 550 ECU her hi. of pure alcohol with limitations in the 
reduction of existing rates: where the rate applied is less than 
1000 ECU, the rate may not be reduced; where it is more than 
1000 ECU, it may not be less than 1000 ECU
- 45 ECU per hi. on intermediate products
- no minimum on wine
- 0.748 ECU per hi. / degree plato or 1.87 per hi. / degree of 
alcohol of finished product on beer
Tobacco (2) - 5% retail selling price on cigar and cigarillos 
or 7 ECU per 1000 items or kg
- 30% retail selling price on fine-cut smoking tobacco or 20 
ECU per kg
- 20% retail selling price on other smoking tobacco or 15 ECU 
per kg
Cigarettes (3) 57% retail selling price on cigarettes
Mineral oils (4) - 337 per 1000 litres on leaded petrol
- 287 per 1000 litres on unleaded petrol
- 18 per 1000 litres on gas oil
- 18 per 1000 litres on heating gas
- 13 per 1000 kg on heavy fuel oil
- 100 per 1000 kg on liquid petroleum gas and methane
- 245 per 1000 kg on kerosene
Sources:
(1) Council regulation 92/84/EEC on the approximation of rates of excise on alcohol and alcoholic 
beverages, 19 Oct. 1992.
(2) Council regulation 92/80/EEC on the approximation of taxes on manufactures tobacco other than 
cigarettes, 19 Oct. 1992.
(3) Council regulation 92/79/EEC on the approximation of taxes on cigarettes, 19 Oct. 1992.
(4) Council regulation 92/82/EEC on the approximation of the rates of excise duties on mineral oils, 
19 Oct. 1992.
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Appendix 3.1
Relative share of individual Member States 
in the financing of the EU budget (1994)
Portugal 
1,90% 
Netherlands 
6,60%
Luxembourg 
0,30%
Italy 
12 , 10%
Spain
7,40%
Belgium Denmark 
4,40% 2%
France
19,60%
1,50%
Ireland
1%
Germany
33,20%
Source: Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et du Budget (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 
1997 - Relations fmancieres avec I'Union europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) : 16.
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Appendix 3.2
Relative share of individual Member States 
in the financing of the EU budget (1997)
Austria
SpaSl70^  
6,90%
Finland
1,50%
Sweden Belgium Denmark 
2,70% 3,90% 2%
Portugal
1,30%
Netherlands
6 ,10%
Luxembourg |ta|y 
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0,90%
France
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11,40%
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Source: Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et du Budget (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 
1997 - Relations financieres avec I'Union europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale): 16.
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Appendix 3.3.
The growth of the EU budget (1994-1996)
Allocated credits in million ECU
1994
budget
1995
draft
budget
Planned
1995/94
growth
1995
budget
Actual
1995/94
growth
1996
draft
budget
Planned
1996/95
growth
CAP guideline 36,465 36,994 1.5% 36,898 1.2% 40,828 10.65%
Structural 23,176 25,264 9.0% 26,329 13.6% 29,131 10.64%
policies
- Cohesion Funds 1,85 2,152 8.4% 2,260 22.0% 2,552 12.92%
- Structural 
Funds 21,323 23,112 16.1% 24,069 12.9% 26,579 10.43%
Internal policies 4,34 4,286 -1.4% 5,053 16.2% 5,082 0.57%
External policies 4,30 4,363 1.3% 4,874 13.2% 5,104 4.72%
Administration 3,61 3,691 2.0% 3,999 10.5% 4,022 0.58%
Reserves 1,53 1,146 -25.1% 1,146 -26% 1,152 0.52%
Total 73,444 75,744 3.1% 79,846 8.7% 86,020 7.73%
Sources: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1994), Projet de loi de finances pour 1995, 
Relations financieres avec VUnion Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) :11 and Ministere de 
l’Economie et des Finances (1995), Projet de loi de finances pour 1996, Relations financieres avec 
PUnion Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) :13.
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Appendix 3.4.
The Edinburgh Financial Perspectives (1993-1999)
Credits in million ECU at 1992 price levels.
1993* 1994* 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
CAP guideline 35,230 35,095 35,354 37,245 37,922 38,616 39,327
Structural policies 21,277 21,885 24,477 26,026 27,588 29,268 30,945
- Cohesion Funds 1,500 1,750 2,000 2,250 2,500 2,550 2,600
- Structural Funds &
other programmes 19,777 20,135 22,369 23,776 25,088 26,718 28,345
Internal policies 3,940 4,084 4,702 4,914 5,117 5,331 5,534
External policies 3,950 4,000 4,549 4,847 5,134 5,507 5,953
Administration 3,280 3,380 3,738 3,859 3,974 4,033 4,093
Reserves 1,500 1,500 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100
Total 69,177 69,944 72,467 78,692 81,047 83,954 86,952
* European Union before enlargement
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec I ’Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) :11.
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Appendix 4.1
Evolution of Structural Funds payments in France (1989-92)
in million ECU
1989 1990 1991 1992
Guidance spending in France 187.5 361.9 362.9 455.2
Rate-of-retum on Guidance 13.9% 19.8% 19.3% 18.0%
ERDF spending in France 284.2 331.3 323.2 430.0
Rate-of-retum on ERDF 7.2% 7.3% 6.2% 5.8%
ESF spending in France 327.7 442.9 513.5 549.0
Rate-of-retum on ESF 12.2% 13.8% 13.3% 13.7%
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1995), Projet de loi de finances pour 1996, 
Relations financieres avec I'Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale): 32.
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Appendix 5.1.
The Common Agricultural Policy
in million ECU
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* 1997*
Vegetal sector 14,648 17,461 19,171 21,258 21,853 22,983 25,918 26,338
Livestock 9,667 12,143 10,543 11,657 9,804 10,750 12,934 12,478
Other expenditure 754 1,357 1,405 1,676 1,314 764 1,976 1,989
Total Guarantee section 25,069 30,961 31,119 34,591 32,971 34,497 40,828 40,805
Agriculture guideline 30,630 32,511 35,039 36,657 36,465 37,944 40,828 41,805
Difference ** -5,561 -1,550 -3,920 -2,066 -3,494 -3,447 0 -1,000
* Figures of the 1996 budget and the 1997 draft budget, whereas figures for 1990-1995 show actual 
CAP expenditure.
** Difference between total CAP expenditure and authorised CAP guideline.
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1996), Projet de loi de finances pour 1997, 
Relations financieres avec I ’Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale) :18.
339
Appendix 5.2
The Structural Funds: allocation per country and purpose 
(1994-99)
in million ECU at 1994 price levels
Objectives 1 2 3-4 5a (l) 5a (2) 5b Cl (3) Other
Non-Cohesion countries 33,930 5,847 12,106 4,306 78 5,470 5,298
Belgium 730 160 465 170 22 77 178
Denmark 0 56 301 127 135 54 87
Germany 13,640 733 1,942 1,068 66 1,227 1,265
France 2,190 1,765 3,203 1,742 171 2,238 1,231
Italy 14,860 684 1,715 680 119 901 1,505
Luxembourg 0 7 23 40 - 6 6
Netherlands 150 300 1,079 118 41 212 212
United Kingdom 2,360 2,142 3,377 361 150 817 814
Cohesion countries 59,880 1,130 1,843 326 106 664 4,837
Greece 13,980 0 0 0 0 0 990
Ireland 5,620 0 0 0 0 0 374
Portugal 13,980 0 0 0 0 0 1,232
Spain 26,300 1,130 1,843 326 106 664 2,241
Non allocated funds 0 7,942 0 514 82 0 3,332 1,490
Total 93,810 14,919 13,949 5,146 820 6,134 13,467 1,490
Total 1994-99: 149,735
(1) Objectif 5a agriculture
(2) Objectif 5a fisheiy
(3) Community Initiative Programmes
Source: Ministere de l’Economie et des Finances (1995), Projet de loi de finances pour 1996, 
Relations financieres avec I'Union Europeenne (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale): 17-18.
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Appendix 6.1.
European funding for transport projects
Type and description of Fund Possible application / scope Who may apply Value of Fund UK receipts 
1993
Financial
implications
Examples of existing 
schemes
Euronean Regional Develooment
This fund is aimed at stimulating 
economic development in the least 
prosperous regions of the EU.
All modes of transport 
including passenger transport 
initiatives.
ERDF capital or 
revenue grants 
may be approved 
for non-profit 
making bodies in 
the public 
interest.
ECU 2.7 bn 
1987-91
ECU 753 m.. Additionality. East Coast Mainland 
Electrification. 
Bradford City Ring 
Road.
Manchester Docks 
container cranks (?).
European Coal & Steel Community 
Funds (ECSC)
Financial assistance in form of 
grants, loans and guarantees to 
improve economic and social 
conditions in the coal and steel 
producing regions of the EU which 
have suffered particular hardship as 
a result of industrial decline
Projects related to the coal 
and steel industries or at least 
involving the creation of job 
opportunities in defined coal 
and steel areas. However, this 
fund is being wound down.
Private and 
public bodies 
may take 
applications 
direct to the 
Commission or 
indirectly 
through financial 
agents.
Not known. Not known. None. Financed 
by levy from 
coal and steel 
industries.
Eurotunnel has a £200m. 
long term loan facility.
Cohesion Funds
Will supply funds for environment 
and transport infrastructure projects 
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain.
All modes of transport 
infrastructure. Fund should 
contribute to interconnection 
and inter-operability of 
national network and links 
with islands, landlocked and 
peripheral regions.
Though to accept 
both public and 
private ventures.
ECU 1.5 bn in 
1993
None (cohesion 
countries only).
None. Broad schemes in 
Ireland are currently 
receiving funds.
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Type and description of Fund Possible application / scope Who may apply Value of Fund UK receipts 
1993
Financial
implications
Examples of existing 
schemes
Transoort infrastructure oroeramme 
Relatively small fund with limited 
scope. Extended for two years to 
enable establishment of TENs and 
superseded by TENs in 1995.
Limited to land transport and 
apart from a few named 
corridors provides funds for 
feasibility studies not 
construction.
Public, private 
and joint 
ventures.
ECU 185 m. in 
1993 (likely to 
be ECU 200 m. 
in 1994)
ECU 13.1m.. Euro- PES. Channel Tunnel Rail 
Link route evaluation 
study.
A55 Aber improvement 
road project.
Doncaster Road/Rail 
Interchange study.
Trans Eurooean Networks fiindine 
(TENs)
Supports projects contributing to 
networks in transport, energy and 
telecommunication. Funding 
established in the 1995 EU budget.
All transport modes Certainly public 
bodies. Not yet 
known whether 
private and joint 
ventures will be 
funded.
ECU 280 m. in 
1995.
ECU 2,345 m. 
1995-1999.
None Euro-PES. na
Euronean Investment Bank (EIB) 
Provides medium and long-term 
finance for investments which 
further the balanced development of 
the community.
Medium and long-term loans 
in the infrastructure, energy, 
services and agriculture 
sectors.
Public and 
private
borrowers. But 
all loans must be 
guaranteed either 
by institutions or 
Member State 
governments.
Around ECU 
17 bn in 1992. 
About 30% 
went to the 
Transport 
sector.
Around ECU 
2.5 bn in 1992. 
Copenhagen 
European 
Council also 
agreed on 
landing of ECU 
8 m..
None. Channel Tunnel 
(Eurotunnel pic.).
New passenger terminal 
at Birmingham. 
International Airport 
(Eurohub-Birmingham 
Ltd.)
Second Severn crossing.
Eurooean Investment Fund (EIF) 
Loan guarantees agreed at 
Edinburgh Summit not yet 
operational
Probably similar to EIB but 
there are many legal and 
practical ramifications. Not 
yet clear when fund will be 
operational.
Likely to be 
similar to EIB.
None. None na
Source: Department of Transport (1992), A basic guide to Europes, July
Appendix 6.2
Priority transport projects 
Final list submitted by the Christophersen Group 
to the Essen European Council for approval (December 
1994)
1. Priority projects
Projects started or meant to start by the end of 1996:
- High speed train / combined transport North-South (I, G, D)
Nuremberg - Erfurt - Halle/Leipzig - Berlin - Brenner Verone Axis - Munich
- High speed train (Paris) - Brussels - Cologne - Amsterdam - London (PBKAL)
Belgium: F/B frontier - Brussels - Liege - B/G frontier 
Belgium: Brussels - B/NL frontier 
UK: London - entry of the Channel Tunnel 
Netherlands: B/NL frontier - Rotterdam - Amsterdam 
Germany: (Aix-la-Chapelle) - Cologne - Rhine/Main
- South high speed train (S, F)
Madrid - Barcelona - Perpignan - Montpellier 
Madrid - Vitoria - Dax
- East high speed train (F, G, L)
Paris - Metz - Strasbourg - Appenweier - (Karlsruhe)
including Metz - Saarbriicken - Mannheim and Metz - Luxembourg
- Conventional rail / combined transport “Betuwe line” (NL, G)
Rotterdam - NL/G frontier - (Rhine/Ruhr)
- High speed train / combined transport France - Italy (F, I)
Lyon - Turin - Milan - Venice - Trieste
- Greek motorways (Gr.)
Pathe: Rio Antirio - Patras - Athens - Thessalonik - Prohamon (frontier 
between Greece and Bulgaria)
Via Egnatia: Igoumenitsa - Thessalonik - Alexandroupolis - Ormenio (frontier 
between Greece and Bulgaria) - Kipi (frontier between Greece and Turkey)
- Motorway Lisbon - Valladolid (P, S)
- Conventional rail link UK - Ireland (UK, Irl)
Cork - Dublin - Belfast - Lame - Stranraer
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- Malpensa airport: Milan (I)
- Rail/road link between Denmark and Sweden (Oresund fixed link") (D, Sw)
including road, rail and air access infrastructure
- Nordic Triangle (Fin, N, Sw)
- Ireland - UK- Benelux road link (Irl, UK)
including Holyhead - Felixstowe and Stanraer - Birmingham
- West Coast Main Line (rail) (UK)
2. Other important projects
Projects for which an acceleration is possible so that they are started in about 
two years time:
- Combined transport in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and Spain
- Spata airport (Athens) (Gr)
- Berlin airport (G)
- Maurienne motorway (F)
- Motorway Marateca - Elvas (P)
- High speed train (D)
- Trans-Alps motorway Bologna - Florence (I)
- High speed train / combined transport of the Danube Axis (G, D)
Munich/Nuremberg - Vienna - (Budapest - Bratislava)
- Motorway Nice - Cuneo (F, I)
Projects which would require further investigation:
- Fehmam strait: fixed link between Denmark and Germany (D, G)
- Motorway Bari - Otranto (I)
- Waterway Rhine - Rhone (F)
- Waterway Seine - Escaut fF)
- Waterway Elbe - Oder fG)
- Danube berthing between Straubing and Vilshofen (G)
- High speed train Randstad - Rhine/Ruhr (NL)
Amsterdam - Arnhem - (Cologne)
- Road corridor Valencia - Saragosse - Somport (S)
- High speed train (Brenner! - Milan - Rome - Naples (I)
- Magnetic support train: Transrapid (G)
- High speed train connection Luxembourg - Brussels (B, L)
- Road corridor Naples - Reggio di Calabria (I)
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3. Projects of European dimension
Pilot projects involving setting up new technologies, a better traffic management, and
improving the use of infrastructures for all transport modes (earth, sea, air) in several
Member States:
- System for the management of air traffic
- Services for the management of road traffic
- Services for the management and the information of sea traffic
- System multi-modal positioning using satellites
- Pilot projects of system of rail management
4. Projects for the connection with third countries
Priority projects (started already or meant to start within two years)
- Berlin - Varsovie - Minsk - Moscow (road and rail)
Other important projects
- Dresden - Prague (rail and road)
- Nuremberg - Prague (Road)
- Fixed link crossing the Danube (road and rail) between Bulgaria and Romania
- Helsinki - Saint-Petersburg - Moscow (rail and road)
- Trieste - Ljubljana - Budapest - Lvov Kiev (rail and road)
- Telematic platform in the Baltic
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